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Prior analytical research suggests that independently verified financial reports can 
enhance informational efficiency by serving a confirmatory role, where they discipline 
managers’ unverified, but more timely, voluntary disclosures. I study the confirmatory role of 
financial reports by examining how fair value accounting affects two aspects of informational 
efficiency: the credibility of voluntary disclosures and the timeliness of price discovery. I argue 
that greater measurement uncertainty associated with fair values can make the accounting 
numbers less verifiable and potentially less reliable. This, in turn, can hinder the extent to which 
financial reports can serve a confirmatory role. Thus, I hypothesize that fair value accounting can 
reduce the credibility of voluntary disclosures and the timeliness of price discovery. 
To examine these hypotheses, I exploit SFAS 133 (FASB 1998), which increases fair 
value accounting exposure for derivative users by mandating all derivatives to be reported at fair 
value. I compare the credibility of voluntary disclosures and the timeliness of price discovery of 
derivative users to those of derivative non-users, pre- versus post-SFAS 133, using a difference-
in-differences research design. I identify derivative users using a combination of an engine-based 
keyword search and manual tracing to the 10-k filings on the SEC’s EDGAR database. 
Using management forecasts as a key voluntary disclosure, I find results suggesting that an 
increase in exposure to fair value accounting impairs the credibility of good news management 
forecasts, but not of bad news forecasts. A potential explanation for this asymmetric result is that 
bad news from management is inherently more credible and, thus, less susceptible to credibility 
concerns. In contrast, I find results suggesting that fair value accounting does not impede timely 
price discovery, but rather, can enhance timely price discovery in negative return periods. I also 
identify potential alternative explanations for these results. 
In examining the impact of fair value accounting on the timeliness of price discovery, I 
find that the firm-level intraperiod timeliness metric, used in prior literature, has some 
limitations. Specifically, large return reversals during the period can lead to values that cannot be 
clearly interpreted as the timeliness of price discovery. I create a proxy to capture the extent of 
return reversals and find that the portfolio-level intraperiod timeliness metric mitigates such 
issues through averaging firm-level returns. In particular, using simulation analysis, I explore 
portfolio sizes that will mitigate these issues and use this to inform my analysis. 
These results suggest that fair value accounting can have unintended adverse 
consequences for informational efficiency, by weakening the credibility of managers’ voluntary 
disclosures. My findings are relevant to standard setters and regulators, given a continual 
transition towards greater fair value accounting. This thesis highlights the importance of 
considering the system of public financial reporting and disclosure, where the financial report is 
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“Financial reporting conveys an important economic role by accurately and independently 
counting actual outcomes, and hence confirming prior information about expected outcomes. In 
particular, if managers believe actual outcomes are more likely to be reported accurately and 
independently, they are less likely to disclose misleading information about their expectations.” 






Prior literature (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001; Kothari, Ramanna and Skinner 2010) suggests that 
the objective of a public financial reporting and disclosure system is to facilitate efficient allocation 
of resources in the economy. Challenges arise due to information asymmetry and agency problems, 
which hinder the efficient allocation of resources in capital markets. Accordingly, Healy and 
Palepu (2001, p.407) state, “[d]isclosure and the institutions created to facilitate credible disclosure 
between managers and investors play an important role in mitigating these problems.” These 
arguments envision a clear objective for financial reporting - alleviating information problems to 
facilitate efficient capital allocation in the economy. What is less clear is how financial reporting 
should achieve this objective. Specifically, what primary role should financial reporting serve in 
the system of public financial reporting and disclosures to best achieve this outcome? I emphasize 
the term ‘primary’ as financial reporting serves multiple roles and these roles are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, but the desirability of accounting attributes hinges on our beliefs about which 
of these roles is more important.  
Two principal views on the primary role of financial reports in a public financial reporting 
setting are evident from prior literature. Under one view, the financial reports’ primary role is to 
provide stakeholders with new valuation information. While financial reports can certainly provide 
new information to investors, prior capital market research indicates that the amount of new 
information in periodic financial statements is rather small (see Lev 1989 for a survey of 
returns/earnings studies). Ball and Brown (1968, p.176) suggest that the reason for the lack of new 




as a timely medium.” Accordingly, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and Ball (2013) propose that the 
primary value of these reports is, perhaps, outside of the valuation role. In support of this view, 
Bauer, O’Brien and Saeed (2014) advocate that the primary value of audited financial reports is in 
their ability to confirm and discipline managers’ more timely voluntary disclosures. Lee (2014) 
also supports this view in asserting that the financial reports’ ability to serve as an ex post settling-
up mechanism is critical to the credibility of earnings forecasts.  
This study investigates financial reports’ ability to exert an accountability discipline on 
managers’ voluntary disclosures by examining the effect of fair value accounting on a firm’s 
information environment. The transition towards greater fair value accounting in the last four 
decades fuels an ongoing debate regarding the trade-off between the relevance and reliability or 
verifiability of fair values (see Kothari et al. 2010). At a more conceptual level, I posit that this 
debate reflects differential views on what role accounting should primarily serve. Although 
relevance and reliability are not mutually exclusive, relevance is more desirable when one views 
financial reports as primary sources of information (hereafter, valuation role) and reliability when 
one views audited financial reports as control mechanisms for the integrity of management’s 
unaudited voluntary disclosures (hereafter, confirmatory role). Ball (2001) argues that financial 
reports that reliably report actual outcomes increase informational efficiency by enhancing the 
quality of managers’ voluntary disclosures. Using this confirmatory perspective to formulate a link 
between financial reports and voluntary disclosures, I evaluate the impact of fair value accounting 
on voluntary disclosure credibility and the timeliness of price discovery. In particular, I highlight 
potential unintended consequences of fair value accounting, when considering the system of 





A maintained assumption in the literature on the confirmatory role is that the accounting 
numbers should be verifiable or reliable for financial reports to serve a confirmatory role (Ball 
2001, 2006). Fair value accounting generally involves greater measurement uncertainty than 
historical cost accounting because fair values, unlike historical costs, are not always readily 
observable. Greater measurement uncertainty provides managers with greater discretion to report 
opportunistically. This, in turn, hinders the financial reports’ ability to serve a confirmatory role 
(hereafter, confirmability) by reducing the accuracy with which financial reports can confirm the 
earlier voluntary disclosures. Thus, I predict that greater financial report exposure to fair value 
accounting reduces the credibility of voluntary forward-looking disclosures (H1). 
To examine the impact of exposure to fair value accounting on voluntary disclosure 
credibility, I exploit SFAS 133 (FASB 1998), which increases fair value accounting exposure for 
derivative users by mandating all derivatives to be reported at fair value. I focus on SFAS 133 
because the vast majority of derivative instruments are not traded on an exchange and, thus, their 
fair values often involve measurement uncertainty. Furthermore, the bi-directional nature of 
derivative fair value changes can increase or decrease earnings, providing management greater 
discretion to opportunistically misreport accounting numbers, relative to uni-directional changes 
such as goodwill impairment. I focus on management forecasts and examine the management 
forecast response coefficient (MFRC) as a proxy for the credibility of voluntary disclosures.  
To test my hypothesis, I obtain a sample of annual earnings per share management forecasts 
for non-financial firms for the fiscal years ending June 1998 to May 2000 (pre-period) and June 
2001 to May 2003 (post-period). I exclude financial firms because these firms often hold 
derivatives for trading or speculative purposes, which were already reported at fair value prior to 




manual tracing to the 10-k filings on the SEC’s EDGAR database. I use a matched sample to 
alleviate concerns that potential confounds, related to operational uncertainty or the richness of the 
firm’s information environment, affect the MFRC differentially between derivative users and non-
users. 
Comparing changes in the MFRC of derivative users to that of derivative non-users, around 
SFAS 133, I initially do not find support for my hypothesis that an increase in exposure to fair 
value accounting reduces the credibility of management forecasts. However, I find that a 
substantial portion of my sample changes their decision to use/not use derivatives between the pre- 
and the post-period, leading to non-constant control and treatment groups that can confound results. 
Once I restrict the sample to treatment (control) firms that continue to use (not use) derivatives 
throughout the sample period (hereafter, constant derivative sample), I find some evidence 
supporting H1. Specifically, derivative users exhibit a more negative change in MFRC from the 
pre- to the post-SFAS 133 period than derivative non-users, suggesting that an increase in exposure 
to fair value accounting decreases management forecast credibility, when the forecast conveys 
good news. However, I find null results for bad news management forecasts. A potential 
explanation for the asymmetric result is that bad news from management is inherently more 
credible and, thus, less susceptible to credibility concerns as documented in prior literature (e.g., 
Jennings 1987; Skinner 1994; Williams 1996). However, these results may not generalize to firms 
that opt out of or into using derivatives in the post-period. 
These findings are robust to including firm fixed effects, using an alternative matched sample, 
and using alternative specifications of the regression model. They are also robust to using three-
day cumulative abnormal returns instead of two-day cumulative abnormal returns. I find stronger 




concurrently with earnings announcements. However, I find weaker evidence in support of H1 
using the earliest management forecast for each firm-year, relative to using the latest forecast. 
Finally, I find that the findings are sensitive to whether or not I control for loss forecasts, as these 
observations are highly influential. When I do not control for these influential loss forecasts, I find 
null results for good news forecasts. However, if I include an indicator for loss forecasts or exclude 
loss forecasts, which comprise less than 2% of the constant derivative sample, results are similar 
to or stronger than the primary findings. Overall, these results suggest that fair value accounting 
can inadvertently impair the integrity of managers’ voluntary disclosures, when the forecasts 
convey good news, but these results may not generalize to loss forecasts. 
In my second hypothesis, I consider the impact of fair value accounting on the timeliness of 
price discovery. The prior literature (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005; Ng, Tuna and Verdi 2013) 
finds that investors discount their reaction to news that they perceive to be less credible. Further, 
Lennox and Park (2006) find that managers are less likely to issue management forecasts when 
the expected reaction to each unit of news in the forecast is lower. Collectively, these studies 
suggest that less credible voluntary disclosures reduce the timeliness of price discovery because 
investors will discount their reactions to these disclosures, which, in turn, lowers managers’ 
propensity to issue voluntary disclosures. Hence, building on my prior argument that fair value 
accounting dampens the financial reports’ confirmability, and, thereby, reduces voluntary 
disclosure credibility, I hypothesize that greater exposure to fair value accounting reduces the 
timeliness of price discovery. 
Similar to H1, I use SFAS 133 as a shock to the exposure to fair value accounting for 
derivative users and compare the timeliness of price discovery between derivative users and non-




metric, IPT, that captures the speed with which information is reflected in prices. I test the 
difference-in-differences in IPT (DiD_IPT) using a permutation test, where I compare the observed 
DiD_IPT to a null distribution of DiD_IPT, created under the assumption that the order of the 
monthly returns does not matter. 
The intraperiod timeliness (IPT) metric, which has been used both at the portfolio level and 
at the firm level in prior literature has some limitations.1 IPT is a function of both the timing of 
news arrival and the speed with which this news is communicated and incorporated into stock 
prices. Thus, to interpret IPT as the timeliness of price discovery, it is necessary to average away 
the idiosyncratic timing of firm-level news arrival. If not, this can lead to large return reversals in 
the IPT curves, which can produce IPT values that cannot be clearly interpreted as timeliness of 
price discovery. Unfortunately, prior literature does not discuss such problems in great detail. Thus, 
to ensure that the IPT metric, used in this thesis, is appropriate for making inferences, I examine 
the impact of such return reversals on both firm-level and portfolio-level IPT, in appendix B. I 
create a proxy to capture the extent of return reversals and find that the firm-level IPT, within my 
setting, is particularly prone to such reversals. However, I find that the portfolio-level metric 
substantially reduces the impact of return reversals through averaging. In particular, using 
simulation analysis, I explore portfolio sizes that will mitigate these issues and use this to inform 
my analysis. 
Unlike H1, I am not restricted to management-forecast-issuing firms; hence, the H2 sample 
differs from and is larger than the H1 sample. I use a coarsened exact matched sample of derivative 
users and non-users to control for operational uncertainty, the richness of the information 
 





environment and the sign of the 12-month buy-and-hold return. Given that the impact of the 
confirmatory role of financial reports on IPT may be more important for management-issued good 
news than bad news, the impact of fair value accounting exposure on IPT may be asymmetric for 
positive and negative intraperiod return observations. 
Using a portfolio analysis, I find null results in the positive intraperiod return subsample 
and results in the opposite direction from that predicted in the negative intraperiod return 
subsample. These findings, which persist in the constant derivative sample, suggest that fair value 
accounting does not impede timely price discovery, but rather, can enhance timely price discovery 
in negative return periods. However, it is also possible that these results are driven by enhanced 
transparency of derivative use after SFAS 133, which can enhance, rather than deteriorate, the 
confirmability of financial reports. Alternatively, results may be confounded by Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg FD). As I discuss, in section 3.2, while I have no reason, ex ante, to suspect any 
differential impact of Reg FD on derivative users and non-users, I cannot completely dispel its 
effects. If Reg FD increases the frequency and/or timeliness of voluntary disclosures more for 
derivative users than for non-users, this would counteract any effects of SFAS 133 on derivative 
users. Finally, the null results in the positive return subsample may be due to an insufficient sample 
size for adequately averaging away firm-level returns. 
This thesis comprises five chapters, organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
confirmatory role of accounting, reviews related literature, and develops the hypotheses. Chapter 
3 presents the research design and the sample selection. Chapter 4 provides the results of 





Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses relevant literature and develops my hypotheses. The first part of Section 
2.2 introduces the confirmatory role of financial reporting and provides the basis for the thesis’s 
theoretical cause and effect. The latter part of section 2.2 discusses relevant literature. Section 2.3 
discusses the literature examining fair values. Finally, section 2.4 develops the hypotheses.  
2.2 The Confirmatory Role of Financial Reporting 
2.2.1 The Confirmatory Role of Financial Reporting - Theory 
As I discuss in greater detail in section 2.2.2, prior literature (Gigler and Hemmer 1998; Stocken 
2000; Ball 2001; Lundholm 2003) illustrates that, under the confirmatory role of financial 
reporting, the primary role of financial reports is to provide stakeholders with an ex-post 
mechanism for validating the accuracy or truthfulness of managers’ non-verified, but timely, 
voluntary disclosures. Importantly, the audit of financial reports adds credence to the financial 
statement numbers, enabling them to serve a confirmatory role. The expectation of this ex post 
check motivates managers to truthfully report voluntary forward-looking information. Thus, it 
promotes an environment where managers can credibly communicate private information that is 
not ex ante verified.  
An implicit assumption underlying the confirmatory role of financial reporting is that a 
moral hazard problem exists between managers and stakeholders due to information asymmetry. 




confirmatory role, financial reports alleviate such information problems between managers and 
stakeholders by motivating and enabling managers to credibly communicate relevant information 
in the non-directly verified voluntary disclosures. This contrasts with the view that the primary 
role of mandatory audited financial reports is to provide stakeholders with new valuation 
information. Under the confirmatory role, financial reports themselves need not communicate new 
information. Rather, they enable other information channels to credibly communicate relevant 
information on a timely basis by serving as a source of reliability for financial information in 
capital markets. 
To clarify, the term ‘confirmatory role’ in this literature should not be linked to 
‘confirmatory value’ in SFAC No. 8, QC7, 9 (FASB 2010). While, in theory, their definitions are 
similar, conceptualizing ‘confirmatory role’ as a characteristic of relevance, as in SFAC No.8, may 
be misleading for purposes of this paper. In particular, I posit that although ‘confirmatory value’ 
may be a characteristic of relevance, it critically depends on reliability since unreliable numbers 
cannot confirm prior information. See Bauer et al. (2014) for a discussion of how “reliability makes 
accounting relevant.” This link to reliability is not conceptualized in SFAC No.8 and, therefore, 
the framework’s reference to ‘confirmatory value’ is not necessarily consistent with the use of 
‘confirmatory role’ in literature. For example, the change in the fair value of derivatives in the 
current year has ‘confirmatory value’ for prior predictions of the fair value change, in the FASB 
sense. However, the change in the fair value of derivatives may not serve a strong ‘confirmatory 
role’ as discussed in the confirmatory literature if the fair value measurement is not based on 
observable market prices. 




The confirmatory role of financial reporting is initially examined in analytical studies such as 
Sansing (1992), Gigler and Hemmer (1998), Stocken (2000), Lundholm (2003), and Şabac and 
Tian (2015). In these studies, a key assumption is that verifiable information in financial reports 
can, to some extent, confirm the truthfulness of unverified information (i.e., voluntary disclosures). 
Gigler and Hemmer (1998) examine the association between the frequency of mandatory financial 
disclosures and managers’ incentives to issue voluntary disclosures within the context of the 
confirmatory role of financial reports. They illustrate that increasing the frequency of mandated 
financial reports promotes the view that financial reports are a primary source of information, to 
the detriment of the confirmatory role of financial reports. Hence, frequent reporting can 
negatively affect investors by crowding out more timely and potentially more informative 
voluntary disclosures. They state (p.118), “…evidence that most of the “news” in earnings has 
been preempted may actually be evidence of a well-functioning disclosure regime rather than 
evidence that the regime needs fixing.” Under this view, smaller news content in earnings 
announcements can be a positive outcome. This is in stark contrast to the view that mandatory 
financial reports serve as a primary source of new information, where larger, not, smaller news in 
earnings is perceived as a desired outcome. 
Sansing (1992), Stocken (2000) and Lundholm (2003) examine the disciplining role of 
financial reports on managers’ voluntary disclosures. Specifically, Sansing (1992) states that the 
accounting system constrains management from misrepresenting information in management 
forecasts by serving as a verification mechanism for the truthfulness of the management forecasts. 
He qualifies that the extent to which the accounting system constrains management forecasts 
depends on the degree to which the accounting system reflects the private information considered 




private information if, among other conditions, the financial report can sufficiently verify the 
truthfulness of the voluntary disclosure. Financial reports must be able to confirm the earlier 
voluntary disclosures in order to enable investors to detect and punish dishonest reporting ex post. 
If investors cannot detect dishonest reporting, the rational, but unethical, manager has no incentive 
to report relevant forward-looking information truthfully. These models emphasize the critical role 
that accounting serves in establishing credible communication of private information through 
voluntary disclosures.  
An important aspect of the information environment embedded within the confirmatory 
theory is the interaction between mandatory financial reports and voluntary disclosures. In the 
analytical studies discussed above, financial reports serve a critical disciplining role on managers’ 
voluntary disclosures, which, in turn, facilitate the timely communication of relevant information. 
Accordingly, Ball (2001) argues that an economically efficient financial reporting and disclosure 
system is one where timely disclosures facilitate informational efficiency and financial reports 
facilitate contracting efficiency. That is, the communication of relevant new information primarily 
rests with voluntary disclosures. The role of financial reports, then, is to provide verifiable 
information that establishes the credibility of voluntary disclosures. Hence, under this view, the 
financial reports, themselves, cannot effectively satisfy both the relevance and reliability criteria. 
However, by focusing on reliability, financial reports can promote timely relevant and reliable 
information in capital markets, when other information channels are considered. Highlighting this 
interaction, Ball (2001) urges that the impact of accounting be examined in light of other sources 
of information, rather than in isolation. 
In addition to the analytical studies discussed above, archival studies test the confirmatory 




specifically discuss Beniluz (2005), Ball, Jayaraman and Shivakumar (2012a), Ball, Jayaraman 
and Shivakumar (2012b) and Frankel, Kalay, Sadka and Zou (2017) and explain how my work 
contributes to this literature.  
My thesis closely relates to Beniluz (2005), which explores the relation between accounting 
quality and management and analyst forecast characteristics. Consistent with the confirmatory 
theory, he argues that high quality accounting information - defined as verifiable and auditable 
information - enables investors to detect bias in management and analyst forecasts. In turn, this 
increases managers’ and analysts’ costs of misreporting information and biasing the forecasts. 
Using five-year absolute discretionary accruals and restatements as inverse proxies for accounting 
quality, he finds that firms with poorer accounting quality have more optimistic forecasts. In 
addition, he finds that investors discount their reaction to forecasts of poorer accounting quality 
firms.  
Although the first part of my thesis that examines the impact of accounting on the 
credibility of voluntary disclosures is similar to Beniluz (2005), it differs in the following way. 
Beniluz (2005) captures the firm’s choice of accounting quality, within a (presumed) static regime 
of accounting standards. As discussed in Beniluz (2005), poor accounting quality reduces 
managers’ costs of misreporting in their voluntary disclosures because such misrepresentations are 
harder to detect when accounting quality is low. In other words, poor accounting quality dampens 
the confirmability of the financial reports. However, poor accounting quality is not costless. 
Specifically, the firm’s choice of low accounting quality, measured as either the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals or restatements, increases litigation costs associated with misreporting 
mandatory financial reports. So, when firms reduce their accounting quality, they reduce the costs 




financial reports. In contrast, I am interested in capturing the impact of a change in accounting – 
namely, fair value accounting. The importance of this difference is that fair value accounting alters 
the managers’ GAAP-permitted discretion over the accounting numbers. As I discuss in section 
2.4.1, such discretion associated with fair values reduces the confirmability of financial reports 
without necessarily imposing greater litigation costs to using managerial discretion on the reports.   
Ball et al. (2012a) examine the confirmatory role of accounting by investigating how a 
stronger commitment to independent verification enhances disclosure credibility. They use 
abnormal audit fees based on an audit fee model to proxy for the level of commitment to 
independent verification, arguing that greater abnormal audit fees reflect a greater resource 
allocation to financial statement verification. They find that higher audit fees are associated with 
higher quality (i.e., more frequent, specific, timely and accurate) management forecasts. They also 
find that firms with higher abnormal audit fees have stronger investor reactions to management 
forecasts, in the form of higher abnormal returns and abnormal volume, than those with lower 
abnormal audit fees. They interpret this evidence as documenting a complementary relation 
between audited financial reports and voluntary disclosures and warn against drawing inferences 
exclusively from earnings announcement returns. 
Frankel et al. (2017) employ an exogenous shock to mandatory reporting quality to study 
the complementary relation between voluntary disclosures and mandatory reporting quality 
suggested by the confirmatory role of accounting. Specifically, they use the demise of Arthur 
Anderson (AA) in 2002 to examine the non-voluntary auditor switch for former AA clients.  They 
find that these firms have lower abnormal accruals post-switch, which they interpret as increased 
financial reporting quality. Consistent with the confirmatory theory, they find that the voluntary 




improved more than that of non-AA firms in the same period. Further, they find that the magnitude 
of the investor reaction to management forecasts, controlling for the management forecast surprise, 
is greater for former AA clients after the auditor switch, indicating an incremental improvement 
in the credibility of management forecasts for AA client firms relative to other firms. 
My thesis differs from Ball et al. (2012a) and Frankel et al. (2017) in that it examines the 
impact of accounting rather than audit quality. In particular, while greater audit quality can 
significantly enhance the financial reports’ ability to serve a confirmatory role by increasing the 
accuracy of the reported numbers, the extent of this impact may be limited by the amount of 
measurement error permitted by the accounting standards. As I discuss in section 2.4.1, fair value 
accounting is inevitably associated with greater measurement uncertainty, which cannot always be 
alleviated by an audit, given the nature of fair values.  
Also, an incremental contribution of my thesis relative to Beniluz (2005), Ball et al. (2012a) 
and Frankel et al. (2017) is that my thesis examines the impact of accounting on the timeliness of 
information within a given period, a construct that encompasses all information sources within that 
period. The timeliness construct allows one to assess how accounting may affect the speed with 
which information is incorporated into prices within a given period. The ‘speed’ provides insight 
into how well a firm is able to credibly communicate private information on a timely basis. This 
analysis examines the assertion by Gigler and Hemmer (1998) that a well-functioning system is 
one where little news remains to be conveyed by the annual earnings announcement as most of the 
news has been pre-empted via voluntary disclosures. 
Finally, Ball et al. (2012b) examine the association between mark-to-market (MTM) 
accounting for trading securities and information asymmetry in banks. While the primary focus of 




of their arguments for why MTM accounting may reduce information asymmetry. Specifically, 
they argue that MTM accounting reduces investors’ ability to verify the truthfulness of mangers’ 
earnings forecasts and, thus, makes it more costly for managers credibly communicate private 
information. They argue that this, in turn, can reduce the likelihood of management forecasts and, 
thus, exacerbate information asymmetry. They predict and find that banks with trading securities 
have lower bid-ask-spread, analyst following and IPT and are less likely to issue management 
forecasts than those without trading securities. Furthermore, using a difference-in-differences 
research design around SFAS 115 and SFAS 159, they find evidence suggesting that MTM 
accounting increases bid-ask spreads in banks, relative to historical cost accounting. 
While Ball et al. (2012b) examine the impact of accounting on IPT, similar to my thesis, a 
few differences remain. First, their analysis using IPT is restricted to a cross-sectional test where 
they compare banks with and without trading securities in the post-SFAS 115 period only. In 
contrast, I use a difference-in-differences research design, which allows me to draw causal 
inferences. While they use a difference-in-differences research design around SFAS 115 and SFAS 
159, as discussed above, they only examine the bid-ask spread under this analysis and not IPT. 
Second, their tests use a firm-level IPT metric, which can be potentially problematic for 
interpreting the timeliness of price discovery, as I discuss in section 3.2.3.1 and appendix B. In 
this thesis, I use a portfolio-level IPT metric, which alleviates such concerns. Third, they focus on 
the effects of SFAS 115 in banks, while I examine the impact of a different fair value accounting 
standard, SFAS 133, in non-financial industries. It is not obvious, ex ante, whether their findings 
will generalize to SFAS 133 and non-financial industries. 




Accounting standards have transitioned towards greater fair value accounting in the last four 
decades, despite on-going controversy about the trade-off between relevance and reliability.2 
Proponents of fair value accounting argue that fair values provide incremental relevant information 
for the users of financial reports. For instance, Barth (2006, pp.283-284) argues that incorporating 
more estimates of the future in the financial reports can improve the information available to the 
users of the financial reports. On the other hand, opponents of fair value accounting raise concerns 
over fair values’ reliability. Ball (2006, p.13) argues that, when fair values are not publicly 
observable, fair value accounting provides greater opportunity for managers to strategically 
manipulate their earnings. 
Mirroring the fair value debate, the fair value literature can be categorized into two broad 
streams. The first stream of literature focuses on the gain in relevance associated with fair values. 
A large portion of this literature (e.g., Barth 1994; Eccher, Ramesh and Thiagarajan 1996; Song, 
Thomas and Yi 2010) comprises value relevance studies. These studies generally conclude that 
fair values provide more value-relevant information to investors than historical values, but that 
measurement uncertainty affects the extent of this informativeness (see Landsman 2007 for a 
summary). It is worthwhile to note that value relevance studies do not, nor are they intended to, 
consider the potential interaction between financial reports and voluntary disclosures.  
A second stream of fair value literature focuses on the loss in reliability of fair values. This 
literature argues that greater measurement uncertainty associated with fair values can increase 
managers’ opportunity to bias the reported numbers, adversely affecting their reliability. For 
 
2  In SFAC No.8, QC6, the FASB defines financial information to be relevant if “it has predictive value, 
confirmatory value, or both.” To be clear, for purposes of this thesis, my use of the term ‘relevance’ incorporates the 





example, Nissim (2003) documents that banks’ overstatement of loan fair values is associated with 
incentives to favorably influence market perceptions of firm risk and performance (e.g., regulatory 
capital, asset growth, loan portfolio credit quality). Also, using a sample of firms whose book-to-
market ratios are likely indicative of goodwill impairment, Ramanna and Watts (2012) find that 
the decision not to recognize the impairment is associated with managers’ contracting and 
reputational concerns, consistent with opportunism.  
As evident in the two streams of literature, I posit that the fair value debate reveals differing 
opinions on the primary role of financial reports. Proponents of fair value accounting generally 
interpret as a positive outcome that fair values provide incremental information in the financial 
statements. These interpretations are predicated on the assumption that the primary role of 
financial reports is to provide new information. In contrast, opponents of fair value accounting, in 
raising concerns over the reliability of fair values, reveal that they believe that the primary role of 
financial reports is not necessarily the provision of new information, but rather, the provision of 
reliable information.  
In summary, the fair value literature indicates that fair values can provide more relevant 
information to the users of financial reports, but also that they suffer reliability issues, validating 
the assertions of both proponents and opponents of fair value accounting. However, much of this 
fair value literature fails to consider the interaction between financial reports and voluntary 
disclosures and, thus, the impact of fair value accounting on management disclosures outside the 
financial reports. This thesis specifically considers this interaction by studying the impact of fair 
value accounting on the credibility of voluntary disclosures and the timeliness of price discovery,  




2.4 Hypotheses Development 
2.4.1. Fair Value Accounting and the Confirmatory Role of Financial Reporting 
I argue that the transition towards greater fair value accounting changes the nature of the 
accounting signal in a way that limits its ability to serve a confirmatory role. Lundholm (2003) 
discusses that the backward-looking nature of financial reports allows these reports to lend 
credibility to more timely, yet unverified, voluntary disclosures. Accordingly, the ability of 
accounting numbers to assess the past is essential to the confirmatory role of financial reporting; 
this is in stark contrast with fair value accounting’s mandate to predict the future. Thus, 
replacement of historical cost accounting with fair value accounting may have altered the extent 
to which the financial reports serve a confirmatory role. Specifically, I posit that fair value 
accounting dampens the financial reports’ confirmability because it generally permits greater 
measurement uncertainty, relative to historical cost accounting.  
When market prices are not readily observable, fair value measurement involves estimates 
that depend, to varying extents, on management’s choice of models and parameters. 3 In turn, 
uncertainty about these choices may reduce the accuracy with which financial reports can confirm 
the earlier voluntary disclosures. The magnitude of such uncertainty can be substantial. For 
example, based on interviews with 96 high-level audit engagement team members, Cannon and 
Bedard (2017) report that uncertainty associated with fair values exceeds materiality (five times 
materiality) in 72 (21) percent of challenging fair value audits. To make matters worse, an audit 
cannot alleviate such measurement uncertainty issues when fair values are not readily verifiable. 
 
3  Measurement uncertainty is not unique to fair values. For example, under historical cost-based accounting, 
expenses such as warranty and bad debt expense involve uncertainty. However, as Lee (2014) asserts, the level of 




An example auditor statement from Cannon and Bedard (2017) illustrates this point well: “No 
audit adjustment was proposed and no impairment was recorded, but it could have very easily 
resulted in an impairment by adjusting the assumptions slightly. The main reason the adjustment 
was not recorded was the level of uncertainty of management’s assumptions (i.e., inputs into the 
model). Neither the audit firm nor management had firm evidence that could support one 
assumption was better than another” (p. 98-99). Such estimation uncertainty associated with fair 
values can reduce the financial reports’ ability to accurately reveal misrepresentations in voluntary 
disclosures, even in the absence of management bias. 
Furthermore, greater within-GAAP measurement uncertainty associated with fair values 
provides managers greater discretion to report opportunistically. This, in turn, can render the fair 
values less reliable than historical values. As discussed in section 2.3, Ramanna and Watts (2012) 
and Nissim (2003) provide support that less verifiable fair values are prone to management 
manipulation. Having said this, I note that managers need not act opportunistically in any given 
period for fair values to impair confirmation. Rather, the potential for managers to act 
opportunistically, combined with uncertainty about actual actions are sufficient to create 
credibility concerns about voluntary disclosures.4 Fair values increase this potential by making it 
more difficult for investors to assess the truthfulness of managers’ earlier voluntary disclosures 
using the accounting numbers on the financial reports. This, in turn, reduces the costs to managers 
of including misleading information in their voluntary disclosures. Hence, fair value measurement 
uncertainty reduces the usefulness of financial reports for evaluating the truthfulness or accuracy 
 
4 Ball (2001, p.174) argues that “earnings management is a problem precisely when it is not clear whether managers 
are likely to overstate or understate earnings.” He states that if the bias is obvious to investors, they would simply 




of the prior voluntary disclosures by providing managers with greater discretion over reported 
amounts. 
Greater discretion can affect the extent to which financial reports can serve a confirmatory 
role by allowing greater opportunism. Prior literature suggests that firms opportunistically report 
their earnings to “meet” the earlier forecasts. For instance, Kasznik (1999) finds that when the 
firm’s reported earnings fall below the forecasted earnings, managers use positive discretionary 
accruals to improve the perceived forecast accuracy. However, he does not find symmetric 
evidence when the reported earnings are above the forecasted earnings, suggesting that managers 
use discretionary accruals opportunistically to meet earnings targets when the actual earnings falls 
short. Also, comparing fraud-period reported earnings to actual restated earnings, Baginski, 
McGuire, Sharp and Twedt (2015) find that firms manage their reported earnings to reduce the 
perceived management forecast bias. Together, prior findings of opportunistic fair value reporting 
and earnings management to “meet” forecasted earnings suggest that managers can use the 
measurement uncertainty associated with fair values to bias the financial reports, reducing the 
financial reports’ confirmability. Overall, fair value accounting makes it more difficult for 
investors to assess the truthfulness of managers’ voluntary forward-looking disclosures, relative 
to historical cost accounting. 
2.4.2 Fair Value Accounting and Credibility of Voluntary Disclosures (H1) 
Beniluz (2005) states that the credibility of voluntary disclosures rests heavily on the extent to 
which the accounting signal provides an effective ex post settling-up mechanism and, thereby, is 
able to serve a confirmatory role. Section 2.4.1 argues that, relative to historical values, fair values 




measurement uncertainty. Building on this argument, I posit that fair value accounting adversely 
affects voluntary disclosure credibility. Hence, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). All else equal, greater exposure to fair value accounting reduces the 
credibility of voluntary forward-looking disclosures.  
 
H1 is not without tension. As discussed in section 2.4.1, managers may use accounting 
discretion to “meet” expectations communicated in prior voluntary disclosures (Kasznik 1999; 
Baginski et al. 2015). If investors fail to identify such behavior, they may perceive these 
disclosures as more credible, not less. Baginski et al. (2015) find some support for such behavior 
examining fraud periods where earnings were managed to produce an appearance that the earlier 
forecasts were less optimistic and more accurate than they actually are. Specifically, their results 
suggest that, relative to the pre-fraud period, investors perceive fraud period bad news forecasts as 
more, not less, credible.  
In addition, to the extent that fair values on the financial reports are reliable and accurate, fair 
value accounting can potentially allow investors to confirm voluntary forward-looking disclosures 
earlier than under historical cost accounting. Note that under historical cost accounting, investors 
have to wait until the outcome is realized (e.g., sale of asset), whereas fair value accounting 
provides interim values of assets and liabilities. Fair value’s ability to confirm forward-looking 
disclosures earlier than historical cost accounting may strengthen the market reaction to voluntary 
disclosures. 
2.4.3 Fair Value Accounting and Timeliness of Price Discovery (H2) 
If we consider that all information will eventually be released to the market, it is timeliness that 




disclosure is to mitigate the “information and incentive problems [that] impede the efficient 
allocation of resources in a capital market economy.” More timely information equips investors 
with a more comprehensive information set at any given point in time and, therefore, should lead 
to a more efficient allocation of capital and a more accurate valuation of equity. Hence, timeliness 
is an important aspect of informational efficiency. By examining an information timeliness 
construct that encompasses the consideration of information both within and outside of financial 
reports, this thesis provides insight into how fair value accounting affects investors via the 
interaction between financial reports and voluntary disclosures.  
Fair value accounting may affect the timeliness of price discovery via its impact on the 
confirmability of financial reports and, thus, on the credibility of voluntary disclosures. Pownall 
and Waymire (1989) argue that investors will discount news that they perceive to be less than fully 
credible and that the extent of the discount will be decreasing in the perceived credibility. Indeed, 
Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that investors discount their reaction to management forecasts in 
accordance with the predictable bias in the forecast, which is a function management’s incentives 
to misreport and the market’s ability to detect misrepresentation - both determinants of credibility. 
Further, Ng et al. (2013) find that less credible management forecasts have smaller market 
reactions around their issuance and a larger post-issuance drift. Hence, less credible voluntary 
disclosures will likely suffer dampened market reactions. 
In addition, given disclosure costs, managers may be less likely to issue voluntary 
disclosures when they perceive that investors will discount these disclosures. In support of this 
conjecture, Lennox and Park (2006) find that managers are less likely to issue management 
forecasts when the expected reaction to each unit of news in the forecast is lower. Lennox and Park 




earnings response coefficient. Thus, this conclusion is premised on the assumption that the 
earnings response coefficient is an appropriate proxy for the expected management forecast 
response coefficient. 
Collectively, these studies suggest that less credible voluntary disclosures reduce the 
timeliness of price discovery because investors will reduce the magnitude of their reactions to less 
credible disclosures and, this, in turn, makes managers less inclined to issue voluntary disclosures.5 
Therefore, building on the discussion in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 that fair value accounting will 
dampen the financial reports’ confirmability and, thereby, reduce voluntary disclosure credibility, 
I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). All else equal, greater exposure to fair value accounting reduces the timeliness 
of price discovery. 
 
While the confirmatory theory predicts H2, the tension in this hypothesis derives from the 
fact that fair values generally include more current information than historical cost. Therefore, to 
the extent that they are credible, fair values in interim financial reports may increase the timeliness 
of price discovery. This biases against finding results supporting H2. 
In both hypotheses, I examine the effects of greater exposure to fair value accounting on 
constructs that involve investor pricing (i.e., credibility of voluntary disclosures, timeliness of 
price discovery). While different systems of accounting (e.g., historical cost and fair value) provide 
different types of information on financial reports, stock prices ultimately reflect investors’ 
aggregate beliefs about the expected future payoffs to shareholders. So, under either accounting 
 
5 I examine the impact of an increase in exposure to fair value accounting on the frequency of management 




system, what is ‘priced’ by investors is information about expected future economic profits, 






Research Design and Sample 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design for each of my hypotheses, with its associated sample 
design. Section 3.2 presents the research design, beginning with an overview of the difference-
in-differences research design. I then describe the detailed research design for each hypothesis 
separately. Section 3.2.1 discusses the identification of derivative users and non-users. Section 
3.2.2 presents the research design to test the impact of exposure to fair value accounting on the 
credibility of voluntary disclosures (H1), while section 3.2.3  presents the design for the impact 
on the timeliness of price discovery (H2). Section 3.3 presents the sample selection process for 
H1 and H2, in subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, respectively. 
3.2 Difference-in-Differences Research Design 
To examine the impact of exposure to fair value accounting, I exploit SFAS 133 - Accounting for 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (FASB 1998) (currently ASC 815), which increases 
fair value accounting exposure for derivative users by mandating all derivatives to be reported at 
fair value. In tests of both H1 and H2, I use a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design, 
comparing derivative users to derivative non-users, pre- versus post-mandatory adoption of SFAS 
133.  
SFAS 133 has two advantages for capturing the impact of an increase in exposure to fair 
value accounting. First, it mandates fair values that often include some degree of measurement 
uncertainty, which I hypothesize can dampen the confirmability of financial reports. For selected 




Settlements (BIS) (2000) reported total notional amounts for over-the-counter (OTC) derivative 
instruments and exchange traded instruments of $88.2 trillion and $13.5 trillion, respectively.6 
Hence, the vast majority of derivative instruments are not traded on an exchange and their fair 
values therefore involve some level of measurement uncertainty.  
Second, SFAS 133 results in frequent bi-directional fair value changes. Relative to uni-
directional fair value changes, which only affect accounting numbers in one direction, bi-
directional changes provide greater opportunity for managers to manage accounting numbers on 
the financial report. For example, goodwill impairment is a uni-directional fair value change that 
can decrease, but not increase earnings. While management has some discretion over the timing 
and/or the amount of the impairment, this fair value adjustment cannot be used to increase earnings. 
In contrast, bi-directional fair value changes, such as fair value gains/losses on derivative 
instruments, can both decrease or increase earnings. Thus, I argue that both measurement 
uncertainty and frequent bi-directional fair value changes can provide management with greater 
discretion to opportunistically bias financial reports, weakening the reports’ confirmability. 
Prior to SFAS 133, the accounting for derivative financial instruments was primarily 
governed under SFAS 52– Foreign Currency Translation (FASB 1981), SFAS 80– Accounting 
for Futures Contracts (FASB 1984a) and the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issue No. 84-36 
– Interest Rate Swap Transactions (FASB 1984b). However, the accounting guidance for 
derivative financial instruments was incomplete as these standards only address a few instruments 
– namely exchange-traded futures contracts, foreign currency forward contracts, and interest rate 
 
6 Selected exchange-traded instruments include interest rate futures, interest rate options, currency futures, 
currency options, stock market index future and stock market index options. Selected OTC instruments include 
interest rate swaps, interest rate options, currency swaps, currency options, foreign exchange forwards and swaps 




swaps. For derivative instruments covered in these pronouncements, those used for speculative 
purposes were required to be reported at fair value, while those used for hedging purposes were 
required to be reported in the same manner as the hedged asset or liability. For example, derivative 
instruments used to hedge fair-valued assets or liabilities, such as foreign currency available-for-
sale securities, were required to be reported at fair value. In contrast, those used to hedge assets or 
liabilities at historical or amortized costs (hereafter, historical cost), such as held-to-maturity debt, 
were reported at historical cost, which was often negligible or zero.7 SFAS 133 (FASB 1998, par. 
235) states that “The EITF addressed the accounting for some derivatives and for some hedging 
activities not covered in either Statement 52 or Statement 80. However, that effort was on an ad 
hoc basis and gaps remained in the authoritative literature.” It goes on to explain that “[t]he result 
was that (a) many derivative instruments were carried "off-balance-sheet" regardless of whether 
they were formally part of a hedging strategy, (b) practices were inconsistent among entities, and 
(c) users of financial reports had inadequate information.” Thus, reporting of derivatives at fair 
value was limited in the pre-SFAS 133 period.  
SFAS 133 was issued to provide more complete and uniform accounting guidance for 
derivative instruments. It mandates recognition of all derivatives at fair value and standardizes the 
hedge accounting criteria. The accounting treatment for a derivative depends on its intended use. 
If a derivative is designated as a hedge of exposure to changes in fair value (i.e., fair value hedge), 
the unrealized fair value gain or loss is recorded in net income. If a derivative meets necessary 
conditions and is designated as a hedge of exposure to variable cash flows (i.e., cash flow hedges) 
or of foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation, the unrealized fair value 
 





gain or loss is recorded in other comprehensive income (OCI). Any ineffective portion of the gain 
or loss on a derivative designated as a hedging instrument is included in net income. Finally, if a 
derivative is not designated as a hedging instrument, the unrealized fair value gain or loss is 
recognized in net income. By mandating fair value reporting for all derivatives, SFAS 133 
increased the exposure to fair value accounting for derivative users.  
For H2, the pre-period is the fiscal year two years prior to the first fiscal year for which 
SFAS 133 is mandatorily effective (hereafter, mandatory fiscal year), and the post-period is the 
mandatory fiscal year. I exclude the one year prior to the mandatory fiscal year, to reduce the 
likelihood of capturing potential anticipatory effects or early adopters. Since SFAS 133 is 
mandatorily effective for fiscal periods beginning after June 15, 2000, fiscal years ending June 
2001 to May 2002 (fiscal 2001) comprise the first mandatory fiscal year.8 Accordingly, for H2, 
the pre-period includes fiscal 1999 and the post-period includes fiscal 2001. 
For H1, which suffers greater data limitations as discussed below, I use two years for each 
of the pre- and post-periods to maximize the sample size. In addition, using more than one 
observation for a given firm in each of the pre- and post-periods guards against firm-level 
idiosyncratic effects related to the management forecast announcement returns. However, errors 
may be correlated between observations for a given firm, which can lead to unreliable regression 
results. I address such concerns by clustering the standard errors at the firm level, as I discuss in 
section 3.2.2, and using firm fixed effects in the additional analyses, reported in section 4.2.3.1. 
 
8 This standard was originally effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 1999. The date was later 




For H1, the pre-period includes fiscal 1998 and 1999 and the post-period includes fiscal 2001 and 
2002. 
I identify a firm as a derivative user if it holds any derivatives in the latest pre-period year, 
fiscal 1998 or 1999 for H1 and fiscal 1999 for H2. Because firms that do not use derivatives are 
not affected by SFAS 133, I use them as a control group. I discuss the identification of derivative 
users and non-users in section 3.2.1. By comparing differences in the credibility of voluntary 
disclosure or the timeliness of price discovery between derivative users (treatment) and non-users 
(control), pre- and post- adoption of SFAS 133, I control for time-invariant firm characteristics. 
The DiD research design also controls for confounding concurrent market-wide factors, which can 
influence market reaction to disclosures or the timeliness of price discovery, providing a strong 
test of causal effects. For instance, changes in technology (e.g., easier access to internet) can 
significantly alter the transmission of information, which, in turn, affects the timeliness of price 
discovery for all firms.  Comparison of treatment to control firms measured over the same time 
period should mitigate the effects of market-wide factors.  In sum, a DiD research design provides 
a strong test of causal effects. However, several key identifying assumptions are required to draw 
causal inferences from a DiD analysis. I discuss these below. 
First, treatment and control firms should not differ fundamentally. Ideally, I would like to 
randomly assign treatment to a homogeneous group of firms. However, this is not feasible because 
the applicability of SFAS 133 depends on whether or not firms use derivatives. 9  Firms use 
derivatives to either take risk (i.e., speculate) or manage risk (i.e., hedge). Thus, derivative users 
 
9 Alternatively, I can compare treatment firms with greater derivative use to those with less. Firms with greater 
derivative use will likely experience a larger increase in exposure to fair value accounting. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to assess the extent of derivative use from examining the notes to the financial statements 




likely differ from derivative non-users in their risk exposures and/or risk management practices, 
which, in turn, affect operational uncertainty.  
To alleviate concerns that control and treatment firms differ fundamentally, I use matched 
samples of control and treatment firms that control for the major confound, operational uncertainty, 
as I discuss in sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. The matched sample is less subject to the concern that 
treatment and control firms differ fundamentally. However, the trade-off is a smaller sample size, 
which may reduce test power. In addition, for H1, I test for differences in the control variables 
between treatment and control groups. Where statistically different, I include the control variables 
in the regressions. Furthermore, for H1, I include firm fixed effects, in additional analyses, to 
control for time-invariant differences between treatment and control firms. For H2, I use 
alternative matched samples to control for potential confounds that statistically differ between the 
two groups. 10  If there remain fundamental differences between control and treatment firms 
affecting the credibility of management forecasts and/or the timeliness or price discovery that I 
fail to capture, the generalizability of the results may be limited to derivative users (i.e., treatment 
firms). 
A second key identifying assumption in a DiD design is that the allocation of treatment 
must be exogenous. This assumption is not met in my setting because firms can potentially self-
select into or out of treatment by acquiring or disposing of derivative instruments. However, I 
highlight that the primary motivation for derivative use in hedging firms should be to manage risk 
exposures.11 In section 4.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.1, I find that 4.8% and 5.5% of treatment firms stop and 
 
10 Recall that the test of H2 uses a portfolio analysis, rather than a regression analysis. 
11 There are very few speculating firms in my sample, at least based on the pre-period note disclosures. Out of 
the 175 derivative users in my random sample of 250 observations for manual tracing to the 10-k filing in appendix 




45.4% and 17.1% of control firms begin using derivatives in the post-period in the H1 and H2 
samples (hereafter, switching firms), respectively. These firms may be influenced to switch their 
decision to use or not use derivatives because of the provisions under SFAS 133, as I discuss in 
section 4.2.2.1. In these cases, the allocation of treatment is not exogenous.  
To alleviate concerns that these switching firms confound results, I also test H1 and H2 
using constant subsamples of treatment/control firms that continue to use/not use derivatives in 
the post-period (hereafter, constant derivative samples). This is more consistent with prior 
literature examining derivative users and non-users (e.g., Donohoe 2015; Chang et al. 2016; 
Campbell, Cao, Chang and Chiorean 2020), which restricts the non-user control firms to those that 
do not use derivatives throughout their sample period. For the firms that continue to use or not use 
derivatives throughout the sample period, I argue that SFAS 133 is exogenous because their 
decision to use or not use derivatives is not influenced by the application of the standard itself. 
These decisions were made in the pre-period, apart from the influence of the standard. In particular, 
I exclude the year immediately prior to mandatory application of the standard (i.e., fiscal 2000) to 
minimize any anticipatory effects or early adopters. 
Third, the DiD research design requires that the composition of treatment and control 
groups be stable throughout the sample period. As discussed above, I find that firms switch into 
or out of treatment by acquiring or disposing derivative instruments, leading to unstable control 
and treatment groups. When treatment firms cease to hold derivatives in the post-period, they are 
similar to control firms in that they do not experience an increase in exposure to fair value 
accounting. In addition, they experience a change in their operations due to derivative non-use. 
Conversely, control firms that begin using derivatives in the post-period are also problematic 




accounting). I discuss the potential reasons for the change in derivative use as well as the impact 
of including changing firms in greater detail in sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.3.2.1. 
Using the constant derivative samples helps to alleviate concerns over non-constant 
treatment and control groups. However, the trade-off in using the constant derivative samples is 
that the identification of treatment and control firms is based not only on pre-period attributes, but 
also on post-period attributes, which may be influenced by SFAS 133. Hence, I cannot generalize 
findings using the constant derivative samples to firms that change their use of derivatives around 
SFAS 133.  
Finally, to appropriately draw causal inferences, any contemporaneous events affecting the 
post-period must affect treatment and control groups similarly. Reg FD became effective in 
October 2000, overlapping with the post-period in this thesis. Reg FD requires that when public 
companies disclose material information to a limited group of individuals (e.g., financial analysts), 
they must also publicly disclose this information. Essentially, this regulation was implemented to 
prohibit selective disclosure, while motivating more timely public disclosure. Consistent with this 
aim, Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang (2003) find evidence suggesting that Reg FD substantially 
increased the frequency of management forecasts. 
I have no reason, ex ante, to suspect that Reg FD will affect treatment and control firms 
differently. In particular, any size or industry differences, which may moderate the impact of Reg 
FD on disclosure credibility or intraperiod timeliness, are eliminated in the matched samples. 
Furthermore, in section 4.3.3.3, I find no DiD in analyst following between control and treatment 
firms from the pre- to the post-periods. Nevertheless, I cannot effectively rule out potential 




While the DiD research design described in this section applies to tests of both H1 and H2, 
a key difference between H1 and H2 necessitates a separate discussion of the detailed research 
design for each hypothesis. Because of specific characteristics of the intraperiod timeliness metric 
used as a proxy for timeliness of price discovery, which I discuss in section 3.2.3.1, H2 must be 
tested at the portfolio level. H1, not being subject to this constraint, is tested at the firm-year level. 
This difference leads to distinct research designs for H1 and H2, which I discuss in sections 3.2.2 
and 3.2.3, respectively. Prior to describing these research designs, I discuss the identification of 
derivative users and non-users in section 3.2.1. 
3.2.1 Identification of Derivative Users and Non-Users 
As discussed in section 3.2, I identify a firm as a derivative user if it holds derivatives in the 
latest pre-period year. To assess whether a firm holds derivatives, I use a combination of 
keyword search results via SeekEdgar and manual data collection by examining the 10-K filing 
on SEC’s EDGAR database.12 Prior literature (e.g., Zhang 2009; Donohoe 2015; Chang, 
Donohoe and Sougiannis 2016) uses a keyword search to narrow down the set of potential 
derivative users, which they then manually verify by examining the 10-K filing.13 I follow this 
prior research in using a keyword search to facilitate the identification of derivative users.  
Specifically, I use a count of keywords to distinguish derivative users from non-users, 
following Campbell et al. (2020). In the pre-SFAS 133 period, SFAS 119 – Disclosure about 
Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments (FASB 1994) 
 
12 I use the SeekiNF search engine provided by SeekEdgar to perform the keyword search. See seekedgar.com 
for more details. See the following link for SEC’s EDGAR database: 
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html 
13 Compustat provides data on derivative gains/losses that flow through OCI (AOCIDERGL) beginning in 2001 
and data on ineffective gains/losses on hedges (HEDGEGL) beginning in 2005. However, these data do not identify 




mandates firms to disclose the contract or notional amounts and the nature and terms for all 
derivatives, by category (e.g., class, business activity, risk). Hence, the more derivative words 
the financial statement notes contain, the higher the likelihood that the firm is a derivative user.14 
I note that the mere presence of a derivative word does not necessarily indicate derivative use. 
For example, some derivative non-users disclose SFAS 133 as a newly issued, but not yet 
effective standard and include multiple derivative words in that disclosure. As another example, 
some derivative non-users use derivative words in combination with negation words to indicate 
that they do not use or hold any derivative financial instruments.  
I use a list of 101 derivative-related keywords/phrases (see figure C.1). It is most similar 
to the list used by Campbell et al. (2020), which is the most comprehensive list used in prior 
studies, to my knowledge.15 As I mentioned above, these prior studies manually verify all 
initially identified potential derivative users. In contrast, to minimize manual data collection 
costs, I intend to rely solely on results of the keyword search without manual verification, where 
these results reasonably identify users. Therefore, using a comprehensive list of keywords is 
necessary to ensure I capture most cases of derivative words.  
In addition to the count of keywords, I also incorporate information on the absence or 
presence of keywords related to specific derivative instruments (hereafter, specific instrument 
words). Specific instrument words comprise a subset of the derivative words list and include 
 
14 I observe this to be the case in my random sampling results in appendix C. For example, in a random sample 
of 50 observations from the H1 and H2 samples with 1-5 derivative words, I find that 28% are derivative users. In 
the random sample of 50 observations with 6-10 keywords, 40% are users. In the random sample of 50 observations 
with 20 or more derivative words, 100% are users. See table C.2 in appendix C. 
15 Campbell et al. (2020) use a list of more than 100 derivative-related keywords/phrases. The authors kindly 
provided me with the list of words used in their paper, for reference. Prior studies such as Manconi, Massa and 
Zhang (2017) use 36 keywords to identify potential interest rate or foreign exchange hedgers. As another example, 




words such as interest rate swap, foreign exchange forward, and commodity contracts. Firms are 
less likely to include specific instrument words if they don’t hold any derivative instruments, but 
merely use derivative words to discuss the FAS 133 pronouncement or indicate their non-use of 
derivatives, as explained above.16 Rather, these firms are more likely to include only generic 
derivative words, such as: derivatives, hedge and derivative instruments. Hence, the 
presence/absence of specific instrument words helps to distinguish such cases. 
I begin with Campbell et al.’s (2020) criteria of classifying firms with 20 or more 
derivative words as derivative users. I then calibrate the criteria to identify derivative users, 
incorporating the presence/absence of specific instrument words, by manually tracing random 
subsamples of my H1 and H2 samples to the 10-K filings, by categories of keyword count (e.g., 
1-5 keywords, 6-10 keywords, etc.). Based on the results of this analysis, reported in appendix C, 
I classify a firm as a derivative user if the 10-K has 20 or more derivative words, or if it has 16-
19 derivative words and at least one specific instrument word. I classify a firm as a derivative 
non-user if it has zero derivative words.  
For the remaining firms - those with 1-16 derivative words, or between 16 and 19 
derivative words and zero specific instrument words – the word counts ambiguously identify 
derivative users and non-users. Hence, for these firms, I cannot identify derivative use based on 
the word counts alone. Instead, I manually trace these observations to the 10-K filings on SEC’s 
EDGAR database to assess derivative use. Specifically, I search for the keywords -  derivative, 
hedge, hedging, and swap - and read the surrounding text to assess whether the firm uses 
 




derivatives.17 This usually leads me to the following sections of the 10-K filing: disclosures 
about risk, summary of significant accounting policies, and any notes pertaining specifically to 
“derivative financial instruments” or “financial instruments”.  Where no such words are found, I 
also browse the summary of significant accounting policies, and any notes pertaining to financial 
instruments before classifying these observations as non-users. I also manually examine 
observations with no SeekEdgar results due to missing or miscoded footnote (i.e., notes to the 
financial statements) headings and suspicious observations where SeekEdgar reports the total 
words on the report as less than 1000 words.18 
3.2.2 Research Design - Fair Value Accounting and Credibility of Voluntary Disclosures (H1) 
To examine the impact of fair value accounting on voluntary disclosure credibility, I focus on 
management forecasts as a key voluntary disclosure as they constitute a significant portion of the 
information communicated outside of financial reports. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) show that, 
among firms whose managers issue earnings forecasts, those forecasts are associated with 
approximately one-quarter of quarterly return volatility. I then infer the credibility of management 
forecasts using the management forecast response coefficient (MFRC). Jennings (1987) states that 
the market reaction to a management forecast is a function of its news content and the credibility 
of the news. Hence, the MFRC, which captures the market reaction per unit of news in the forecast, 
reflects the credibility of the news in the disclosure. Consistent with this idea, Rogers and Stocken 
(2005) find that the market adjusts its reaction to forecasts in accordance with the predicted bias 
based on management’s incentives to misreport.  
 
17 I specifically search for the word “swap” even though this is not a generic derivative keyword like derivative 
or hedge because interest rate swaps are not always described as derivatives. 




I focus on forecasts of annual earnings to capture the confirmatory effect of audited 
financial reports as the independent audit provides the added reliability necessary for financial 
reports to serve a confirmatory role, as discussed in section 2.2.1. I use earnings per share (EPS) 
forecasts because the EPS figure is important to investors. Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) find 
that nearly all (99.1%) of the 1,126 sell-side analyst reports issued between 1997 and 1999 
examined in their study provide an EPS forecast. Similarly, Previts, Bricker, Robinson and 
Young (1994), examining 479 sell-side analyst reports issued between 1987 and 1992, find that 
analysts focus much of their discussion around earnings. Hirst, Koonce and Venkataraman 
(2008, p.315) state that “Such [earnings] forecasts represent one of the key voluntary disclosure 
mechanisms by which managers establish or alter market earnings expectations…” 
To test H1, I use the following model, which is similar to that used by Rogers and Stocken 
(2005):  
 MF_CAR0,1= β0+ β1MF_SURP + β2TREAT + β3POST + β4TREAT × POST   
    + β5TREAT × MF_SURP + β6POST × MF_SURP  
             + β7 TREAT × POST × MF_SURP + Σ𝛤𝛤X  + ε                              (3.1) 
where MF_CAR0,1 equals the two trading-day cumulative market-adjusted returns around the 
management forecast date and measures investor reaction to the forecast.19 The precise definitions 
of all variables appear in Appendix A and control variables (X) are described below. 
As discussed above, I infer the credibility of management forecasts from investors’ 
response to the news in the forecast, or MFRC, represented by the coefficient on MF_SURP and 
its interactions. MF_SURP represents the magnitude of the news in the forecast, calculated as the 
management forecast EPS minus the mean analyst forecast EPS in the set of analyst forecasts 
 




issued 90 to 2 calendar days prior to the management forecast date, deflated by the pre-
management forecast share price. I follow prior literature (e.g., Pownall and Waymire 1989; 
Williams 1996; Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta 2005; Anilowski, Feng and Skinner 2007; Choi, 
Myers, Zang and Ziebart 2010) in using prior analyst forecasts as a proxy for investors’ prior 
earnings expectation when calculating the management forecast surprise. Prior research indicates 
that analyst forecasts are generally more accurate proxies for prior earnings expectations earnings 
than time-series models.20 I only include forecasts issued within 90 days prior to the management 
forecast date to keep relatively recent analyst forecasts. Using relatively recent analyst forecasts 
as the benchmark for pre-existing news reduces the chance that MF_SURP captures news that is 
already communicated and priced by the market via other information channels.21 The less stale 
news is captured in MF_SURP, the better I can infer the credibility of management forecasts from 
the MFRC. 
 The main test variable in (3.1) is an interaction of the forecast surprise, MF_SURP, with 
an indicator for treatment firms, TREAT, and an indicator for post-SFAS 133 observations, 
POST. As discussed in section 3.2, treatment firms are those identified as derivative users, while 
control firms are those identified as derivative non-users, in the latest pre-period. If fair value 
accounting weakens the confirmability of financial reports, I expect to observe a negative 
coefficient β7, indicating a more negative change in the MFRC for treatment firms from the pre- 
to the post-period, relative to the change in control firms over the same period. The coefficient β5 
represents differences in the MFRC between treatment and control firms in the pre-period. Given 
 
20 Brown and Rozeff (1978), Fried and Givoly (1982) and O’Brien (1988) find evidence suggesting that analyst 
forecasts are generally more accurate estimates of earnings expectation. They argue that the reason for this finding is 
that analysts incorporate information beyond historical time series data.  
21 Using varying horizons throughout the year, O’Brien (1988) demonstrates that a more recent analyst forecast 




that my research design does not capture an all-else-equal control group because the applicability 
of SFAS 133 depends on whether or not the firm holds derivatives, I do not make predictions 
about the sign of β5. I expect a positive coefficient β6, which measures differences in the MFRC 
between the pre- and post-periods for control firms. Heflin et al. (2003) document improvements 
in the information available to investors, evidenced by stock prices which anticipate a larger 
proportion of the earnings announcement information and an increase in management forecasts, 
after Reg FD, which came into effect in 2000. I posit that this, in turn, can enhance the credibility 
of management forecasts. 
A key potential confound for this test is operational uncertainty. Derivatives are often 
associated with significant volatility and/or uncertainty with regard to their economic benefits, 
which can make accurate earnings prediction more difficult. In turn, as Rogers and Stocken (2005) 
argue, forecasting difficulty can dampen investors’ ability to assess the truthfulness of managers’ 
forecasts and increase managers’ propensity to strategically bias their forecasts. Using non-
financial and non-utility industry firms during the period 1998-2011, Chang et al. (2016) find 
evidence suggesting greater earnings prediction difficulty for derivative users. They find that 
initiation of derivative use is associated with less accurate and more dispersed analysts’ earnings 
forecasts.  
In contrast, if derivatives are effective hedges of risk associated with underlying assets 
and/or liabilities, derivatives can lead to less operational uncertainty and more, not less, accurate 
earnings forecasts, which can improve the confirmability of financial reports. Ranasinghe, 
Sivaramakrishnan, and Yi (2021) find some support for this contrasting argument, examining firms 
in the oil and gas exploration and production and the airline industries - two industries that use 




discussed above, they find that firms that use derivatives for hedging purposes have more accurate 
and less dispersed analyst forecasts, indicating better earnings predictability. However, they find 
that this positive effect disappears for firms with ineffective hedges and actually turns negative for 
firms with only ineffective hedges.   
I control for operational uncertainty by including the volatility of operating cash flows, 
OCFVOL, following Dechow and Dichev (2002), as a control variable. As an alternative way to 
control for operational uncertainty, I form a matched control group of derivative non-users using 
one-to-one coarsened exact matching (CEM).22 I match on OCFVOL and Fama-French (1997) 12 
industry classifications (FF12) to control for operational uncertainty. In addition, I match on the 
fiscal year, because the latest pre-period can be 1998 or 1999, and on firm size (MVE). I first sort 
(coarsen) the continuous variables, OCFVOL and MVE, into bins using the lowest number of 
equally spaced cutpoints (n) to achieve covariate balance. This ensures covariate balance, while 
preserving the largest possible sample size. The cutpoints include the extreme outermost values; 
thus, n cutpoints produce n-1 bins. The CEM algorithm matches each derivative user to a non-user 
in the same OCFVOL-MVE-industry-year stratum, without replacement. If the stratum has 
multiple non-users, the algorithm chooses one at random. Using this matched sample of treatment 
and control firms provides a stronger control for operational uncertainty than simply including 
OCFVOL as a control variable in a regression using an unmatched sample because it does not 
require a linearity assumption. However, it reduces the sample size substantially, as I show in 
section 3.3.1. Accordingly, I examine H1 using both the unmatched sample (controlling for 
OCFVOL by inclusion in the regression) and the matched sample. 
 




While prior literature has often used propensity score matching (PSM) to match derivative 
users and non-users (e.g., Donohoe 2015; Chang et al. 2016), I choose to use CEM because King 
and Nielson (2019) show that relative to other matching models, PSM is not efficient at achieving 
covariate balance. They argue that PSM sometimes increases, rather than decreases, imbalance in 
some covariates because it prunes observations based on the propensity score, rather than on the 
covariates themselves. They propose CEM as a preferred alternative to PSM for matching 
covariates when matching on continuous, discrete and mixed variables. Since I match on both 
discrete (industry classification, fiscal year) and continuous (OCFVOL, MVE) variables, I choose 
to match treatment to control firms using CEM. 
I also consider controls for various management forecast and firm characteristics that have 
been documented, in prior literature, to influence the market’s reaction to the forecast. I consider 
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP|, following Lipe, Bryant and Widener (1998) and Rogers and Stocken 
(2005), to control for a potential non-linear relation between stock returns and earnings news 
suggested by prior studies. For example, Freeman and Tse (1992) find that the market response to 
each unit of earnings surprise decreases as the magnitude of the surprise increases. I consider an 
indicator variable for loss EPS forecasts (MF_LOSS) because prior studies like Hayn (1995) and 
Basu (1997) find that the informativeness of and, thus, the market reaction to losses is lower than 
that for profits. I include both point and range forecasts, and control for the width of the forecast 
interval (MF_WIDTH) because Baginski, Conrad and Hassell (1993) find that more precise 
forecasts induce stronger market reactions, consistent with Kim and Verrecchia’s (1991) model. I 
also consider management forecast horizon. Management forecasts that forecast longer horizons 
are generally less credible due to greater uncertainty pertaining to the prediction of earnings; thus, 




Rogers and Stocken 2005).  
In addition, I control for various firm-level characteristics. I proxy for size using the natural 
log of market value of equity (MVE). Bamber and Cheon (1998) argue that size is correlated with 
the costs of preparing disclosures. Furthermore, Freeman (1987) argues and finds evidence 
suggesting that larger firms have a richer information environment that anticipates a larger 
proportion of the earnings information earlier than smaller firms. Hence, larger firms experience 
smaller announcement returns. I consider controlling for firm growth using MTB, as the market 
reaction may vary with the extent of firm growth. Specifically, Gong, Li and Xie (2009) argue that 
“the valuation of high-growth firms largely hinges on expected future cash flows…, which 
intensifies the market demand and public scrutiny for forward-looking information disclosures.” I 
posit that this, in turn, can influence the credibility of the voluntary disclosure. 
In addition, I consider controls for management forecasts that are issued concurrently with 
an earnings announcement (EA_CONCUR), to isolate the impact of the management forecast 
surprise from the concurrent earnings announcement surprise. I also control for the earnings 
announcement surprise (EA_SURP), measured using the rolling seasonal random-walk model 
following prior literature (e.g., Livnat and Mendenhall 2006; Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper 
2007). That is, EA_SURP is the current quarter EPS minus the four quarters ago EPS, deflated by 
the pre-earnings-announcement share price. When the management forecast is not issued 
concurrently with an earnings announcement, EA_SURP equals zero. I also consider controlling 
for potential non-linearity in the response coefficient to the earnings news (EA_SURP × 





I transform the continuous control variables other than MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| (e.g., 
MF_WIDTH, MVE) into binary variables equal to one for above median values and zero otherwise 
(e.g., HiMF_WIDTH and HiMVE). Then, I interact the binary variables with MF_SURP to control 
for their effect on the MFRC. I use binary variables because the interaction between two 
continuous variables is difficult to interpret.23 I perform the regression analyses using firm-level 
clustering and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors to avoid bias in standard errors resulting 
from correlated residuals between observations of the same firm (Petersen 2009). 
While I consider all of the above variables, I do not include them all in the regressions as 
controls. Instead, I only include those variables that are statistically different between treatment 
and control groups in the respective H1 samples. I report the results of the t-tests of the 
management forecast-level and firm-level variables considered, in table 4.2 in section 4.2.1.2. 
Based on these results, I exclude variables that do not differ between treatment and control groups 
to reduce the number of unnecessary regressors in the regression model.  
In addition to the regression model in equation (3.1), I allow the MFRC to vary depending 
on the sign of MF_SURP (i.e., good versus bad news) as follows: 
 MF_CAR0,1= β0+ β1MF_SURP_GNEWS + β2MF_SURP_BNEWS   + β3TREAT  
 + β4POST + β5TREAT ×POST + β6TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS  
 + β7TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS + β8POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS   
                   + β9POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS   
                    + β10TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS  
 + β11TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + Σ𝛤𝛤X + ε                 (3.2)          
where the set of controls (X) is the same as those discussed above for equation (3.1), but are 
interacted with MF_SURP_GNEWS and MF_SURP_BNEWS instead of MF_SURP. 
 
23 Using continuous forms of these variables instead of their binary forms does not qualitatively alter results. See 




MF_SURP_GNEWS (MF_SURP_BNEWS) is equal to MF_SURP where MF_SURP is positive 
(negative), and zero otherwise. Skinner (1994) finds a stronger average market reaction to bad 
news forecasts than to good news forecasts. Accordingly, the effect of fair value accounting on the 
MFRC may differ for good news and bad news forecasts. Consistent with H1, I predict negative 
β10 and β11 coefficients, indicating that treatment firms experience a more negative change in the 
strength of the reaction to management forecasts from the pre- to the post-period, relative to control 
firms.  
 Similar to the unsigned regression (equation (3.1)), I include only those variables that differ 
statistically between treatment and control groups in each of the good and bad news forecast 
samples. The results of the t-test of mean differences are reported in table 4.2 and discussed in 
section 4.2.1.2. 
3.2.3 Research Design - Fair Value Accounting and Timeliness of Price Discovery (H2) 
To assess how fair value accounting affects the timeliness of price discovery, I compare the change 
in timeliness of price discovery between derivative users and non-users around SFAS 133. 
Derivative users (treatment) and non-users (control) are identified as discussed in section 3.2.1. 
Specifically, I compare the DiD in IPT between the portfolios, DiD_IPT (={IPTtreat,post – IPTtreat,pre} 
- {IPTcontrol,post – IPTcontrol,pre}). I test DiD_IPT using a permutation test, where I create a null 
distribution of DiD_IPT under the assumption that the order of the observed monthly returns does 
not matter. I then test the statical significance of the observed DiD_IPT by comparing it to the null 
distribution of DiD_IPT. I discuss this test in greater detail in section 3.2.3.2.  
I use a portfolio-level intraperiod timeliness metric, IPT, described in 3.2.3.1, to capture 




IPT metric, is crucial for making inferences about the price discovery process. As I discuss in 
section 3.2.3.1 and explore in appendix B, a portfolio-level metric averages away random news 
arrival at the firm level and substantially reduces the influence of intraperiod return reversals that 
can inflate IPT values – both of which can render the metric useless for interpreting the timeliness 
of price discovery. 
I also separately examine the subsamples of positive and negative intraperiod return 
observations. Positive (Negative) intraperiod return observations are those with positive (negative) 
12-month abnormal buy-and-hold returns. As discussed in section 3.2.2, the confirmability of 
financial reports may be more important for management-issued good news disclosures, which 
generally suffer greater credibility concerns. Since management-issued news is a non-trivial part 
of the intraperiod news, the impact of fair value exposure on IPT may be asymmetric for positive 
or negative intraperiod return observations. 
Similar to H1, I believe the major confound in the analysis is operational uncertainty. As 
discussed in section 3.2.2, derivative users can have greater or lower operational uncertainty 
depending on the derivatives’ use and effectiveness, if used as hedges. Operational uncertainty can 
be associated with greater information asymmetry, which can delay the incorporation of 
information in prices. Another potential confounding construct is the richness of the information 
environment, which I proxy using firm size (MVE). In the unmatched H2 sample, I find that 
derivative users are generally larger firms than derivative non-users (see table 4.17, panel A in 
section 4.3.1.2). Freeman (1987) finds that larger firms reflect earnings information earlier in the 
fiscal year than smaller firms. Also, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) find that the returns of larger stocks 
lead those of smaller stocks. The general consensus is that larger firms have a richer information 




there may be a spurious correlation between derivative users and IPT because derivative users are 
generally larger firms.  
I control for such confounds by matching derivative users to non-users using one-to-one 
CEM, similar to H1, as discussed in section 3.2.2. In addition to matching on OCFVOL, MVE and 
FF12, as in H1, I also control for the sign of the 12-month buy-and-hold returns. As discussed 
above, the impact of the confirmatory role of financial reports on IPT may differ for positive and 
negative intraperiod return observations. By default, I also match on fiscal year as the H2 sample 
only includes one pre-period year, 1999. I first sort (coarsen) the continuous variables, OCFVOL 
and MVE, into bins using the lowest number of cutpoints to achieve covariate balance for each 
variable. I then perform an exact match on the OCFVOL bin, MVE bin, FF12 and the sign of the 
12-month buy-and-hold returns. Similar to H1, I match each derivative user to a random derivative 
non-user in the same stratum, without replacement.  
3.2.3.1 Portfolio-Level Intraperiod Timeliness Metric 
IPT is calculated as the area under a curve representing cumulative buy-and-hold returns over a 
period, expressed as a percentage of the total 12-month buy-and-hold return. A bigger area 
indicates more timely incorporation of information in prices. Prior literature has used both 
portfolio-level IPT metrics, as discussed below, and firm-level IPT metrics, as discussed in 
appendix B, to assess the timeliness of price discovery. In this thesis, I use a portfolio-level metric 
for two reasons. First, a portfolio-level metric reduces the impact of idiosyncratic timing of news 
arrival inherent at the firm level. The IPT metric captures the speed with which all available 
information within a given period is impounded into prices. More specifically, it is a function of 




which this news is communicated and incorporated into stock prices by market participants (price 
discovery process). Bushman, Smith and Wittenberg-Moerman (2010, p. 931) argue that “[t]he 
use of portfolio-level analysis instead of regression analysis is crucial to average away the random 
news arrivals that render firm-period measures extremely noisy.” Their goal, and mine, is to make 
inferences about the price discovery process as opposed to the news arrival process. Second, I find 
that firm-level stock returns often include large reversals within a given period. In such cases, IPT 
values can be artificially inflated and, thus, difficult to interpret. Appendix B provides a discussion 
of the limitations related to using a firm-level IPT metric. 
Capital markets research since Ball and Brown (1968) has examined such cumulative 
abnormal return curves, although not always in the same form as in this thesis. Examples of such 
studies include Freeman (1987), Alford, Leftwich and Zmijewski (1993), Butler, Kraft and 
Weiss (2007), and Bushman et al. (2010). I briefly discuss the use of cumulative abnormal return 
curves for each of these studies. Ball and Brown (1968) plot the abnormal returns separately for 
positive and negative income forecast error portfolios to show that the market has reacted in the 
same direction as the sign of the income forecast error. The authors cite this as evidence that the 
annual accounting income figure has meaning, contrary to prominent beliefs at that time. They 
also indicate that “the annual income report does not rate highly as a timely medium,” since most 
of its information content is anticipated by the market beforehand. Freeman (1987) tests whether 
abnormal stock returns of larger firms anticipate accounting earnings earlier than those of 
smaller firms, by plotting the cumulative abnormal returns for portfolios of large and small firms. 
Alford et al. (1993) plot the abnormal cumulative returns as a percentage of the 15-month 
cumulative returns (ending three months after the fiscal year-end) to compare the timeliness of 




timeliness metric that estimates the area under the intraperiod timeliness curve to examine 
whether financial reporting frequency affects the timeliness of earning information. Bushman et 
al. (2010) then use a modified version of the IPT metric developed by Butler et al. (2007) to 
assess whether earlier access to private information via loan syndicates affects the timeliness of 
price discovery. Bushman et al. (2010) use portfolio-level returns instead of firm-level returns to 
average away the idiosyncratic news arrival evident at the firm level.  
I calculate the portfolio-level IPT following Bushman et al. (2010). Using monthly 
portfolio buy-and-hold cumulative returns over a 12-month period, the formula is: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 1
2
∑ (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚−1  + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚)/𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵1212𝑚𝑚=1  = ∑ (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚/𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵12) +  0.511𝑚𝑚=1        (3.3) 
where BH equals abnormal portfolio buy-and-hold return, and m denotes the month. Using this 
formula, if no news were incorporated until month 12, IPT would equal 0.5. Conversely, if all 
news were incorporated at the beginning of the 12-month period, IPT would equal 11.5. Lastly, 
if news were incorporated evenly throughout the 12-month period, IPT would equal 6.  
For each of the treatment and control portfolios, I construct portfolio buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns as the equally weighted hedge return one would earn based on perfect foresight 
of the 12-month return. Specifically, it is calculated as the return one would earn by taking a long 
position in firms with a positive 12-month buy-and hold return and a short position in firms with 
a negative 12-month buy-and hold return. This ensures that the positive and negative returns do 
not simply cancel out and yield near-zero aggregate returns.  I use the sign of the 12-month buy-
and hold returns, rather than the change in net income, to create the hedge portfolio returns 
because I am interested in the timeliness of all price-relevant information, which encompasses 




may also be relevant to stock prices. It can also include qualitative information in voluntary 
disclosures that can be confirmed, to some degree, by accounting information. In contrast, prior 
studies that use equally-weighted hedge portfolio returns based on perfect foresight of the 
change in net income (e.g., Ball and Brown 1968; Alford et al. 1993; Butler et al. 2007) are 
interested in examining the timeliness with which accounting earnings information is 
incorporated into prices.  
3.2.3.2 Test of Difference-in-Differences in Intraperiod Timeliness 
I test DiD_IPT using a modified version of the permutation test used by Butler et al. (2007), 
originally developed by McNichols (1984). The null distribution of DiD_IPT assumes that the 
order of the observed monthly return quartets (pre-period treatment, post-period treatment, pre-
period control and post-period control) is random and thus, each has an equal probability of 
representing any given month in the test period. To create the distribution under the null hypothesis, 
I randomly assign each of the 12 portfolio monthly return quartets to a month, 1 to 12.  Using the 
randomly assigned monthly returns, I calculate IPT for each of the four portfolios using the formula 
in equation (3.3) above. Then, I estimate the DiD_IPT as indicated in the formula above. I repeat 
this process 1000 times to produce a sampling distribution of DiD_IPT. I use this sampling 
distribution to assess the likelihood that the sample statistic, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼� , will be observed in this null 
distribution. To aid in interpreting the DiD results, I also examine the statistical significance of 
D_IPT, the change in IPT from the pre- to the post-period, for each of the control and treatment 
portfolios. 
This permutation test differs from that of Butler et al. (2007) in the following ways. First, 




distance between two IPT curves, rather than the difference in the areas under each curve. Their 
implicit assumption is that the largest distance between the two IPT curves is increasing in the 
difference in the areas under the two curves. While this assumption is intuitive, it is possible that 
the IPT curves intersect each other, such that curve A is below curve B for part of the 12-month 
period and then rises above curve B for the remainder of the period. In such cases, either curve 
could have the larger area. Hence, I posit that it is more accurate and direct to compare the 
difference in the areas under IPT curves, than to infer this difference from the largest distance 
between the curves. Second, while Butler et al. (2007) only test the difference between two IPT 
curves, I adapt their test to assess the DiD between four IPT curves. Consistent with H2, I predict 
that ΔIPT will be more negative (or less positive) for the treatment group, relative to the control 
group. In other words, I predict that DiD_IPT will be negative, indicating that an increase in 
exposure to fair value accounting decreases the timeliness of price discovery. 
3.3 Sample Selection 
For all tests, I examine U.S. firms to focus on a single set of accounting standards in a single 
country with a large amount of data available. The focus on the U.S. aligns with much of the prior 
literature on fair values.  I obtain stock returns data from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) and financial data from Compustat. All management and analyst forecast data are from 
Thomson Reuters’ Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). I identify derivative users and 
non-users using a keyword search via SeekEdgar and manual examination of the 10-K filing, as 
discussed in section 3.2.1. I separately discuss the sample selection processes for H1 and H2 in the 
following subsections, as H1 is crucially limited by the availability of management forecasts, 




3.3.1 Sample Selection – Fair Value Accounting and Credibility of Voluntary Disclosures 
(H1) 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes my sample selection process for H1. Panel A describes the sample selection 
process to arrive at the set of H1 observations with necessary management forecast and firm-level 
data. Then, in panel B, I describe the sample selection process to identify the unmatched and 
matched H1 samples. Specifically, this panel restricts the sample based on the availability of pre- 
and post-period observations necessary for a DiD analysis, prior to identifying firms as treatment 
or control. I delay the identification of treatment and control firms to this later point in the sample 
identification to minimize hand collection costs. Recall that the identification of treatment and 
control firms involves keyword search results as well as manual examination of the 10-K filing for 
some instances. Finally, in panel C, I report the number of treatment and control observations in 
each of the unmatched and matched H1 samples.  
In panel A of table 3.1, I begin with the intersection of U.S. firms on CRSP and Compustat 
for the pre- and post-SFAS 133 years examined (fiscal 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002), as discussed 
in section 3.2. The initial population contains 26,455 firm-year observations for 8,883 unique firms. 
I exclude financial firms because these firms often hold derivatives for trading or speculative 
purposes, which were already reported at fair value prior to SFAS 133. This removes 6,951 firm-
year observations for 2,221 firms. I then exclude firms with no annual EPS management forecasts 
(MF) on IBES. The resulting subset comprises 8,296 annual EPS MFs, representing 3,426 firm-
years and 1,918 firms. Hence, the data requirement to have EPS MFs on IBES removes more than 





Next, I apply the following restrictions to my sample based on prior literature (e.g., Rogers 
and Stocken 2005; Josefy, Rees and Tse 2015). I remove 681 MFs other than point or closed range 
MFs, since investors face significant ambiguity in comparing and confirming open range or 
qualitative forecasts against the actual outcome on financial reports. I exclude 412 MFs issued on 
or after the fiscal-year end forecasted, since these are, in substance, earnings pre-announcements. 
I also exclude 1,084 MFs issued before the prior year’s earnings announcement to ensure that the 
voluntary disclosure relates primarily to the forecast of current year earnings.  
Next, I restrict my sample to observations with sufficient data to calculate the dependent 
and independent variables of interest. First, I exclude 70 MF observations with insufficient data to 
calculate MF_CAR0,1, the dependent variable. Next, to construct MF_SURP, I exclude 207 MFs 
with no viable analyst forecast for the corresponding firm-year issued prior to the MF date. In 
addition, I require the observations to have a corresponding analyst forecast to be issued within 
the 90-calendar-day window prior to the MF to better isolate new information in MF_SURP, as 
discussed in section 3.2.2. This restriction removes 656 MFs.  
Next, I exclude 11 MF observations with a pre-MF share price below $1.00 to avoid the 
small denominator problem, as MF surprise is divided by the pre-MF share price to construct 
MF_SURP. I exclude 69 extreme MF observations where the absolute value of MF_SURP is 
greater than 0.10, or 10% of price, to ensure results are not biased by extreme values, following 
Josefy et al. (2015).24 Next, I exclude 119 MF observations for 70 firm-years with incomplete data 
to construct control variables. Finally, to avoid having multiple MFs for a given firm-year, I keep 
 
24 The validity of some extreme MF_SURP values is questionable. I trace 10 randomly selected observations 





only the latest MF issued for each firm-year, subject to the above data restrictions, resulting in 
2,254 MF observations for 1,325 firms.25  
The first few lines of table 3.1, panel B isolate the firms with data in both the pre- and the 
post-periods, for the DiD analysis.  The pre-period requirement excludes 1,175 firm-years for 832 
firms. The number of MFs in the IBES database is rather small in the earlier years of my sample 
period; it increases substantially in the early 2000s, as I discuss in section 3.3.1.1 (table 3.3). The 
post-period data requirement removes 225 firm-years for 199 firms, leaving 854 firm-year 
observations for 294 firms with at least 1 pre- and 1 post-period observation. I exclude 26 firm-
years for 10 firms, for which I cannot classify as treatment (derivative user) or control firms 
(derivative non-users) due to missing 10-K filing on SEC’s EDGAR database. This results in an 
unmatched H1 sample of 828 firm-years representing 284 firms.  
As discussed in section 3.2.2, I also use a matched sample of derivative users and non-
users to better control for operational uncertainty. I use CEM, and match on bins of OCFVOL (i.e., 
coarsened OCFVOL), MVE, FF12 industry and fiscal year. The algorithm selects the minimum 
number of cutpoints to achieve OCFVOL and MVE balance between the treatment and control 
groups. This results in 5 equally spaced cutpoints (i.e., 4 bins) for OCFVOL and 4 cutpoints (i.e., 
3 bins) for MVE, and yields a matched sample of 318 firm-year observations for 112 firms. Table 
3.2 provides the results of the t-test of covariate means between treatment and control groups 
before and after matching, in the latest pre-period year, the year of the match. In panel A, the 
 
25 I examine the latest MF for a given firm-year as later forecasts are generally more credible than earlier forecasts. 
For example, Baginski and Hassell (1997) argue that a longer forecast horizon increases earnings uncertainty. Since 
this thesis examines a construct, fair value exposure, that reduces, rather than increases, voluntary disclosure 
credibility, I focus on MFs that are otherwise more credible. In section 4.2.3.4, I also examine results using the earliest 
MF of each year that meets the data requirements, to assess the sensitivity of results to forecast horizon. Results are 




treatment group has smaller OCFVOL and greater MVE than the control group. However, after 
matching, in panel B, OCFVOL and MVE are no longer statistically different between these two 
groups, indicating a successful match. 
Finally, in panel C of table 3.1, I report the unmatched and matched H1 samples, by 
treatment (derivative users) and control (derivative non-users) groups, respectively. The 
unmatched sample comprises 263 firm-year observations for 97 control firms and 565 firm-year 
observations for 187 treatment firms. Hence, the unmatched sample has more treatment firms than 
control firms. After applying CEM, the matched sample includes 56 matched pairs of control and 
treatment firms. It comprises 153 firm-years for the control group and 165 firm-years for the 
treatment group. The number of firm-year observations in the treatment group does not correspond 
exactly to that in the control group because I require at least one pre- and one post-period 
observation, but allow up to two observations for each period for a given firm to expand the sample 
size. Hence, each firm has a  minimum of 2 and a maximum of 4 firm-year observations in the 
sample. The important matched sample characteristics are that each firm has at least one pre- and 
one-post period observation and that treatment and control firms are matched in the same pre-
period year, to allow for a DiD analysis. 
3.3.1.1 H1 Sample Representativeness 
The H1 sample restriction related to managers’ decision to issue management forecasts and the 
availability of those forecasts on IBES significantly reduces the sample from the intersection of 
non-financial U.S. firms on Compustat and CRSP (hereafter, Compustat population). 
Specifically, as shown in panel A of table 3.1, of 19,504 (26,455 – 6,951) firm-years in the 




(hereafter, annual EPS MF issuers). Given this large reduction as well as further reductions 
related to characteristics of the management forecasts discussed in 3.3.1 and reported in table 
3.1, I assess the representativeness of the unmatched H1 sample (828 firm-years) and the 
matched H1 sample (318 firm-years). Specifically, I compare the frequency distributions, across 
years and across industries, between the matched sample, the unmatched sample, set of annual 
EPS MF issuers, and the Compustat population.  
Panels A and B of table 3.3 report the temporal and industry distributions, respectively, of 
each of the matched and unmatched samples, the set of annual EPS MF issuers, and the Compustat 
Population. In panel A, fiscal year t includes fiscal years ending June t to May t+1, to correspond 
to the effective date of SFAS 133, as discussed in section 3.2. I find that the numbers of firms 
issuing annual EPS MFs is very low in fiscal years 1998 and 1999, relative to those in fiscal years 
2001 and 2002, and relative to the Compustat population. The number of annual EPS MF issuers 
increases drastically beginning in 2001, which is consistent with the increase in voluntary 
disclosures associated with Reg FD (2000) documented in prior literature (e.g., Anilowski et al. 
2007; Choi et al. 2010). Hence, the propensity to issue EPS MFs appears to have increased during 
my sample period. Using a DiD research design, where I compare treatment firms to control firms 
over the same period helps to alleviate concerns that changes in MFRC are driven by temporal 
changes in disclosure behavior.  
In both the unmatched and matched samples, however, the earlier years represent a larger 
proportion of the samples, relative to the proportion represented in the set of annual EPS MF 
issuers. This is by design, because the restriction to have non-missing pre- and post-period 
observations removes many firms with only post-period MF observations. Given this restriction, 




around the year 2000.  
With respect to industry distribution (Table 3.3, panel B), I find some notable differences 
between the Compustat population and the unmatched sample. First, the business equipment 
industry is under-represented (i.e., greater than 3 percentage decrease) in the unmatched sample, 
relative to the Compustat population. This industry represents 25.5% of the Compustat population, 
but only 13.6% of the unmatched sample. This large difference is attributable to fewer proportion 
of EPS MF issuing firms in this industry, noted by the decrease in industry representation from 
25.5% in the Compustat population to 20.6% in the set of annual EPS MF issuers, and to fewer 
firms meeting data requirements in both the pre- and post-periods. Second, the following industries 
are over-represented (i.e., greater than 3 percentage increase) in the unmatched sample, relative to 
the Compustat population: consumer non-durables, utilities and wholesale and retail. These 
differences in representation are partially driven by a larger proportion of EPS MF issuers in these 
industries. These differences suggest that managers in certain industries are more likely to issue 
forecasts, though differences could also be caused by differences in completeness of the IBES 
Guidance data, as I discuss below. Forms of communication may also differ across industries.  
Next, I compare the industry distribution of the unmatched sample to the matched sample. 
The wholesale and retail, and other industries constitute a larger proportion of the matched sample, 
relative to the unmatched sample, because these industries have more balanced distributions of 
derivative users and non-users, relative to other industries (see table 4.1). A more balanced 
distribution of derivative users and non-users allows for a higher likelihood of successful matches, 
ceteris paribus. In contrast, the manufacturing, utilities and healthcare industries constitute lower 
proportions of the matched sample than of the unmatched sample. These industries have more 




Despite some notable differences in the industry distribution of the H1 samples and the 
Compustat population, large industries in the Compustat population are generally well represented 
in the samples. Further, examining an industry matched sample of derivative users and non-users 
and including multiple industries in the analysis helps to alleviate concerns that results are driven 
by industry-specific characteristics. 
In addition to the differences noted above, I also caveat that the H1 sample may not be 
representative of the Compustat population due to IBES data limitations. Chuk, Matsumoto and 
Miller (2013) find that the coverage of management forecasts on Thomson First Call's Company 
Issued Guidance (CIG) database, the precursor to the IBES Guidance data, is far from complete.26 
In particular, they find that the CIG database is more likely to cover firms with greater analyst 
following, greater institutional ownership and better firm performance. Accordingly, the H1 results 
may not generalize to firms with less analyst following, lower institutional ownership or poorer 
firm performance. I, however, do not expect such coverage issues to confound tests of H1. 
Although I don’t directly control for analyst following and institutional ownership, I eliminate any 
size differences between derivative users and non-users using the matched sample and prior 
literature documents that both analyst following and institutional ownership are increasing in firm 
size.27 Finally, I control for firm performance by including a control variable for loss forecasts.28  
 
26 Chuk et al. (2013) examine a random sample of 1,756 management forecasts for the years 1997, 1999, 2001, 
2003, 2005 and 2007, manually identified from Lexis Nexis, and find that the CIG database only covers 
approximately 51% of these management forecasts. 
27 For example, Bhushan (1989) and Shores (1990) note that analysts are more likely to follow larger firms. 
Similarly, O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) and Duggal and Millar (1999) argue that institutional investors often invest 
in larger firms for liquidity reasons. 
28 Chuk et al. (2013) use the frequency of losses in the prior eight quarters as a proxy for firm performance. While 
I do not examine this frequency, I posit that it is positively correlated with the expected likelihood of annual loss 




3.3.2 Sample Selection - Fair Value Accounting and Timeliness of Price Discovery (H2) 
Table 3.4 provides the sample selection process for H2. Panel A reports the sample selection to 
arrive at the set of H2 observations with necessary IPT data. To test H2, I begin with the 
intersection of U.S. firms on Compustat and CRSP for fiscal 1999 and 2001, which comprises 
13,289 firm-years for 7,765 firms. I exclude 3,497 firm-years for 1,953 firms in the financial 
industry, for the same reasons as for H1, discussed in section 3.3.1. I then exclude observations 
with fewer than 10 monthly returns in the 12-month period, to ensure sufficient data to calculate 
IPT. This removes 1,166 firm-years for 601 firms, leaving 8,626 firm-year observations for 5,211 
firms with necessary data to calculate IPT. 
Next, I restrict the sample to firms that have both pre- and post-period observations, as 
shown in panel B of table 3.4. This removes 692 and 1,104 firms with no pre-period observation 
and post-period observation, respectively, resulting in a set of 6,830 firm-years for 3,415 firms. 
From this set, I exclude firms that do not have sufficient data to construct the confounding variables, 
MVE and OCFVOL, in the pre-period. This removes 306 firm-year observations for153 firms.  
Prior to identifying derivative users (treatment) and non-users (control), I remove 3,712 
firm-year observations for 1,856 firms with differing signs of intraperiod news (i.e., 12-month 
buy-and-hold returns) in the pre- and post-periods. As discussed in section 3.2.3, the impact of fair 
value exposure on IPT may be contingent on whether the intraperiod news is net positive or net 
negative. To attribute results to fair value exposure and not a change in the sign of intraperiod 
news from the pre- to the post-period, I restrict attention to firms whose annual returns have the 
same sign in the pre- and post-periods. I apply this restriction prior to identifying treatment firms 




identifying derivative users and non-users involves a combination of SeekEdgar keywords search 
and hand collection. Next, I exclude 58 firm-years for 29 firms that I am unable to classify as 
derivative users or non-users due to missing 10-k filings on the SEC’s EDGAR database. This 
results in 2,754 firm-year observations for 1,377 firms in the unmatched sample.  
As discussed in section 3.2.3, I use CEM to match on OCFVOL, MVE, FF12 industry, and 
sign of intraperiod news, without replacement. For continuous variables, I identify the minimum 
number of cutpoints to achieve covariate balance between the treatment and control groups, 
through trial and error. This results in 28 equally spaced cutpoints (i.e., 27 bins) for OCFVOL, and 
8 cutpoints (i.e., 7 bins) for MVE. The CEM matching process drops 1,578 firm-years for 789 
firms. Thus, the matched sample comprises 1,176 firm-years for 588 firms.29 
Panel C provides a breakdown of the H2 samples, by treatment and control groups. The 
unmatched sample comprises 1,770 firm-years for 885 control firms and 984 firm-years for 492 
treatment firms. Hence, prior to matching, the sample includes more control firms than treatment 
firms. In the matched sample, each of the treatment and control groups comprise 588 firm-year 
observations for 294 firms. Within the matched sample, 66 pairs of treatment and control firms 
have positive intraperiod returns and 228 pairs have negative intraperiod returns in both the pre- 
and post-periods. Hence, each of the treatment and control groups comprise 132 (456) firm-year 
observations for 66 (228) firms for the positive (negative) intraperiod return subsample. 
3.3.2.1 H2 Sample Representativeness 
 
29 To increase sample size, I create two alternative matched samples, where I use CEM to match on each of 
OCFVOL and MVE, separately, in addition to industry and sign of intraperiod news. These results are reported in 




To gain a better understanding of how the sample selection affects the sample composition, I 
compare the industry distributions as well as firm characteristics between the non-financial-
industry Compustat population (hereafter, Compustat population) and the unmatched and matched 
H2 samples for each of the pre- and post-periods. Panel A of table 3.5 reports the industry 
distributions of the Compustat population and the H2 samples. I highlight any differences in 
industry representations greater than 3 percentage points.  
I find that the manufacturing industry is over-represented in the both the unmatched and 
matched samples relative to the Compustat population, while the business equipment industry is 
under-represented. In addition, the “other” industry is over-represented and the healthcare industry 
is under-represented in the matched sample, relative to the 2001 Compustat population. In 
particular, the business equipment industry comprises 26% and 27.1% of the Compustat 
population in the 1999 and 2001, respectively, but only 16.7% of the matched sample. A larger 
proportionate loss in observations in this industry, relative to other industries, is due a large 
imbalance in the numbers of potential treatment and control firms, prior to matching (see table 
4.16, panel A). In contrast, the manufacturing industry experiences a small proportionate loss in 
observations in the matched sample due to more balanced proportions of potential control and 
treatment firms (see table 4.16, panel A). 
Overall, I observe some substantial differences in the industry distribution between the H2 
samples and the Compustat population. Nevertheless, all large industries in the Compustat 
population continue to be reasonably represented in both the unmatched and matched samples. In 
addition, using an industry-matched sample of derivative users and non-users across several 




Panel B of table 3.5 reports the means of descriptive variables for the Compustat population 
and the unmatched and matched H2 samples. For each variable, I test whether each of the sample 
means equals the value of the Compustat population mean. I do not perform a two-sample t-test 
between the Compustat population and the respective sample because the latter is a subsample of 
the former. Instead, I perform a one sample t-test to examine whether the respective sample mean 
is equal to the value of Compustat population mean, which does not consider the population’s 
standard deviation or sample size. 
In the pre-period, I find that operational cash flow volatility is significantly lower in both 
the matched and unmatched samples than the mean value of the Compustat population. In addition, 
I find that both the matched and unmatched samples comprise larger firms with more frequent 
management forecasts, relative to the Compustat population averages. However, analyst following 
is larger than the Compustat population mean in only the matched sample. In the matched sample, 
some of these differences disappear in the post-period. While the matched sample still has lower 
operational cash flow volatility, these sample firms are not larger and do not  have greater analyst 
following or more frequent management forecasts than the Compustat population in the post-
period. Similar to the matched sample, the unmatched sample continues to have lower operational 
cash flow volatility than the Compustat population. However, unlike the matched sample and 
unlike the pre-period, in the post-period the unmatched sample has smaller firms, with lower 
analyst following and less frequent management forecasts than the Compustat population.  
Overall, the selection process biases the matched sample in favor of firms with less 
operational volatility and a more rich information environment, particularly in the pre-period. 
Accordingly, I caveat that the matched sample results may not generalize to young firms, which 




to the unmatched sample in the pre-period. However, in the post-period, the unmatched sample 







This chapter presents the results of the empirical analyses testing the impact of fair value 
accounting on the credibility of voluntary disclosures (H1) and the timeliness of price discovery 
(H2). Due to specific characteristics of the intraperiod timeliness metric used as a proxy for 
timeliness of price discovery, as discussed in 3.2.3.1, H2 is tested at the portfolio level, while H1 
is tested at the firm-year level. Furthermore, H1 is crucially limited by the availability of 
management forecasts, while H2 is not. Given that these differences lead to different research 
designs and samples, as discussed in chapter 3, I separately discuss the results of the empirical 
analyses of H1 and H2, in sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Fair Value Accounting and Credibility of Voluntary Disclosures (H1) 
This section presents the empirical analyses of the impact of fair value accounting on the 
credibility of voluntary disclosures. Section 4.2.1 discusses the industry distribution and the 
descriptive statistics of management forecast and firm characteristic variables for the unmatched 
and matched samples. Section 4.2.2 presents the results of the main analyses, which shows that 
an increase in exposure to fair value accounting reduces the credibility of good news voluntary 
disclosures, but not of bad news voluntary disclosures. Section 4.2.3 presents the results of 
additional analyses that test the sensitivity of my findings to including firm fixed effects, using 
an alternative matched sample, using only stand-alone forecasts, using the earliest management 
forecast for each firm-year instead of the latest, and using an alternative set of control variables. I 




using a three-day, instead of a two-day, management forecast return. I find that the results of the 
main analyses, in section 4.2.2, are generally robust to various model specifications and 
alternative samples and subsamples. 
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
4.2.1.1 Industry Distribution 
Table 4.1 reports the industry distribution of observations in the unmatched and matched H1 
samples, using unique firm observations. The manufacturing, business equipment, wholesale and 
retail and other industries have the largest representations in the unmatched sample. However, the 
manufacturing industry is no longer one of the largest industries in the matched sample because 
the large imbalance in derivative users and non-users results in few matches. As discussed in 
section 3.3.1.1, the proportion of derivative users and non-users in each industry affects the 
matched sample because I match firms within industry. Meanwhile, the consumer durables, energy 
and extraction and telecommunications industries have the smallest representations in both the 
unmatched and matched samples – each industry comprises 10 (4) or fewer firms in the unmatched 
(matched) sample. In the matched sample, the chemicals and allied products industry also has only 
4 firms. Finally, the utilities industry, with only 1 control firm in the unmatched sample, drops out 
of the matched sample.  
 I examine the proportion of treatment firms within each industry to assess derivative usage. 
I observe substantial differences in the proportion of derivative users across industries, ranging 
from a low of 28.6% in the telecommunications industry to a high of 93.8% in the utilities industry. 
Prior to matching, treatment firms comprise more than 80% of the manufacturing, chemicals and 




users and non-users. Treatment firms comprise 50% or less of the following three industries: 
telecommunications, wholesale and retail and other. Accordingly, industry factors appear to, at 
least partially, drive the firm’s decision to use or not use derivatives. As discussed in section 3.2.2, 
I match treatment and control firms within each FF12 industry classification, which controls for 
industry-specific incentives to use derivatives.30  
 Nearly two-thirds of the firms in the unmatched H1 sample are derivative users. However, 
this proportion of derivative users is not representative of the wider population of firms. In the H2 
sample, which is not subject to management forecast data constraints, derivative users comprise 
only about one-third of the unmatched H2 sample (table 4.16). The unmatched H1 sample has a 
greater proportion of derivative users than the unmatched H2 sample because firms with annual 
EPS MFs in IBES are more likely to be derivative users than derivative non-users. This is not 
surprising because MF issuers tend to be larger and prior literature (e.g., Zhang 2009; Donohoe 
2015) documents that derivative users are, on average, larger than derivative non-users. For 
example, in the Compustat population of non-financial firms in the H1 sample period (fiscal 1998, 
1999, 2001 and 2002), the mean MVE for non-annual EPS MF issuers is $1.388 billion, whereas 
it is $5.541 billion for annual EPS MF issuers (untabulated). 
4.2.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics of management forecast and firm characteristic variables 
for the unmatched and matched H1 samples, in panels A and B, respectively. The descriptive 
statistics of management forecast variables are comparable to those reported in prior literature (e.g., 
Baginski and Hassell 1997; Ajinkya et al. 2005; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Choi et al. 2010; Cheng, 
 
30I find that adding industry fixed effects and their interactions with the management forecast surprise variables in 




Luo and Yue 2013; Baginski et al. 2015; Li and Zhang 2015). I find that a little over half of the 
management forecasts are bad news forecasts, whose EPS is below analyst expectations 
(MF_BNEWS). Similarly, approximately 54% of forecasts have negative management forecast 
announcement return (MF_CAR0,1) (untabulated). Less than 2% of management forecasts forecast 
losses. Approximately 38% of forecasts forecast a specific target EPS, as opposed to a range 
(MF_WIDTH equal to 0) (untabulated).  Also, a little over half of the management forecasts are 
issued concurrently with an earnings announcement (EA_CONCUR) (hereafter, bundled 
forecasts).31 
Panels C.1 to D.3 report the descriptive statistics of management forecast and firm 
characteristic variables, by control and treatment firms, as well as the results of the t-test of means 
for the unmatched and matched samples/subsamples. Panels C.1, C.2 and C.3 report the descriptive 
statistics and the t-test results for the combined, good news (positive MF_SURP), and bad news 
(negative MF_SURP) unmatched sample/subsamples, respectively.  Similarly, panels D.1, D.2 and 
D.3 report the descriptive statistics and the t-test results for the combined, good news, and bad 
news matched sample/subsamples, respectively.  
In the combined unmatched sample, I find that treatment firms have more positive forecast 
surprises (MF_SURP) than control firms. Also, treatment firms have smaller cash flow volatility 
(OCFVOL) than control firms, which may be attributable to lower economic volatility through the 
effective use of hedges. The non-linearity term, MF_SURP×|MF_SURP|, is more positive in 
treatment firms than in control firms, similar to MF_SURP. Treatment firms are larger (MVE) and, 
thus, may have a richer information environment than control firms. They are also less likely to 
forecast losses (MF_LOSS) and have more precise forecasts (i.e., smaller MF_WIDTH) than 
 





In both the good and bad news subsamples, treatment firms have lower cash flow volatility 
(OCFVOL) and more positive MF_SURP×|MF_SURP| and are larger (MVE). In addition, in the 
good news subsample, treatment firms are less likely to forecast losses (MF_LOSS) and, in the bad 
news subsample, treatment firms have more positive forecast surprises (MF_SURP).  
In the combined unmatched sample as well as the good and bad news unmatched 
subsamples, MF_HORIZON, MTB, EA_CONCUR, EA_SURP, EA_SURP×|EA_SURP| and 
EA_LOSS are not statistically different between the treatment and control groups. Thus, to limit 
the number of regressors, I do not include these variables as controls in the tests of H1. Furthermore, 
I exclude MF_WIDTH from the regression conditioned on the sign of news as it does not differ 
statistically between the treatment and control groups within each of the good and bad news 
unmatched subsamples. Note each control variable contributes 2 regressors to the regression not 
conditioned on the sign of management forecast news (hereafter, unconditioned regression) and 3 
regressors to the regression conditioned on the sign of news (hereafter, conditioned regression), 
because I interact each control variable with MF_SURP (MF_SURP_GNEWS and 
MF_SURP_BNEWS). Also, recall from section 3.2.2, that all continuous variables are transformed 
into binary variables based on a median split, prior to their inclusion in the regression analyses, to 
facilitate the interpretation of interaction terms. 
In contrast to the unmatched sample, the t-test results of the matched sample, in panel D.1 
of table 4.2, show no remaining differences in the observed variables between the treatment and 
control groups, except for MF_SURP×|MF_SURP|. Based on these results, I include this variable 
as a control in the unconditioned regressions, using the matched sample. In the good news 




groups. However, in the bad news subsample, treatment firms are larger (MVE), have lower cash 
flow volatility (OCFVOL) and are more likely to have bundled forecasts (EA_CONCUR). This 
imbalance in OCFVOL and MVE, despite matching on these variables, results because the CEM 
process provides matches at the firm level using the latest pre-period year, while the t-tests use 
firm-year observations, consistent with the level of observations used in the regression analyses. 
The purpose of the CEM process is to identify treatment and control firms that are similar in terms 
of the potential confounds prior to treatment (i.e., SFAS 133). To control for this remaining 
difference in OCFVOL and MVE, I include the binary variables, HiOCFVOL and HiMVE, and 
their interactions with MF_SURP_GNEWS and MF_SURP_BNEWS  in the conditioned 
regressions, using the matched sample. I also include EA_CONCUR and its interactions with the 
surprise variables since EA_CONCUR also differs significantly between the treatment and control 
groups in the bad news subsample. 
4.2.2 The Effect of Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Voluntary Disclosures 
This section presents the results of the empirical analysis of H1, which predicts that greater 
exposure to fair value accounting reduces the credibility of voluntary disclosures. Specifically, I 
compare the DiD in the MFRC between derivative users and non-users, pre- and post-SFAS 133, 
as discussed in section 3.2.2. 
Panels A and B of table 4.3 present the regression results before and after conditioning on 
the sign of MF_SURP, respectively. In both panels, columns (1) - (3) present the results for the 
unmatched sample and columns (4) and (5) present the results for the matched sample. Consistent 
with H1, I predict a negative coefficient on TREAT×POST×MF_SURP (TREAT×POST× 
MF_SURP_GNEWS, TREAT×POST×MF_SURP_BNEWS), suggesting that the change in 




control firms. Column (1) of panel A reports the unconditioned regression results using the 
unmatched sample prior to the inclusion of control variables. I find that the coefficient on 
TREAT×POST×MF_SURP is marginally positive, contrary to H1. The marginally positive 
coefficient persists after controlling for operational uncertainty, in column (2). However, once we 
add all relevant control variables, in column (3), TREAT×POST×MF_SURP becomes statistically 
insignificant. I find that the loss in significance is largely attributable to the inclusion of the non-
linearity variable (see table D.5, panel A, column (2)). Hence, the failure to control for non-
linearity, when it differs significantly between treatment and control groups, can lead to misleading 
results. In the matched sample, in columns (4) and (5), TREAT×POST×MF_SURP is not 
statistically significant. Thus, the results do not support H1, using the unconditioned regression.  
I draw attention to a few noteworthy coefficients. First, MF_SURP is positive and 
statistically significant in all columns, suggesting that management forecasts are credible in the 
pre-period. In this period, I do not find a different investor response for treatment versus control 
firms (TREAT×MF_SURP). Second, in the matched sample (columns (4) and (5)), I find some 
evidence indicating that the MFRC is stronger in the post-period (POST×MF_SURP), relative to 
the pre-period. The increase in management forecast credibility might be due to more frequent 
communication of private information in the post-Reg FD period, evidenced by Heflin et al. (2003). 
Third, I find a negative coefficient for HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP, in column (3), suggesting that 
firms with greater operational uncertainty have less credible forecasts, as predicted. As discussed 
in section 3.2.2, it is likely more difficult for both managers and investors to accurately predict 
earnings when operational uncertainty is high. Rogers and Stocken (2005) document that such 
forecasting difficulty motivates managers to strategically bias their forecasts, making them less 




differs significantly between treatment and control groups, as observed in panel C.1 of table 4.2.  
The significant coefficients on the remaining control variables have the predicted sign, 
where a sign is predicted, with the exception of HiMF_WIDTH×MF_SURP. I predicted a negative 
coefficient for this interacted variable because Baginski et al. (1993) find that less precise forecasts 
are expected to induce weaker market reactions, as discussed in section 3.2.2. However, I find a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient for this variable in column (3), suggesting that less 
precise forecasts have stronger, not weaker, market reactions, contrary to predictions. To 
investigate this opposite result, I regress MF_CAR0,1 on MF_SURP, an indicator variable that 
equals one for closed range forecasts, and zero for point forecasts, and the interaction of these two 
variables, which brings the regression model closer to that of Baginski et al. (1993). However, I 
continue to find opposite results in this model (untabulated). Accordingly, the differing results may 
be driven by sample differences, rather than model differences. Specifically, Baginski et al. (1993) 
study the sample period 1983 to 1986, whereas I examine the period 1998 to 2002. Also, Baginski 
et al. (1993) include open range forecasts in their sample, whereas I do not. Finally, my sample is 
subject to other restrictions incremental to those included in Baginski et al.’s (1993) sample, such 
as exclusion of extreme MF_SURP observations or the requirement to have non-missing MF 
observations in both the pre- and post-periods. 
Panel B of Table 4.3 presents the regression results for equation (3.2), allowing the MFRC 
to differ for good news and bad news forecasts. I first discuss the results for good news forecasts 
and then move on to discuss the results for bad news forecasts. In the unmatched sample, 
TREAT×POST×MF_SURP_GNEWS is statistically insignificant both before and after adding 
control variables (columns (1)-(3)). In the matched sample, prior to including HiOCFVOL, HiMVE 




TREAT×POST× MF_SURP_GNEWS is statistically insignificant. 32 Once, I include these control 
variables in the regression model (column (5)), the coefficient for TREAT×POST× 
MF_SURP_GNEWS becomes negative and statistically significant at the 5% level (β = -8.445; t-
stat = -1.88). This is consistent with H1 and suggests that investors perceive management forecasts 
of firms with high fair value exposure as less credible when the forecast contains good news.  
The gain in significance of the coefficient for TREAT×POST×MF_SURP_GNEWS 
moving from column (4) to column (5) is not attributable to the inclusion of any single control 
variable in column (5) (see table D.5, panel B). Rather, the addition of all three controls and their 
interactions with forecast surprise, in combination, give rise to the negative and significant 
coefficient for TREAT×POST×MF_SURP_GNEWS. The results using the matched sample are 
likely more reliable than those of the unmatched sample because using CEM to match on potential 
confounding variables does not require a linearity assumption, whereas including these variables 
in the regression model does. While the matched sample regression also includes controls for 
operational uncertainty and the richness of the information environment, similar to the unmatched 
sample, this is in addition to controlling for these confounds in the pre-period using matching, 
rather than as a substitute for matching. 
Next, I focus on the results for bad news forecasts. The coefficient for TREAT×POST× 
MF_SURP_BNEWS is statistically insignificant in all columns, suggesting that an increase in 
exposure to fair value accounting does not affect the credibility of bad news forecasts. Prior 
literature (e.g., Jennings 1987; Williams 1996; Rogers and Stocken 2005) generally suggests that 
investors perceive bad news from management to be inherently more credible than good news. 
 
32 As discussed in section 4.2.1.2, I match derivative users and non-users on OCFVOL and MVE at the firm level 
using the latest pre-period values. Hence, these proxies are balanced in the latest pre-period year. However, the t-test 
of differences in means are performed at the firm-year level, synonymous with the regression analysis and, thus, can 




Thus, the confirmability of financial reports may have little impact on the credibility of bad news 
forecasts. 
I draw attention to some other variables of interest. First, I find that bad news forecasts are 
credible in the pre-period (positive and statistically significant MF_SURP_BNEWS), but good 
news forecasts are not (insignificant MF_SURP_GNEWS). Hutton, Miller and Skinner (2003) 
argue that investors are more skeptical about forecasts that convey good news. Josefy et al. (2015) 
documents this null reaction to good new forecasts in their pre-2000 subsample, which partially 
corresponds to my pre-period (see panel A of their table 6).  
Second, I find some evidence suggesting that, in the pre-period, derivative users had more 
credible good news forecasts than non-derivative users (positive and significant coefficient on 
TREAT×MF_SURP_GNEWS in column (5)). It is possible that derivative users effectively hedged 
their risk exposures, reducing their economic volatility. This, in turn, would make it easier to 
predict earnings and might constrain management from misreporting private information in 
voluntary disclosures, as documented in Rogers and Stocken (2005). While I control for 
operational uncertainty using OCFVOL, there may be aspects of economic volatility that is not 
fully captured in OCFVOL. In contrast, I find no statistical difference in the credibility of bad news 
forecasts between derivative users and non-users (TREAT×MF_SURP_BNEWS) in the pre-period. 
Differences in predictability may have little impact on the confirmability of financial reports when 
managers forecast bad news.  
Third, I find that POST×MF_SURP_GNEWS is positive and statistically significant, in 
columns (3) and (4), suggesting an increase in the credibility of good news management forecasts 
from the pre- to the post-SFAS 133 period, in control firms. This is consistent with my prediction 




credibility of management forecasts. Similarly, I find some evidence suggesting greater credibility 
of derivative non-users’ bad news forecasts in the post-period than in the pre-period. Specifically, 
the coefficient for POST×MF_SURP_BNEWS is positive and statistically significant in the 
matched sample (columns (4) and (5)). 
Fourth, HiOCFVOL×MF_SURP_GNEWS is negative and statistically significant, except 
for in the matched sample (column (5)), suggesting that firms with greater operational uncertainty 
have less credible good new forecasts. This is consistent with greater difficulty of forecasting 
earnings for firms with greater operational uncertainty, which, in turn, exacerbates the credibility 
of forecasts. In contrast, the coefficients for HiOCFVOL× MF_SURP_BNEWS are statistically 
insignificant in all columns, suggesting that operational uncertainty does not affect the credibility 
of bad news forecasts. 
Finally, the significant coefficients on the remaining control variables have the predicted 
sign, where a sign is predicted, with the exception of MF_LOSS× MF_SURP_BNEWS. I predicted 
a negative coefficient for this interacted variable because loss forecasts are expected to be less 
informative, and, thus, induce weaker market reactions, as discussed in section 3.2.2. However, I 
find a positive and statistically positive coefficient for this variable in column (3), suggesting that 
loss forecasts have stronger market reactions when the managers’ forecasted loss is below prior 
analyst expectations. It is also possible that investors perceive bad news forecasts as optimistic 
when managers forecast losses; thus, investors react more negatively to the bad (i.e., negative) 
news to correct for the perceived optimism, which would result in a positive coefficient. For 
example, a firm may prefer to release bad news slowly to mitigate extreme market reactions. In 
contrast, loss forecasts indeed have weaker market reactions when managers’ loss forecasts exceed 




Overall, these results provide some support for H1 for good news forecasts. However, the 
results are not consistent across the unmatched and matched samples. In contrast, I do not find any 
support that an increase in exposure to fair value accounting affects the credibility of bad news 
forecasts. As discussed in section 3.2.2, given that management-issued bad news is inherently more 
credible than management-issued good news, it is possible that the confirmability of financial 
reports is influential for the credibility of good new disclosures, but not for bad news disclosures.  
4.2.2.1 Change in the Firm’s Decision to Use/Not Use Derivatives 
Given the inconsistent results in table 4.3, I assess the validity of my classification of treatment 
and control firms by examining whether treatment (control) firms continue to use (not use) 
derivatives in the post-period. Recall that I identify treatment and control firms based on their use 
or non-use of derivatives in the latest pre-period. However, a firm’s decision to use or not use 
derivatives can change from period to period. If treatment firms discontinue their use of derivatives 
in the post-period, they are no longer exposed to the fair value accounting under SFAS 133. In 
contrast, if control firms begin using derivatives in the post-period, they will then be exposed to 
the fair value accounting under SFAS 133. Hence, control firms that begin using derivatives will 
experience an increase in exposure to fair value accounting whereas treatment firms that 
discontinue their use of derivatives will experience no change or a decrease in exposure to fair 
value accounting, biasing against finding results in support of H1.33  
To examine any changes in firms’ decisions to use (not use) derivatives, I identify whether 
firms use derivatives in the post-period, following the same procedures as for the pre-period 
 
33 The change in exposure to fair value accounting for treatment firms that discontinue their use of derivatives 
depends on the type of derivatives held in the pre-period. Treatment firms that held speculative derivatives will 
experience a decrease in exposure to fair value accounting since these derivatives were already fair valued prior to 
SFAS 133, as discussed in section 3.2. In contrast, treatment firms that held only derivatives qualifying for hedge 




observations, described in section 3.2. Table 4.4 reports the samples of treatment (control) firms 
that continue to use (not use) derivatives in the post-period. Panels A and B report on the 
unmatched and matched H1 samples, respectively. In the unmatched sample (panel A), 9 out of 
187 (4.8%) treatment firms stop using derivatives and 44 out of the 97 (45.4%) control firms begin 
using derivatives between the pre- and post-periods. It is possible that firms that stop using 
derivatives do so to avoid the burden of more stringent hedging criteria and disclosures under 
SFAS 133. However, these firms are relatively few and likely comprise firms whose derivative 
activity was not an important part of their operations. 
In contrast, the proportion of control firms using derivatives in the post-period is alarming. 
Consistent with this observation, prior research (e.g., Abdel-Khalik and Chen 2015; Chang et al. 
2016; Campbell et al. 2020) documents an increase in derivative users after SFAS 133. Abdel-
Khalik and Chen (2015) argue that hedge accounting incentives under SFAS 133, which can 
reduce earnings volatility for effective hedgers, motivated a growth in non-trading derivative 
activities. This highlights self-selection concerns, which can attenuate results. Specifically, it is 
likely easier to forecast earnings for firms with lower earnings volatility, relative to those with 
greater earnings volatility. As discussed in 4.2.2, Rogers and Stocken (2005) document that 
managers are less likely to bias management forecasts when forecasting difficulty is lower, relative 
to greater, making forecasts more credible. Thus, derivative users that experience a decrease in 
earnings volatility due to SFAS 133 should experience an increase in management forecast 
credibility, which biases against the predicted H1 relation.  
To remove this bias and satisfy the DiD research design assumption that the classification 
of treatment and control firms (i.e., derivative users and non-users) is stable throughout the sample 




the full samples. Eliminating firms that change their decision to use (not use) derivatives leaves 
231 unique firms with at least one post-period observation whose derivative use (non-use) is 
consistent with the pre-period treatment/control classification (table 4.4, panel A). These firms 
comprise 674 firm-years. I exclude another seven firm-years (but no firms) because, while these 
firms have at least one post-period observation consistent with the pre-period classification, 
derivative use (non-use) in these particular firm-years are inconsistent. 34  Thus, the constant 
derivative unmatched sample comprises 667 firm-years for 231 unique firms, of which 53 are 
control firms and 178 are treatment firms. In this sample, all treatment (control) firm-years use (do 
not use) derivatives, resulting in a sample of constant derivative users/non-users. 
I similarly restrict the matched sample (see panel B). Nearly half of the control firms (29 
out of 56 firms) begin to use derivatives in the post-period, while only a small number of treatment 
firms (4 out of 56 firms) discontinue their use. Applying the same sample restrictions as described 
for the unmatched sample results in a constant derivative matched sample of 219 firm-years for 79 
firms. Given the small number of control firms in the matched sample, I caution against 
interpreting results based solely on the matched sample. Thus, I continue to assess H1 using both 
the constant derivative unmatched and matched samples. 
Prior to re-analyzing H1 using the constant derivative sample, I assess covariate balance 
between treatment and control groups in the constant derivative matched sample. Because some 
treatment firms do not have matching control firms and vice versa for the control firms in the 
constant derivative matched sample, the covariates may no longer be balanced between treatment 
and control firms. To ensure covariate balance, I perform a t-test of the covariate means between 
 
34For example, a firm may have four observations, one for each of the fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002 
and this firm may use derivatives in 1998, 1999 and 2001, but not in 2002. In this case, I exclude the 2002 




treatment and control groups using the constant derivative matched sample/subsamples in the latest 
pre-period, the year of match. Panel A, B and C of table 4.5 report the results of this analysis for 
the combined, the good news and the bad news constant derivative matched sample/subsamples, 
respectively. I find no differences across all constant derivative matched sample/subsamples, 
which provides some assurance that the results of the constant derivative matched sample are still 
valid for interpreting the impact of exposure to fair value accounting on management forecast 
credibility.  
In sum, in the previous analysis in section 4.2.2 (table 4.3), the control groups in both the 
unmatched and matched samples include a substantial proportion of firms that became exposed to 
fair value accounting in the post-period; these are not appropriate control firms. Given the 
inclusion of affected firms in the control group, one may expect to observe a weak negative 
coefficient on POST×MF_SURP in panel A of table 4.3. However, because Reg FD was also 
enacted between the pre- and the post-period, this confounds inferences about POST×MF_SURP. 
I posit that Reg FD can enhance the credibility of management forecasts by enhancing the 
information environment, as discussed in section 3.2.2. The positive and significant coefficient on 
POST× MF_SURP in the matched sample (table 4.3, panel A, columns (4) and (5)) provides 
support for Reg FD effects. This highlights the importance of using a DiD analysis to help isolate 
the impact of SFAS 133 from the effects of Reg FD, which affects all firms. Overall, a mis-
identification of treatment and control firms can bias against finding results by reducing the DiD 
in the MFRCs between treatment and control firms. Thus, the null or weak results observed in 
table 4.3 may be an artifact of this poor classification. To assess whether this is the case, I re-
analyze H1 using the constant derivative unmatched and matched samples.  




Table 4.6 reports the results of testing H1 using the constant derivative samples.35 For brevity, 
other than for TREAT×POST×MF_SURP (TREAT×POST×MF_SURP_GNEWS and 
TREAT×POST× MF_SURP_BNEWS), I only discuss coefficients that may be of interest and are 
different from those reported in table 4.3. Panel A provides the unconditioned regression results. 
Similar to the results in table 4.3, in column (1), I find a positive and marginally significant 
coefficient on TREAT×POST×MF_SURP (β = 3.342; t-stat = 1.64). However, similar to the results 
in table 4.3, this significance disappears once I add all relevant control variables (column (2)), 
indicating a lack of support for H1. The results in the constant derivative matched sample (columns 
(3) and (4)) are also consistent with the findings in table 4.3. 
Next, in Panel B of table 4.6, I examine H1, conditioning on the sign of MF_SURP. I find 
that the coefficient on TREAT×POST×MF_SURP_GNEWS is negative and statistically significant 
in the unmatched sample with control variables and in the matched sample (column (2): β = -
15.529; t-stat = -2.33; column (3); β = -11.354; t-stat = -1.43; column (4): β = -16.759; t-stat = -
1.96). Recall that, in panel B of table 4.3, this coefficient was negative and statistically significant 
only in the matched sample after additionally controlling for HiOCFVOL, HiMVE and 
EA_CONCUR. In column (1), which reports the results for the unmatched sample with no control 
variables, the coefficient is statistically insignificant. However, given that I observe a negative and 
marginally significant coefficient on TREAT×POST×MF_SURP_GNEWS in the matched sample, 
prior to additionally controlling for HiOCFVOL, HiMVE and EA_CONCUR, I posit that the lack 
of significance in the unmatched sample with no controls is related to the lack of control for 
important confounds such as operational uncertainty or the richness of the information 
 
35 In table 4.6, I do not repeat column (3) of table 4.3, which was included to show how including a control for 
the major confound, operational uncertainty (OCFVOL), absent other controls affects the coefficients of interests. 
For reference, I include this analysis for the constant derivative sample in table D.5 (panel A, column (6), panel B, 




environment. Hence, using the constant derivative samples provides stronger and more consistent 
results in support of H1 for good news forecasts, relative to using the full samples in table 4.3. 
Consistent with the results in table 4.3, I find that derivative users have more credible good 
news forecast in the pre-period than derivative non-users (positive coefficient for 
TREAT×MF_SURP_GNEWS). However, I find this result not only in the matched sample with 
additional controls, as in table 4.3, but also in the unmatched sample with controls. Hence, 
derivative users (non-users) that continue to use (not use) derivatives versus those that stopped 
(began) using derivatives in the post-period may be systematically different firms to begin with. I 
also find more consistent results that the credibility of good news management forecasts improved 
from the pre- to the post-period (positive coefficient for POST×MF_SURP_GNEWS), relative to 
the results in table 4.3. 
Next, I focus on the results of bad new forecasts in panel B of table 4.6. Across all columns, 
the coefficient on TREAT×POST×MF_SURP_BNEWS is not statistically significant, consistent 
with the results in panel B of table 4.3. In contrast to the results in table 4.3, I find some weak 
evidence that derivative users had less credible bad news forecasts than derivative non-users in the 
pre-period (negative coefficient for TREAT×MF_SURP_BNEWS in column (2)).  
Overall, I find stronger results supporting H1 for good news management forecasts in the 
constant derivative samples than in the full samples. This indicates that the inclusion of firms that 
use (do not use) derivatives in the post-period in the control (treatment) group weakened results in 
table 4.3. I continue to find null results for H1 for bad news forecasts. This suggests that while fair 
value accounting under SFAS 133 reduced the credibility of derivative users’ good news 
management forecasts, it does not affect the credibility of bad news forecasts. As discussed above, 




reports may be less important for managers’ bad news voluntary disclosures. I caveat that the 
generalizability of these results may be limited to firms that continue to use/not use derivatives 
throughout the sample period. 
4.2.3 Additional Analysis 
In this section, I test the sensitivity of the findings of the constant derivative samples from table 
4.6 (hereafter, primary results) to including firm fixed effects, using an alternative matched sample, 
using only stand-alone forecasts, using the earliest management forecasts for each firm-year 
instead of the latest, and including an alternative set of control variables. In addition, I test the 
sensitivity of my findings to alternative specifications of the regression model and using a three-
day, instead of a two-day, management forecast return. Recall that the primary results in the 
regression unconditioned on the sign of MF_SURP, reported in panel A of table 4.6, do not support 
H1. This null result, in this regression, is driven by differing results for good news and bad news 
forecasts. In the regression conditioned on the sign of MF_SURP, reported in panel B of table 4.6, 
the primary results support H1 for good news forecasts, but not for bad news forecasts. In the 
additional analyses, I use the constant derivative samples, unless otherwise stated. As discussed in 
section 4.2.2.1, some of the control and treatment firms change from derivative users to non-users 
or vice versa in the post-period, which can bias against finding results supporting H1. 
4.2.3.1 Firm Fixed Effects 
In this sub-section, I analyze H1 after including firm fixed effects to control for unobservable firm-
specific characteristics that are relatively constant across time within a given firm. This alleviates 
concerns that the results are driven by unobservable inherent differences between derivative users 




the results of this additional analysis of H1, after including firm fixed effects. Panel A reports the 
unconditioned regression results. In the unmatched sample (column (1)), I continue to find a 
statistically insignificant coefficient for TREAT×POST ×MF_SURP, similar to the primary results 
reported in panel A of table 4.6. However, in the matched sample (column (2)), the coefficient for 
TREAT×POST×MF_SURP is negative and significant at the 1% level (β = -6.514; t-stat = -3.00), 
which contrasts with the null results reported in table 4.6. Including firm fixed effects provides 
results supporting H1 using the matched sample, in the unconditioned regression.   
Next, panel B of table 4.7 reports the conditioned regression results. In the unmatched 
sample (column (1)), I find that the coefficient for TREAT×POST×MF_SURP_GNEWS is 
negative and significant at the 5% level (β = -13.897; t-stat = -1.83). In the matched sample, it is 
negative and significant at the 10% level (β = -13.804; t-stat = -1.66). The coefficient on 
TREAT×POST×MF_SURP_BNEWS is not statistically significant in either sample, consistent 
with the primary results, reported in panel B of table 4.6.  
In addition, I find that the coefficient for HiOCFVOL×MF_SURP_BNEWS is positive and 
significant at the 10% significance level in the matched sample (column (2)), inconsistent with the 
primary results. The positive coefficient may indicate that investors perceive bad news forecasts 
of firms with high operational uncertainty as less credible due to optimism. Recall that a more 
negative reaction to bad news forecasts would manifest as a positive coefficient in the regression. 
In summary, the test variables are consistent with that of the primary analysis. Thus, the primary 
results are not driven by unobservable inherent differences between derivative users and non-users.  
4.2.3.2 Alternative Matched Sample  
In section 4.2.2.2, I exclude firms that change their decision to use (not use) derivatives, which 




matched sample, identified in panel B of table 4.4, this sample does not preserve all matched pairs 
of control and treatment firms. Recall that only 27 (52) out of the 56 control (treatment) firms in 
the matched sample continue to not use (use) derivatives in the post-period (table 4.4, panel B). 
Thus 29 control and 4 treatment firms are dropped from the constant derivative matched sample, 
resulting in an unbalanced number of treatment and control firms.  
To alleviate concerns over an incomplete matched sample, I create an alternative matched 
sample, where I match control and treatment firms within the constant derivative unmatched 
sample of 231 firms, from panel A of table 4.4. I use CEM to match on OCFVOL (5 cutpoints), 
MVE (4 cutpoints) , industry and year. This matching process yields 28 matched pairs of treatment 
and control firms, comprising 71 control and 81 treatment firm-year observations, for a total of 
152 firm-year observations for 56 unique firms. Panel A of table 4.8 reports the results of the t-test 
of pre-treatment covariate means between the control and treatment groups in the combined 
alternative matched sample. Both covariates, OCFVOL and MVE, are balanced, indicating a 
successful match.  
I also test for differences in management forecast and firm characteristics between the 
control and treatment groups using firm-year observations to assess which control variables I need 
to retain in the regressions using the alternative matched sample. Panels B, C and D report these 
results for the combined, good news and bad news alternative matched sample/subsamples, 
respectively. In the combined sample (panel B), I find that OCFVOL and MF_HORIZON are 
smaller and MVE is larger in the treatment group than in the control group. Hence, I control for 
HiOCFVOL, HiMF_HORIZON, and HiMVE and their interactions with MF_SURP in the 
unconditioned regression model. In the good news subsample (panel C), I find that MF_HORIZON 




(panel D), the treatment group has smaller OCFVOL and larger MVE than the control group. Hence, 
I retain controls for HiOCFVOL, HiMF_HORIZON, and HiMVE and their interactions with 
MF_SURP_GNEWS and MF_SURP_BNEWS in the conditioned regression model. However, 
given the small number of observations, I control for each variable plus their interaction terms in 
separate regressions to prevent overfitting the model. Accordingly, I only rely on results that are 
consistent across all regressions to ensure that any single result is not driven by the failure to 
control for a relevant management forecast or firm characteristic.  
 Table 4.9 reports the results of testing the impact of exposure to fair value accounting on 
the credibility of management forecasts using the alternative matched sample. In panel A, I find 
that the coefficient for TREAT×POST×MF_SURP is not statistically significant across all columns, 
consistent with the primary results in panel A of table 4.6. In panel B, I find that the coefficient for 
TREAT×POST×MF_SURP_GNEWS is negative and statistically significant across all three 
columns (column (1): β = -13.000; t-stat = -1.76; column (2): β = -13.113; t-stat = -1.31; column 
(3): β = -11.785; t-stat = -1.55), consistent with the primary results in panel B of Table 4.6. 
However, in contrast to the primary results, the coefficient for TREAT×POST× 
MF_SURP_BNEWS  is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level in column (3) (β = 
4.959; t-stat = 1.35). However, this result is not robust to controlling for OCFVOL (column (1)) 
and MF_HORIZON (column (2)), which are relevant controls, based on the results reported in 
table 4.8. Hence, I conclude that fair value accounting does not affect the credibility of bad news 
forecasts. In addition, contrary to the primary results and to predictions, the coefficient on 
HiOCFVOL× MF_SURP_GNEWS is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (column 
(1)). It is possible that, given the small number of observations in this sample, this unexpected 




with caution. Overall, the primary results, reported in table 4.6, are not sensitive to an alternative 
matched sample.  
4.2.3.3 Stand-Alone Management Forecasts 
Next, I test H1 in the subsample of stand-alone management forecasts. In bundled forecasts, the 
concurrent earnings announcement can add noise to the test of H1, potentially weakening results. 
Removing these forecasts isolates the management forecast response coefficient from the 
concurrent earnings announcement news. Thus, I expect to observe stronger results in support of 
H1 for the stand-alone forecast subsample than for the constant derivative sample (table 4.4), 
which includes both stand-alone and bundled forecasts. For this subsample analysis, I do not use 
the matched sample because excluding stand-alone management forecasts in this sample no longer 
preserves a pre- and post-period observation for each firm, nor the pair of treatment and control 
firms, defeating the purpose of using a matched sample. Alternatively, I can create a new matched 
sample within the subset of constant derivative observations with stand-alone forecasts in both the 
pre- and post-periods. However, this retains only 9 and 20 unique control and treatment firms, 
respectively. Hence, after matching, this sample would contain a maximum of 9 pairs of control 
and treatment firms, which is insufficient for regression analysis. Hence, this analysis is restricted 
to stand-alone forecasts in the constant derivative unmatched sample. 
Table 4.10 report these results. In the unconditioned regression, in panel A, the coefficient 
for TREAT×POST×MF_SURP is statistically insignificant, consistent with the primary results in 
panel A of table 4.6. Next, in the conditioned regression, in panel B, I find that the coefficient for 
TREAT× POST×MF_SURP_GNEWS is negative and statistically significant (β = -41.710; t-stat = 
-4.08), consistent with the primary results in panel B of table 4.6. I highlight that the statistical 




than in the primary results (5% significance level). The coefficient on TREAT×POST× 
MF_SURP_BNEWS continues to be statistically insignificant. Thus, excluding bundled forecast 
from the analysis produces stronger results in support of H1 for good news forecasts. 
4.2.3.4 Earliest Management Forecast for Each Firm-Year 
Where multiple management forecasts are available for a given firm-year, I use the latest 
management forecast (that meet the data requirements) to test H1. As discussed in section 3.3.1, 
I do this because I expect to observe the greatest effect size using later forecasts. Since fair value 
exposure is predicted, in this thesis, to reduce, rather than increase, forecast credibility, I 
expected the greatest effect size for forecasts that are otherwise more credible. Baginski and 
Hassell (1997) argue that shorter horizon forecasts are generally more credible than longer 
horizon forecasts.  
The mean (median) MF_HORIZON is 237 (255) days for the unmatched sample and 236 
(259) days for the matched sample (untabulated), using the earliest management forecast of each 
firm year.36 Meanwhile, the mean (median) MF_HORIZON is 136 (98) days for the unmatched 
sample and 141 (101) days for the matched sample (untabulated), using the latest management 
forecast of each firm year. Hence, the earliest forecasts’ mean (median) MF_HORIZON is 
approximately 3-4 months (4–5 months) longer than that of the latest forecasts. The mean 
(median) absolute size of the forecast surprise is 0.005 (.001) in the unmatched sample and 0.006 
(0.002) in the matched sample (untabulated), using the earliest forecast for each firm year. Using 
the latest management forecast of each firm year, the mean (median) absolute size of the forecast 
surprise is 0.005 (.001) in both the unmatched and matched sample (untabulated). Hence, the size 
 
36 Recall, from section 3.3.1, that the H1 sample is restricted to management forecasts issued on or after the prior 




of the earliest forecast surprise is rather similar to that of the latest forecast surprise.  
To examine whether my choice of forecast horizon indeed affects results, I test H1 using 
the earliest management forecast for each firm-year, as opposed to the latest, in the constant 
derivative samples.37 Before, I perform this analysis, I first compare the mean management 
forecast- and firm-level variables between control and treatment firms to determine which 
variables I need to include in the regression analyses. As discussed in section 3.2.2, I only 
include those variables that are statistically different between treatment and control groups to 
avoid including an excessive number of regressors in the model unnecessarily.  
Table 4.11 reports the results of the t-test of mean differences. Panels A.1, A.2 and A.3 
(B.1, B.2 and B.3) provide the descriptive statistics and t-test results for the combined, good 
news and bad news constant derivative unmatched (matched) sample/subsamples, respectively. 
Based on these results, I control for OCFVOL, MF_LOSS, MVE and EA_CONCUR in the 
unconditioned regression, using the constant derivative unmatched sample (see panel A.1). In the 
conditioned regression using the constant derivative unmatched sample, I retain OCFVOL, 
MF_LOSS, MF_HORIZON, EA_CONCUR and MVE as controls as these variables differ 
significantly between treatment and control groups within either the good news or bad news 
unmatched subsamples (see panels A.2 and A.3). Finally, using the constant derivative matched 
sample, I include a control for MVE only in both the unconditioned (see panel B.1) and 
conditioned regressions (see panels B.2 and B.3).  
 Table 4.12 reports the results of testing H1, using the earliest management forecast, 
 
37 Management forecast surprise is calculated as the forecast EPS minus the the mean analyst forecast EPS in the 
set of analyst forecasts issued 90 to 2 calendar days prior to the management forecast date, deflated by the pre-
management forecast share price, as discussed in section 3.2.2. Thus, the earliest management forecasts reference a 




instead of the latest, in a given firm-year, within the constant derivative samples (table 4.4). In 
the unconditioned regression, in panel A of table 4.12, the coefficient for TREAT×POST× 
MF_SURP is statistically insignificant, consistent with the primary results in panel A of table 
4.6. In the conditioned regression, in panel B, I find a negative and significant coefficient on 
TREAT×POST× MF_SURP_GNEWS in the unmatched sample (column (1): β = -10.970; t-stat = 
-2.63), consistent with the primary results in panel B of table 4.6. However, in the matched 
sample, the coefficient is negative, but not statistically significant (column (2): β = -4.762; t-stat 
= -1.28), which differs from the statistically significant results in table 4.6. I find that the size of 
the negative coefficients for TREAT×POST× MF_SURP_GNEWS, are much smaller using the 
earliest forecasts than using the latest forecasts (table 4.6, panel B). However, I also find that the 
coefficients observed for MF_SURP_BNEWS and POST× MF_SURP_GNEWS are also smaller 
using the earliest forecasts than using the latest forecasts, in 3 out of 4 instances. Given that the 
size of the coefficients are smaller using earlier forecasts than using later forecasts, not only on 
TREAT×POST× MF_SURP_GNEWS, but also on other coefficients that capture forecast 
surprise, the results suggest an overall muted response to earlier forecasts that have more 
uncertainty. Next, I find a statistically insignificant coefficient on TREAT×POST× 
MF_SURP_BNEWS, consistent with the primary results in panel B of table 4.6. In sum, using the 
earliest forecast for each firm-year, I find weaker and inconsistent results supporting H1 for good 
news forecasts, relative to using the latest forecast.  
4.2.3.5 Alternative Set of Control Variables 
In the analysis of H1 using the constant derivative samples, in table 4.6, I retain the same set of 
controls that I used for the full samples, defined in panel B of table 3.1 and analyzed in table 4.3, 




the regression model, control variables that were not statistically different between the treatment 
and control groups in panels C.1 to D.3 of table 4.2 for the respective samples. However, it is 
possible that the t-tests of mean differences in management forecast and firm characteristic 
variables in the constant derivative samples yield results that are different from those of the full 
samples. Hence, in this section, I re-perform the t-test of means using the constant derivative 
samples to identify an alternative set of control variables for the constant derivative sample 
regressions.38  
 Table 4.13 reports the results of the t-test of mean differences using the constant 
derivative samples. Panels A.1, A.2 and A.3 (B.1, B.2 and B.3) provide the descriptive statistics 
and t-test results for the combined, good news and bad news constant derivative unmatched 
(matched) sample/subsamples, respectively. Based on these tests, I include, in the respective 
regressions, only those variables that statistically differ between control and treatment groups. 
Hence, in the unconditioned regression using the constant derivative unmatched sample, I control 
for the following variables: OCFVOL, MF_LOSS, MVE, and EA_CONCUR (see panel A.1). In 
the constant derivative matched sample, I only control for MVE (see panel B.1). Next, in the 
conditioned regression using the constant derivative unmatched sample, I control for the 
following variables: OCFVOL, MF_HORIZON, and MVE (see panels A.2 and A.3). Finally, in 
the conditioned regression using the constant derivative matched sample, I control for 
MF_HORIZON and MVE (see panels B.2 and B.3). As discussed in section 3.2.2, I also include 
the interactions of these variables with the forecast surprise variables. I transform all continuous 
variables to indicator variables to facilitate the interpretation of these interaction variables.  
 
38 In table D.1 of appendix D, I include all control variables, regardless of whether or not they are statistically 
different between treatment and control groups, in the regression using the constant derivative unmatched sample. I 




 Table 4.14 provides the analysis of H1 using the constant derivative samples and the 
alternative set of control variables, identified using the t-test of means in table 4.13. In the 
unconditioned regression, in panel A, I find that the coefficients for TREAT×POST× MF_SURP 
are statistically insignificant in both the unmatched and matched samples, consistent with the 
primary results, reported in panel A of table 4.6. In the conditioned regression, in panel B, the 
coefficient for TREAT×POST× MF_SURP_GNEWS is negative and statistically significant (β = 
-13.770; t-stat = -1.52) in the constant derivative matched sample (column (2)), consistent with 
the primary results in table 4.6. However, the significance is smaller than that of the primary 
results. In the constant derivative unmatched sample (column (1)), TREAT×POST× 
MF_SURP_GNEWS is statistically insignificant (β = 0.797; t-stat = 0.16), in contrast to the 
primary results, which showed a negative and statistically significant coefficient. The coefficient 
for TREAT×POST× MF_SURP_BNEWS continue to be insignificant, consistent with the 
primary results. In sum, the primary results, reported in panel B of table 4.6, are not robust to the 
alternative set of control variables. 
To explore the reason for the different results using the same sample, but different sets of 
control variables, in tables 4.6 and 4.14, I re-examine the conditioned regression, adding the 
control variables (and their interactions with the forecast surprise variables) in table 4.6, one at a 
time. These results are reported in panel B of table D.5 in Appendix D. I find that the coefficient 
for TREAT×POST× MF_SURP_GNEWS becomes negative, although statistically insignificant, 
(β = -8.26; t-stat = -1.16) only after including MF_LOSS and its interactions with the good and 
bad news forecast surprises. Hence, it appears that loss forecast observations are very influential. 
To further investigate if loss forecasts are responsible for the different results, I perform two 




alternative set of control variables, but also adding MF_LOSS and its interactions with 
MF_SURP_GNEWS and MF_SURP_BNEWS. If the null result in the constant derivative 
unmatched sample, in table 4.14, is indeed attributable to loss forecasts, I should observe a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient for TREAT×POST× MF_SURP_GNEWS once I 
control for MF_LOSS. Second, I repeat the regression, with the alternative set of control 
variables, but after excluding loss forecast observations. Specifically, this excludes 11 and 1 
observations in the constant derivative unmatched and matched samples, respectively. Again, I 
expect to observe a negative and significant coefficient for TREAT×POST× 
MF_SURP_GNEWS, consistent with the primary findings (table 4.6, panel B), if the weak results 
in table 4.14 are attributable to influential loss forecasts. 
Table 4.15 reports the results of these regressions. Column (1) reports the regression 
results including the alternative set of control variables, plus controls for MF_LOSS and its 
interactions with MF_SURP_GNEWS and MF_SURP_BNEWS. Once I control for MF_LOSS, I 
find that the coefficient for TREAT×POST× MF_SURP_GNEWS is indeed negative and 
significant at the 5% level (β = -14.492; t-stat = -2.11), similar to the primary results in panel B 
of table 4.6. Next, columns (2) and (3) report the regression results using the alternative set of 
control variables and excluding loss forecast observations. In the constant derivative unmatched 
sample (column (2)), the coefficient for TREAT×POST× MF_SURP_GNEWS is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level (β = -17.666; t-stat = -2.39). Hence, excluding the loss 
forecasts yield results that are consistent with the primary results, reported in table 4.6, but with a 
higher significance level. Results in the constant derivative matched sample (column (3)) are 
similar to both the results in table 4.14 and the primary results in table 4.6. These results, 




are, indeed, very influential. Their exclusion alters the coefficient for TREAT×POST× 
MF_SURP_GNEWS significantly.  
Based on these results, I conclude that the primary results are not robust to the alternative 
set of control variables that exclude MF_LOSS. The primary results are, however, robust to the 
alternative set of controls, once I also control for the influence of forecast loss observations 
either by way of including MF_LOSS and its interactions with the forecast surprise variables as 
controls in the regression model or by excluding these observations. Accordingly, I caveat that 
excluding a control for MF_LOSS can alter the results observed in tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.10. 
Furthermore, given the influential nature of loss forecast observations and the extremely small 
number of such observations in the constant derivative sample (i.e., 11 and 1 in the unmatched 
and matched samples, respectively), the primary findings may not generalize to loss forecasts. 
4.2.3.6 Other Additional Analyses 
In addition to the above, I carry out some six other additional analyses. The first four analyses, in 
tables D.1 to D.4, test the sensitivity of the primary findings, in table 4.6, to various 
specifications of the regression model. The fifth analysis, reported in table D.5, provides 
regression results including one control variable (and its interaction(s) with MF_SURP  or 
MF_SURP_GNEWS and MF_SURP_BNEWS), at a time. This analysis allows me to better assess 
the reason for changes in the coefficients of interest. Finally, the last analysis, reported in table 
D.6, tests the robustness of the primary results to using a three-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) around the MF date, which includes the one day prior to the MF date, instead of a two-




First, table D.1 reports the results using the full set of control variables, regardless of 
whether they differ between treatment and control groups, using the constant derivative 
unmatched sample. As discussed in section 3.2.2, I exclude from the main regression model 
those control variables that are not statistically different between the treatment and control 
groups to limit the number of unnecessary independent variables. Results are similar to the 
primary results, reported in table 4.6. Hence, the inclusion of control variables considered and 
excluded in the main regressions do not alter results. I do not run this regression using the 
constant derivative matched sample because this can lead to overfitting. The constant derivative 
matched sample comprises only 219 observations and the unconditioned (conditioned) regression 
includes 28 (45) regressors. 
 Second, table D.2 reports the results including industry fixed effects and their interactions 
with MF_SURP (MF_SURP_GNEWS and MF_SURP_BNEWS). Given substantial variation in 
the proportion of derivative users across industries (see table 4.1), I examine whether including 
industry fixed effects alters results. I do not perform this analysis using the constant derivative 
matched sample as industry effects are already controlled in this sample by way of matching 
control and treatment firms within industry. Using the constant derivative unmatched sample, 
results are qualitatively similar to the primary findings, reported in table 4.6, with the following 
two exceptions. First, the coefficient for TREAT × POST × MF_SURP, in column (2) of panel 
A, is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, showing support for H1, in the 
unconditioned regression. Second, the coefficient for TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. Note that the primary results, in table 4.6, 
showed null results for both of these coefficients. Overall, these results show stronger support for 




accounting reduces the credibility of good news management forecasts is robust to including 
industry fixed effects.  
 Third, table D.3 reports the results using continuous control variables and their 
interactions with MF_SURP (MF_SURP_GNEWS and MF_SURP_BNEWS), instead of the 
indicator forms of the control variables. While interactions of continuous variables with 
MF_SURP (MF_SURP_GNEWS and MF_SURP_BNEWS) are difficult to interpret, it preserves 
more information about the controls than the indicator variables. These results are qualitatively 
similar to the main results in table 4.6, suggesting that using continuous control variables, instead 
of the transformed indicator variables, does not alter results. 
Fourth, table D.4 reports the results excluding the stand-alone control variables, and only 
including the MF_SURP- (MF_SURP_GNEWS- and MF_SURP_BNEWS-) interacted controls to 
be more consistent with the regression model in Rogers and Stocken (2005). All results are 
qualitatively consistent with the primary results reported in table 4.6. 
Next, table D.5 reports the results including one control variable (and its interaction(s) 
with MF_SURP or MF_SURP_GNEWS and MF_SURP_BNEWS) at a time. This analysis is not 
aimed to test the robustness of the primary results, but rather as a supplemental analysis, that can 
be used to inform the potential reason for changes in the coefficients of interest to the inclusion 
or exclusion of certain variables. Various parts of section 3.2.2, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 refer to this table.  
 Finally, I examine the robustness of the primary results, in table 4.6, to using a three-day 
CAR instead of a two-day CAR. This analysis allows me to assess whether including the day 
before the MF date affects results. If there is a leakage of news on the day prior to the MF date, 




if including the day prior to the MF date adds noise, I expect results to be weaker using the three-
day CAR than using the two-day CAR. These results, reported in table D.6, are similar to the 
primary findings in table 4.6, with one exception. In panel A, I find that the coefficient for 
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP in the constant derivative matched sample (column (2)) is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Hence, I find results in support 
for H1, even in the unconditioned regression, when I use the three-day CAR instead of the two-
day CAR. This result suggests that there may be some news leakage in the day prior to the MF 
date.  
Overall, I find that primary results, in table 4.6, are robust to the following additional 
alternate regression model specifications, reported in appendix D: (1) including all control 
variables for the unmatched sample; (2) including industry fixed effects and their interactions 
with MF_SURP (MF_SURP_GNEWS and MF_SURP_BNEWS); (3) using continuous control 
variables instead of indicator variables; and (4) excluding stand-alone control variables and only 
including interactions of control variables with MF_SURP (MF_SURP_GNEWS and 
MF_SURP_BNEWS). The primary results are also robust to using a three-day CAR instead of a 
two-day CAR. When results differ from the primary results, they suggest stronger support for 
H1. 
4.3 Fair Value Accounting and Timeliness of Price Discovery (H2) 
This section presents the results of the empirical analyses examining the impact of fair value 
accounting on the timeliness of price discovery. Section 4.3.1 provides the industry distribution 
and compares potential confounding variables between the control and treatment groups in the 
unmatched and matched H2 samples. Section 4.3.2 presents the results of the tests of H2, which 




of positive intraperiod returns and increases the timeliness of price discovery during periods of 
negative intraperiod returns. Section 4.3.3 presents the results of additional analyses that test the 
robustness of the primary results, reported in section 4.3.2, to alternative matched samples. In 
addition, I perform addition analyses to explore potential explanations for the primary results. 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
4.3.1.1 Industry Distribution 
I examine the industry distribution and the proportion of treatment firms within each industry in 
the unmatched H2 sample, identified in panel B of table 3.4, to assess derivative usage. Table 
4.16 reports the frequency distribution of unique firm observations in the unmatched and 
matched H2 samples, by industry and treatment. In the unmatched sample, the following 
industries have the largest representation: manufacturing, business equipment, healthcare and 
other. However, after matching, the healthcare industry is no longer one of the top four most well 
represented industries in the sample due to the large imbalance of derivative users and non-users 
in this industry. Recall that, because I match within industry, the extent of imbalance in 
derivative users and non-users, within industry, affects the composition of the matched sample. 
In contrast, the consumer durables, chemicals and allied products, and telecommunications 
industries have the smallest representation in both the unmatched and matched samples. 
Next, I examine the proportion of treatment firms in each industry to assess derivative 
usage. In the unmatched sample, derivative users comprise the largest proportions of the 
consumer non-durables, energy and extraction, and utilities industries. These industries have 




comprise less than 25% of the following industries: business equipment and healthcare. Overall, 
a little over one-third of the unmatched H2 sample comprises derivative users.  
4.3.1.2 Comparison of Mean Potential Confounding Variables between Control and 
Treatment Groups 
 
I examine differences between the treatment and control groups for variables representing 
potential confounds – namely operational uncertainty and the richness of the information 
environment. As discussed in section 3.2.3, I use OCFVOL to proxy for operational uncertainty 
and MVE as an indicator for the richness of the information environment. Table 4.17 compares 
these variable means between control and treatment groups in the pre-period. I also examine 
analyst following, ANALYSTS_N, calculated as the natural log of one plus the number analysts 
following the firm for the 12-month period, as an alternative proxy for the richness of the 
information environment. Panels A and B report the tests of mean differences in confounding 
variables between the control and treatment groups in the unmatched and matched H2 samples, 
respectively. Panels C and D report the test results for the positive and negative intraperiod 
return matched subsamples, respectively. The positive (negative) intraperiod return subsample 
includes observations whose 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return is positive (negative) in 
both the pre- and post-periods. 
 In panel A, the mean OCFVOL in the treatment group is less than half of that in the 
control group, prior to matching. Hence, derivative users have substantially lower operational 
uncertainty than non-users, suggesting that derivative users, in the sample, use derivatives to 
effectively hedge their risk exposures. In section 3.2.2, I argued that derivative users may have 
greater or lower operational uncertainty depending on whether or not their derivatives are 




MVE and ANALYSTS_N than controls firms, indicating that treatment firms have a richer 
information environment than control firms. This is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Guay 
1999; Zhang 2009; Donohoe 2015; Chang et al. 2016) that finds that derivative users tend to be 
larger and have greater analyst following than non-users. In panel B, after matching on OCFVOL 
and MVE (in addition to industry and sign of intraperiod return), I find no significant differences 
in the means, suggesting a successful match. In addition, the lack of a statistically significant 
difference in ANALYSTS_N suggests that matching on MVE also controls for that indicator of the 
information environment. In fact, MVE and ANALYSTS_N are highly positively correlated 
(untabulated - pearson: ρ = 0.810; spearman: ρ = 0.816). In the positive return subsample (panel 
C), I find no significant differences in the variable means between the control and treatment 
groups. In the negative return subsample (panel D), treatment firms have a marginally larger 
ANALYSTS_N than control firms.39  
4.3.2 The Effect of Fair Value Accounting on the Timeliness of Price Discovery 
To test the effect of exposure to fair value accounting on the timeliness of price discovery, I 
compare the change in IPT from the pre- to the post-SFAS 133 period between derivative users 
(treatment) and non-users (control). That is, I estimate the DiD_IPT as:  
(IPTtreat,post – IPTtreat,pre) – (IPTcontrol,post – IPTcontrol,pre) 
I then test the significance of the DiD_IPT using a null distribution of DiD_IPT where the 
ordering of the monthly returns in each portfolio is randomized, as discussed in section 3.2.3.2. 
Appendix E reports the null distributions for these tests.  H2 predicts that greater exposure to fair 
value accounting reduces the timeliness of price discovery. Consistent with H2, I expect to 
 
39 In section 4.3.3.1, I test whether matching on ANALYSTS_N instead of MVE, in addition to OCFVOL, industry 




observe a negative DiD_IPT, suggesting that the change in information timeliness is more 
negative for the treatment portfolio than for the control portfolio around the implementation of 
SFAS 133. 
Table 4.18 presents the results of the test of H2. I test H2 using the separate positive 
intraperiod return and negative intraperiod return subsamples, in addition to the combined 
sample of positive and negative return observations. I separately examine the positive and 
negative intraperiod return subsamples because, the confirmability of financial reports may be 
more important for firm-years with a net positive return than for those with a net negative return. 
As discussed in section 3.2.2, management-issued bad news is inherently more credible than 
management-issued good news. 
Panel A of table 4.18 presents the results using the unmatched H2 sample. In the 
combined sample, ΔIPT is positive and statistically significant at the 5% significance level in 
both the treatment and control portfolios, indicating that timeliness improved for both groups. 
The DiD_IPT is not statistically significant because increases in IPT are similar in the two 
portfolios.40 The increase in IPT is consistent with the overall increase in voluntary disclosures 
with the enactment of Reg FD in 2000 documented in prior literature (e.g., Heflin et al. 2003; 
Anilowski et al. 2007; Choi et al. 2010). In the positive intraperiod return subsample, ΔIPT is 
positive in both the treatment and control portfolios, but statistically significant in the control 
portfolio only. This results in a negative and statistically significant DiD_IPT at the 10% 
significance level, consistent with H2. In the negative intraperiod return subsample, ΔIPT is 
again positive in both portfolios, but statistically significant in the treatment portfolio only, 
 




resulting in a positive and significant DiD_IPT at the 1% significance level, contrary to H2. 
These preliminary univariate results in the unmatched sample provide support for H2 in the 
positive return subsample. However, in the negative return subsample, the results contradict H2. 
Panel B of table 4.18 presents the results using the matched H2 sample, which controls 
for operational uncertainty and the richness of the information environment. Using the combined 
sample, both the control and treatment portfolios experience an increase in IPT. While the ΔIPT 
is larger in the control portfolio than in the treatment portfolio, the ΔIPT is statistically 
significant in the treatment portfolio only. The resulting DiD_IPT is negative, but not statistically 
significant. In the positive intraperiod return subsample, both the control and treatment portfolios 
increase in IPT, but statistically insignificantly so. This DiD_IPT is negative but statistically 
insignificant. In the negative intraperiod return subsample, ΔIPT is positive and statistically 
significant in both control and treatment portfolios, but the DiD_IPT is insignificant due to 
similar ΔIPT in the two portfolios. Overall, I fail to find support for H2 using the matched 
sample. 
To assess whether return reversals influence IPT, I plot the IPT curves for the four 
portfolios: treatment-pre, treatment-post, control-pre and control-post. As I discuss in appendix 
B, non-trivial return reversals can inflate IPT values, rendering the IPT metric problematic for 
interpreting the timeliness of price discovery. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 presents the IPT curves for the 
unmatched and matched H2 samples, respectively. Each figure contains three plots: for the 
combined sample (panel A) and each of the positive and negative (panels B and C, respectively) 
intraperiod return subsamples.  
In appendix B, I find that portfolios with even 50 observations average out idiosyncratic 




observations contain return reversals that are notably larger than those in portfolios with 100 or 
200 observations. Thus, it is better to use larger portfolio sizes to minimize the impact of 
reversals. All portfolios represented in figures 4.1 and 4.2 have greater than 50 observations and, 
thus, are deemed reasonable for interpreting IPT. Nevertheless, differences in the extent of return 
reversals between two portfolios with different sample sizes can influence results. Therefore, one 
should use caution when interpreting IPT for smaller portfolios (i.e., fewer than 500 
observations).41 I focus the following discussion on non-trivial return reversals that comprise 
greater than 5% of the 12-month buy-and-hold return.  
Figure 4.1 plots IPT curves for the unmatched sample/subsamples. Panel A of figure 4.1 
presents the IPT curves for the combined unmatched sample, and displays no return reversals 
throughout the period.42 Hence, IPTs in the combined sample are not influenced by return 
reversals and can be interpreted as the timeliness of price discovery. Panel B presents the IPT 
curves for the positive intraperiod return subsample. In this subsample, the post-period treatment 
portfolio has return reversals between months -5 and -3, which amount to almost 15% of the 12-
month buy-and-hold return. This tends to bias against finding results supporting H2 by inflating 
the post-period treatment portfolio’s IPT value and, thus, making the DiD_IPT more positive 
than if the curve were monotonically increasing. Recall that H2 predicts a negative DID_IPT. 
Finally, panel C presents the IPT curves for the negative intraperiod return subsample. In this 
subsample, the pre-period treatment portfolio has a return reversal between months 2 and 3 that 
comprises nearly 10% of the 12-month buy-and-hold return. This can bias for finding results 
 
41 In appendix B, I find that once the portfolio size become 500 or greater, mean RET_REV equals one, 
indicating zero return reversals. Thus, IPT can be interpreted reliably in these portfolios. 
42 To be clear, the cumulative % 12-month buy-and-hold return is 50.0% at month -4 and 50.2% at month -3 




supporting H2 by inflating the pre-period treatment portfolio’s IPT value, resulting in a less 
positive DiD_IPT. 
Figure 4.2 presents analogous IPT curves for the matched H2 sample/subsamples. In 
panel A, the combined sample shows no return reversals larger than 5% of the 12-month buy-
and-hold return. Hence, IPT can be reasonably used to assess the timeliness of price discovery. 
In the positive return subsample (panel B), the post-period treatment portfolio again has a return 
reversal between months -5 and -3, similar to that observed in the unmatched H2 sample in panel 
B of figure 4.1. However, this reversal is larger than that observed in the unmatched H2 sample; 
it comprises almost 22% of the 12-month buy-and-hold return. The greater salience of the 
reversal in the matched H2 sample, relative to the unmatched H2 sample, may be related to a 
smaller sample size. The control and treatment portfolios in the unmatched positive return 
subsample comprise 274 and 123 observations, while those in the matched positive return 
subsample comprise 66 observations each. As discussed in section 3.2.3 and in appendix B, a 
larger sample better averages away the idiosyncratic returns at the firm level, alleviating return 
reversals. In particular, as documented in appendix B, while portfolios with 50 observations 
reduce return reversals substantially, the maximum return reversal (panel B of table B.2: 1.937) 
approaches two, a value that I deem to be problematic for using IPT to assess timeliness of price 
discovery. The post-period control portfolio also exhibits a return reversal between months -4 
and -3 that comprises almost 7% of the 12-month buy-and-hold return. This partially mitigates 
the influence of the return reversal in the post-period treatment portfolio on the DiD_IPT. 
Nevertheless, the return reversal in the post-period treatment portfolio is larger and, thus, still 




In the negative return subsample (figure 4.2, panel C), both the pre-period treatment and 
control portfolios exhibit return reversals between months 2 and 3. However, the return reversals 
are very similar in magnitude and, thus, the net effect on the DiD is minimal. In fact, the IPT 
curves of the treatment and control portfolios are very similar in both the pre- and the post-
periods, resulting in a very small and insignificant DID_IPT, as observed in panel B of table 
4.18. 
Overall, in the combined samples, no return reversals exceed 5%. Hence, the DID_IPT is 
reliable for interpreting the effect of exposure to fair value accounting on the timeliness of price 
discovery. In the positive return subsamples, the post-period treatment portfolio exhibits non-
trivial return reversals that comprise nearly 15% and 22% of the 12-month buy-and-hold return 
in the unmatched and matched samples, respectively. This can potentially bias against finding 
results supporting H2, by influencing the DID_IPT to be more positive. The larger return 
reversal in the positive return subsamples than in the combined samples or the negative return 
subsamples may be related to smaller sample sizes that fail to sufficiently average away the 
random arrival of firm-level news. Thus, the insignificant results in the matched positive return 
subsample, in panel B of table 4.18, may be associated with a small sample size. Nevertheless, 
the return reversal in this portfolio is 1.433 (untabulated), which is well below the clearly 
problematic RET_REV of two, identified in appendix B.4. Thus, the IPT values in the positive 
return subsample can still be useful, if interpreted with caution. In the negative return 
subsamples, the impact of non-trivial return reversals on IPT are alleviated using the DiD 
research design because the reversals are similar between the treatment and control portfolios in 
both the pre- and post-periods. Thus, the IPT results in the negative return subsample are reliable 




In summary, I fail to find results supporting H2 in the matched sample, suggesting that 
fair value accounting does not affect the timeliness of price discovery, once I control for 
operational uncertainty and the richness of the information environment. A potential reason for 
the lack of evidence supporting H2 is that some of the treatment (control) firms stop (begin) 
using derivatives in the post-period. As seen in section 4.2.2.1, around half of the control firms 
and a non-trivial portion of the treatment firms in the H1 sample change their decision to use/not 
use derivatives in the post-period. To alleviate concerns that such changes bias against finding 
results supporting H2, in the following section, I test H2 after excluding firms that change their 
decision to use or not use derivatives. 
4.3.2.1 Exclude Firms that Change Decision to Use/Not Use Derivatives 
In this section, I test H2 using constant derivative samples, where I keep only firms that continue 
to use (not use) derivatives, similar to those used to test H1 in section 4.2.2.2. This ensures that 
the observed results, in section 4.3.2, are not confounded by changes in firms’ decisions to use 
(not use) derivatives and preserves a constant sample of treatment and control groups, as 
discussed in section 3.2. 
 Panel A of table 4.19 reports the sample selection process for the constant derivative 
unmatched H2 sample. Of the 885 control firms in the unmatched H2 sample, 151 begin using 
derivatives in the post-period. As discussed in section 4.2.2.1, Abdel-Khalik and Chen (2015) 
argue that firms increased their use of non-trading derivatives post-SFAS 133 to reduce earnings 
volatility. Similar to H1, this raises self-selection concerns. However, this likely introduces a 
conservative bias because a decrease in earnings volatility likely decreases informational 




facilitates more timely price discovery. Thus, this biases against finding results in support of H2. 
Next, 27 out the 492 treatment firms stop using derivatives in the post-period. Similar to H1, this 
proportion is much smaller than the proportion of control firms that begin using derivatives in 
the post-period.  
The proportion of control firms that begin using derivatives (151 out of 885 firms) in the 
H2 sample is much smaller than that in the H1 sample where 44 out of 97 control firms stopped 
using derivatives (see table 4.4, panel A). This is likely associated with the fact that the H1 
sample only includes firms that issue management forecasts, which tend to be larger. Larger 
firms are more likely to use derivatives in the post-period, as discussed in section 4.2.1.1. The 
average pre-period market value of equity in the H1 unmatched sample is $11.067 billion, 
whereas it is only $2.164 billion in the H2 unmatched sample (untabulated).  
Panel B of table 4.19 reports the constant derivative matched H2 sample. To create a 
constant derivative matched sample, I perform a new match within the constant derivative 
unmatched H2 sample, shown in panel A of table 4.19, with 734 and 465 control and treatment 
firms, respectively.  As discussed in section 3.3.2, I match on OCFVOL (26 cutpoints), MVE (10 
cutpoints), industry and sign of intraperiod return, using CEM. This matching process yields 224 
matched pairs of control and treatment firms. 
 Panel A of table 4.20 presents the results of testing H2 using the constant derivative 
unmatched sample. Results remain qualitatively unchanged from the results in panel A of table 
4.18 using the unmatched sample. In the positive intraperiod return subsample, the DiD_IPT is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% significance level and, in the negative intraperiod 




level. The combined sample yields null results due to the opposite effects found in the positive 
and negative return subsamples.  
Next, I examine the results using the constant derivative matched sample in panel B of 
table 4.20. I continue to find an insignificant DiD_IPT in the combined sample and the positive 
return subsample, similar to the results in panel B of table 4.18. However, the DiD_IPT is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level in the negative return subsample, 
which differs from the insignificant DiD_IPT in table 4.18 (panel B) and contradicts H2.  
 In figure 4.3, I plot the IPT curves for the constant derivative matched sample to look for 
non-trivial return reversals that may render the IPT metric problematic for interpreting the 
timeliness of price discovery, as discussed in appendix B. For brevity, I only highlight notable 
differences in return reversals between the constant derivative matched sample IPT curves and 
the corresponding IPT curves for the full matched sample in figure 4.2, discussed above. 
Panels A, B and C of figure 4.3 presents the IPT curves for the combined, the positive 
intraperiod return and the negative intraperiod return constant derivative matched 
sample/subsamples, respectively. There are no notable differences in return reversals between 
the constant derivative matched sample and the full matched sample (figure 4.2) using the 
combined sample or the positive intraperiod return subsample. In the positive return subsample 
(figure 4.3, panel B), I continue to find a non-trivial return reversal in the post-period treatment 
portfolio. 
In the negative intraperiod return subsample (figure 4.3, panel C), the post-period control 
portfolio has a return reversal between months -6 and -5 that comprises almost 6.8% of the 12-




period IPT value for the control group. However, the post-period treatment portfolio also has a 
return reversal between months -6 and -5, which comprises 3.4% of the 12-month buy-and-hold 
return, offsetting some of the return reversal observed in the post-period control portfolio. In 
particular, an inflation of the IPT value for the post-period control group due to return reversal 
biases for finding a negative DiD_IPT. However, I find a positive, not a negative, DiD_IPT in 
the negative return subsample; hence, the observed results are not driven by the return reversal in 
the post-period control portfolio.  
Importantly, restricting the sample to firms that continue to hold/not hold derivatives 
widens the gap between the post-period treatment and control portfolio IPT curves within the 
negative return subsample. In panel C of figure 4.2, the two curves are so close that they nearly 
overlap each other, resulting in a small and insignificant DiD_IPT. In the constant derivative 
sample, the higher post-period treatment IPT curve and the lower post-period control IPT curve, 
relative to the full sample, result in a positive and statistically significant DiD_IPT. Thus, it 
appears that including firms that changed their decision to use/not use derivatives biased the 
DiD_IPT to be more negative in this subsample. 
 In summary, I find results supporting H2 in the unmatched H2 sample. However, the 
results continue to fail to provide evidence supporting H2 in the matched sample, even after 
restricting the sample to constant derivative users and non-users, suggesting that an increase in 
fair value accounting exposure does not hinder timely price discovery, once I control for 
potential confounds. In fact, in the negative return subsample, I find results opposite to H2, 
suggesting that fair value accounting increases the timeliness of price discovery. This 




reports and, thus, intraperiod timeliness in a manner that differs from my expectations, when the 
net intraperiod news is negative.  
Another potential interpretation of the null results in the positive return subsample and 
the positive DiD_IPT in the negative return subsample is that increased disclosure requirements 
under SFAS 133 enhanced the transparency of derivative use, increasing, rather than decreasing, 
the confirmability of financial reports.43 It is possible that SFAS 133 enhances the external 
information environment (e.g., analysts) of derivative users, enhancing the timeliness of price 
discovery, relative to non-users. Finally, another potential explanation for these results is that the 
effects of Reg FD are not constant for derivative users and non-users, as I assumed. If Reg FD 
increases voluntary disclosures more for derivative non-users than for users, this can bias against 
finding results for H2 or produce results in the opposite direction from H2. 
Furthermore, in the positive return subsample, an alternative explanation for the null 
result is that the sample size is too small to sufficiently average away the firm-level idiosyncratic 
returns. Recall from section 3.2.3.1 that averaging away random news arrival at the firm level is 
crucial for interpreting IPT as the timeliness of price discovery. Note that the constant derivative 
matched sample portfolios sizes (N = 50) are much smaller than those of the unmatched sample 
(Control: N = 225; Treatment: N = 120) and, in the unmatched sample, I find results supporting 
H2. As documented in appendix B (panel B of table B.2), the mean (median) return reversal 
(RET_REV_Port) in portfolios with 50 observations is 1.066 (1.027), while that in portfolios 
with 100 observations is 1.016 (1.000). Hence, moving from a portfolio size of 50 observations 
 
43 I find support for the increase in disclosures around derivatives. In treatment firms that continue to use 
derivatives in the post-period, within the unmatched H2 sample, the mean (median) number of derivative words 




to that of 100 observations can affect the extent of return reversals in intraperiod portfolio 
returns.44 I discuss potential explanations for the observed results in greater detail in section 4.4. 
4.3.3 Additional Analyses 
In this section, I perform additional analyses to test the sensitivity of the primary findings, 
reported in panel B of table 4.20, to alternative matched samples. Recall that I find null results in 
the combined sample and the positive intraperiod return subsample and opposite results to H2 in 
the negative intraperiod return subsample. I explore potential explanations for the primary 
findings. To do so, I first examine the impact of SFAS 133 on the frequency of management 
forecasts because, in section 2.4.3, I conjecture that low financial report confirmability can 
impede timely price discovery by reducing management’s propensity to issue voluntary 
disclosures. Next, I examine changes in analyst following around SFAS 133 to assess whether 
changes in non-management issued disclosures explain the observed results. 
4.3.3.1 Alternative Matched Samples 
In this section, I test the robustness of the primary results using the constant derivative matched 
sample, presented in panel B of table 4.20, to three alternative matched samples. I focus on the 
results using the constant derivative sample because a non-trivial proportion of firms in the full 
sample, identified in panel B of table 3.4, change their decision to use/not use derivatives in the 
post-period (see table 4.19, panel B). In the first two alternative samples, I separately control for 
each of OCFVOL and MVE to match on fewer dimensions, which provides a larger number of 
matches. While matching on multiple criteria likely produces a better control group that is 
balanced along a number of covariates, it results in a smaller sample size. The constant 
 




derivative OCFVOL-matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL (44 cutpoints), 
industry and sign of intraperiod return, while the constant derivative MVE-matched sample is 
identified using CEM on MVE (10 cutpoints), industry and sign of intraperiod return. The 
constant derivative matched sample comprises 224 pairs of treatment and control firms (see table 
4.19, panel B), while the constant derivative OCFVOL- and MVE-matched samples comprise 
349 and 245 pairs, respectively. For the third alternative sample, I match on analyst following, 
ANALYSTS_N, instead of MVE, as an alternative proxy for the richness of the information 
environment. This sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL (33 cutpoint), ANALYSTS_N (5 
cutpoints), industry and sign of intraperiod return, and results in 257 pairs of treatment and 
control firms. 
Panels A, B and C of table 4.21 present the results using the constant derivative 
OCFVOL-, MVE- and OCFVOL-ANALYSTS_N-matched samples, respectively. The results of the 
OCFVOL-matched sample, in panel A, are qualitatively similar to the primary results in panel B 
of table 4.20. Hence, dropping the control for MVE and consequently increasing the number of 
matches does not significantly alter results. I continue to find results similar to the primary 
results in the MVE-matched sample (panel B), except in the negative intraperiod return 
subsample. In this subsample, the DiD_IPT remains positive, but is not statistically significant as 
it is in the primary results. Hence, it is important to control for operational uncertainty. Finally, 
results are robust to using ANALYSTS_N, instead of MVE, to control for the richness of the 
information environment (panel C).  
Larger portfolio sizes generally do not appear to alter results observed in the constant 
derivative matched sample, reported in panel B of table 4.20. In particular, in the positive return 




unmatched sample, reported in panel A of table 4.20. However, these portfolio sizes (N = 88, 57 
and 66 in panels A, B and C, respectively, of table 4.21) are still substantially smaller than those 
of the constant derivative unmatched sample (Control N = 225 and Treatment N = 120 in panel 
A of table 4.20). Hence, I cannot fully dispel the alternative explanation that the null results in 
the positive return subsample may be attributable to a small portfolio size. As discussed in 
section 4.3.2 and in appendix B, while portfolios with 50 observations noticeably reduce the 
impact of returns reversals to reasonable levels, smaller portfolios still contain larger return 
reversals than larger ones. This effect nearly disappears once the portfolio size reaches 500 
observations (see table B.2). 
4.3.3.2 Frequency of Management Forecasts 
As discussed in section 2.4.3, managers may be less likely to issue voluntary disclosures when 
the financial report confirmability is dampened, and the credibility of voluntary disclosures are 
reduced. So, one of the ways in which, I posit, the confirmatory role of financial reports can 
impede timely price discovery is by reducing management’s likelihood of issuing voluntary 
disclosures. In this section, I compare the change in the frequency of management forecasts from 
the pre- to the post-period between treatment and control groups. The variable for management 
forecast frequency, MF_N, equals the natural log of one plus the number of management 
forecasts issued in the same 12-month period as the IPT period. If the increase in exposure to fair 
value accounting associated with SFAS 133 for derivative users reduces management’s 
likelihood of issuing voluntary disclosure, I expect that treatment firms will experience a more 
negative change in management forecast frequency from the pre- to the post-SFAS 133 period 
than control firms. That is, I expect the DID_MF_N ({MF_Ntreat,post – MF_Ntreat,pre} - 




constant derivative matched H2 sample derived in panel B of table 4.19, which controls for 
operational uncertainty (OCFVOL) and the richness of the information environment (MVE) and 
excludes firms that change their decision to use/not use derivatives in the post-period. 
 Table 4.22 reports the DID_MF_N results. The ΔMF_N is positive and statistically 
significant in both control and treatment groups across all sample/subsamples. This is consistent 
with an increase in voluntary disclosures after Reg FD, as evidenced in Heflin et al. (2003) and 
discussed in section 3.2. In the combined sample and the negative intraperiod return subsample, 
the increase in management forecast frequency is slightly larger in the treatment group than in 
the control group, resulting in a positive, yet statistically insignificant, DiD_MF_N. In the 
positive intraperiod return subsample, the increase in management frequency is slightly larger in 
the control group than in the treatment group, resulting in a negative, yet statistically 
insignificant, DiD_MF_N. 
In sum, I do not find support for my conjecture that an increase in exposure to fair value 
accounting reduces voluntary disclosure frequency. This suggests that exposure to fair value 
accounting does not affect the frequency of management forecasts. However, it is also possible 
that Reg FD increased management forecast frequency more for derivative users than for non-
users, reversing any management forecast decreasing effects SFAS 133 may have had on 
derivative users.  
4.3.3.3 Analyst Following 
The theoretical causal construct in this thesis is the confirmatory role of financial reports and its 
effect on management-issued voluntary disclosures. However, the timeliness of price discovery 




financial press. In this section, I focus on analysts as one of these alternative channels of 
information and explore whether analyst following can explain some of the observed results in 
section 4.3.2. Specifically, I compare the change in analyst following from the pre- to the post-
SFAS 133 period between derivative users and non-users using a DiD t-test. Since analysts are 
major intermediaries of information, changes in analyst following can affect the timeliness of 
price discovery.45 For example, Brown and Rozeff (1978), Fried and Givoly (1982) and O’Brien 
(1988) find evidence suggesting that analysts incorporate timely information into their forecasts. 
This analysis is exploratory in nature as I have no ex ante directional predictions about the DiD. 
However, if the change in analyst following is more positive for derivative users, the null results 
observed in the positive return subsample and the positive DiD_IPT observed in the negative 
return subsample, in panel B of table 4.20, may be driven by a change in the external information 
environment, rather than due to a change in the confirmability of financial reports. 
Table 4.23 presents the results of the DiD t-test of the impact of SFAS 133 on analyst 
following using the constant derivative matched H2 sample (table 4.19, panel B). In the 
combined sample and the negative intraperiod return subsample, I find that both control and 
treatment groups have a negative ΔANALYSTS_N, suggesting a decrease in analyst following. 
Mohanram and Sunder (2006) find that analyst following decreased from the pre- (November 
1999 to October 2000) to the post-Reg FD period (November 2000 to October 2001), which 
partially overlaps with my periods. Bradshaw, Ertimur and O’Brien (2017) highlight that, in 
addition to the enactment of Reg FD, investigations over analysts’ conflicts of interest that led to 
 
45 See pages 416-418 of Healy and Palepu (2001) for a discussion of empirical research that examines the role of 
financial analysts as information intermediaries in capital markets. This review suggests that financial analysts 




the Global Analyst Research Settlement in 2003 also occurred during this period. Such changes 
may have contributed to a wide-spread drop in analyst following.   
In contrast, I find no change in analyst following in either the control or treatment groups 
in the positive intraperiod return subsample. It is possible that a change in analyst following is 
only observed in negative intraperiod return periods, which reflect net bad news, because the role 
of analysts is of greater importance during these periods than in positive return periods, which 
reflect good news. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) argue that the role of analysts is particularly 
important when firms have bad news because managers are more likely to withhold or be less 
forthcoming with bad news. In contrast, managers are more likely to openly communicate good 
news. Thus, if Reg FD made it more difficult for analysts to acquire firm-specific information, 
this effect is likely more pronounced for bad news periods. Furthermore, McNichols and O’Brien 
(1997) find evidence suggesting that analysts are more reluctant to issue bad news forecasts. 
Hence, in the face of greater information acquisition costs, analysts are more likely to drop 
coverage of firms with a poorer outlook (i.e., negative intraperiod returns). 
However, in all sample/subsamples, the DiD_ANALYSTS_N is statistically insignificant: I 
find no significant difference in the change in analyst following around the SFAS 133 
pronouncement between treatment and control groups. Hence, changes in analyst following do 
not explain the positive and significant DiD_IPT for the negative intraperiod return subsample, 
observed in panel B of table 4.20.  
4.4 Conclusion 
The empirical analysis in section 4.2 provides evidence supporting H1 for good news management 




increase in their exposure to fair value accounting under SFAS 133, but only when the management 
forecasts convey good news. Fair value exposure does not appear to affect the credibility of 
forecasts when they convey bad news. Bad news disclosures may be less sensitive to confirmability 
of financial reports, relative to good news, because bad news from management is perceived to be 
inherently more credible. Given mixed evidence on the credibility of good news forecasts using 
the full sample, I caveat that these results may be limited to firms that do not change their decision 
to use/not use derivatives. 
The findings for H1 are generally robust to including firm fixed effects and using an 
alternative matched sample. The results are strengthened once I exclude bundled management 
forecasts, suggesting that concurrent earnings announcements add noise to the test of H1. However, 
using the earliest management forecasts in a given year instead of latest forecasts yields weaker 
results, consistent with the expectation that the impact of a reduction in financial report 
confirmability will have greater test power using management forecasts that are otherwise more 
credible (i.e., shorter horizon forecasts). Interestingly, I find that the primary findings that fair 
value accounting reduces the credibility of good news management forecasts disappears when I 
include an alternative set of control variables. Additional analyses indicate that this loss in 
significance is driven by influential loss forecasts, which comprise less than 2% of the constant 
derivative sample. Once, I control for these observations or exclude them from the analysis, results 
are similar or stronger than the primary results. Finally, the results are robust to various alternate 
specifications of the regression model and to using three-day CAR, instead of two-day CAR. 
Overall, the results provide support that fair value accounting for derivative users lowers the 
credibility of good news management forecasts, highlighting a potential unintended consequence 




Unlike the findings for H1, I fail to find evidence supporting H2 in section 4.3. 
Specifically, in the positive intraperiod return subsample, I find no statistical difference between 
derivative users and non-users in the change in IPT from the pre- to the post-SFAS 133 period, 
after controlling for potential confounds. In contrast, in the negative intraperiod return 
subsample, I find that derivative users experience a more positive, as opposed to the predicted 
negative, change in IPT around SFAS 133 than derivative non-users. These results suggest that 
fair value accounting may not affect, or even increase, the timeliness of price discovery. As 
discussed in section 2.4.3, fair values can enhance the timeliness of price discovery to the extent 
that they are credible, by including more current information in interim financial reports, relative 
to historical costs. Below, I discuss potential alternative explanations for the lack of evidence 
supporting H2. 
First, it is possible that features of SFAS 133, other than fair value accounting, affect the 
confirmability of financial reports in the opposite direction from that predicted. Specifically, in 
addition to increasing fair value accounting exposure for derivative users, SFAS 133 also 
enhanced the transparency of derivatives and their use by standardizing the accounting for 
derivatives and the hedge accounting criteria, and increasing the required disclosures for 
derivatives. I posit that an increase in the transparency of derivative use can enhance the 
confirmability of financial reports if it better equips users to assess the accuracy or truthfulness 
of managers’ non-verified earlier voluntary disclosures. This, in turn, can enhance the timeliness 
of price discovery, as discussed in section 2.4.3. Thus, the increase in transparency of derivative 
use under SFAS 133 provides a force opposite to my prediction in H2, and a potential 




Second, the results on the impact of fair value accounting on the timeliness of price 
discovery may be confounded by Reg FD. I hypothesized that fair value accounting reduces the 
timeliness of price discovery by dampening the confirmability of financial reports. In turn, this 
reduces the credibility of voluntary disclosures and, thus, demotivates managers from issuing 
voluntary disclosures, contributing to less timely price discovery. I find evidence suggesting that 
fair value accounting reduces the credibility of voluntary disclosures (H1), as discussed above. 
However, in section 4.3.3.2, I fail to find evidence suggesting that fair value accounting reduces 
the frequency of voluntary disclosures using management forecasts. The average frequency of 
management forecasts increases in both control and treatment groups, likely due to the 
implementation of Reg FD in 2000, as evidenced in Heflin et al. (2003). While I aim to control 
for temporal effects, such as Reg FD, using a DiD research design, it’s possible that Reg FD 
affects treatment firms differently than control firms. For example, if Reg FD increases 
management forecast frequency more for treatment firms than for control firms, it can bias 
against finding results supporting H2 in the positive return subsample. However, this cannot 
explain the positive and statistically significant DID_IPT in the negative return subsample. 
Third, the lack of statistically significant results in the positive return subsample may be 
due to a lack of power in the research design. In particular, the control and treatment portfolios in 
the subsample, comprising 50 observations each, may be too small to sufficiently average away 
idiosyncratic returns, which can result in return reversals that can inflate the IPT metric. While 
portfolios with 50 observations noticeably average away return reversals, as observed in 
appendix B (table B.2, panel B), the maximum RET_REV approaches two, which I deem to be 
problematic for interpreting IPT as the timeliness of price discovery. Hence, I interpret these 




manifest larger return reversals than the other curves, which can bias against finding results 
supporting H2. In contrast, the negative return subsample portfolios are substantially larger, 
comprising 174 observations each. Portfolios with 200 observations have considerably lower 
return reversals than those with 50 observations (see panel B of table B.2).  
Finally, it is possible that changes in external channels of information, such as analysts, 
confound results. For example, analyst following may increase IPT from the pre- to the post-
period more for derivative non-users than for users, biasing against finding results supporting 
H2. However, in section 4.3.3.3, I do not find any differential changes in analyst following 
around SFAS 133 for derivative users and non-users. Hence, I cannot conclude that the lack of 
evidence supporting H2 relates to changes in analyst following. 
In summary, I find support for H1 but not H2. I explain potential reasons for lack of 
evidence for H2 above. Based on additional analysis, I find some evidence consistent with the 
confounding effects of Reg FD and an inability to adequately average away the random timing of 
firm-level returns for the statistically insignificant DiD_IPT results in the positive return 
subsample. In addition, both the null results in the positive return subsample and the opposite 
results in the negative return subsample could be associated with enhanced transparency of 






Discussion and Conclusion 
This thesis studies the confirmatory role of accounting by examining the impact of fair value 
accounting on two aspects of informational efficiency: the credibility of management forecasts 
and the timeliness of price discovery. As discussed in chapter 2, there exists an ongoing debate 
regarding the trade-off between the relevance and reliability or verifiability of fair values, which 
I argue reflects differential views on the primary role of accounting. Nonetheless, there has been 
a transition towards greater fair value accounting in the last four decades. Given this shift, 
standard setters can benefit from understanding the consequences of fair value accounting from 
the perspective that accounting can enhance the credibility of managers’ voluntary disclosures. 
Specifically, the confirmatory role of financial reports highlights the need to assess the impact of 
fair value accounting on information outside of the financial reports.  
I argue that lower reliability or verifiability associated with fair values can reduce the 
financial reports’ ability to serve a confirmatory role. Thus, I hypothesize that an increase in 
exposure to fair value accounting reduces the credibility of voluntary disclosures and the 
timeliness of price discovery. To examine these hypotheses, I exploit SFAS 133 (FASB 1998), 
which increases fair value accounting exposure for derivative users by mandating all derivatives 
to be reported at fair value. I compare the credibility of voluntary disclosures and the timeliness 
of price discovery of derivative users to those of derivative non-users, pre- versus post-
mandatory adoption of SFAS 133, using a DiD research design. 
 Using management forecasts as a key voluntary disclosure, I find results suggesting that 




when the forecast conveys good news. However, fair value exposure does not appear to affect 
the credibility of forecasts that convey bad news. A potential explanation for the lack of results 
supporting my hypothesis for bad news management forecasts is that the confirmability of 
financial reports is not as important for management-issued bad news, which is inherently more 
credible than management-issued good news. These results highlight a potential unintended 
consequence of fair value accounting on voluntary disclosures. I caveat that these findings are 
limited to the constant derivative sample and, thus, may not generalize to firms that change their 
decision to use (not use) derivatives post-SFAS 133. Furthermore, if there remain time-varying 
differences between control and treatment firms influencing the credibility of management 
forecasts that I fail to capture, the generalizability of the results may be limited to derivative 
users (i.e., treatment firms). 
In additional analyses, I find that loss forecasts, which comprise less than 2% of my 
sample, are highly influential. The failure to control for these loss forecast observations leads to 
null results. In contrast, controlling for these forecasts by including an indicator variable for loss 
forecasts or excluding them from the sample strengthens results in support of H1 for good news 
forecasts. 
In contrast to H1, I fail to find results supporting the second hypothesis, that an increase in 
exposure to fair value accounting reduces the timeliness of price discovery. Specifically, in the 
positive intraperiod return subsample, I find results in the predicted direction, but lacking statistical 
significance. In the negative intraperiod return subsample, on the other hand, I find results in the 
opposite direction from that predicted. These results suggest that fair value accounting does not 
affect or even increases the timeliness of price discovery. To the extent that fair values are credible, 




information into the interim financial reports, relative to historical cost accounting.  
I also identify three alternative explanations for these results. First, SFAS 133 may not 
affect the timeliness of price discovery in the predicted manner due to an increase in the 
transparency of derivative use. Under SFAS 133, additional requirements for hedge qualification, 
hedge accounting and derivative-related disclosures led to an improvement in the transparency of 
derivative use, which can strengthen, rather than weaken, the confirmability of financial reports. 
Because my research strategy identifies derivative users as the group affected by SFAS 133, it 
cannot disentangle the effects of increased uncertainties created by fair value accounting from the 
effects of increased transparency; both are associated with SFAS 133. Future research may find a 
way to isolate these two effects.  
 Second, these results may be driven by potential confounding effects of Reg FD, which 
was enacted between the pre- and post-periods in this thesis. Additional analysis indicates that 
the frequency of management forecasts increases significantly from the pre- to the post-SFAS 
133 period in both treatment and control firms, which is consistent with the effects of Reg FD 
documented in prior literature (e.g., Heflin et al. 2003; Anilowski et al. 2007; Choi et al. 2010). 
While I aim to control for temporal changes in the timeliness of price discovery using a DiD 
research design, it is possible that Reg FD affects treatment firms more strongly than control 
firms. If so, this can bias against finding results supporting H2.  
Finally, a potential explanation for the null results in the positive intraperiod return 
subsample is that I cannot adequately average away firm-level returns, perhaps due to an 




users has a larger return reversal than that of non-users in the post-period, which can bias against 
finding results supporting the hypothesis.  
My study has four primary contributions. First, it contributes to the stream of empirical 
literature examining the confirmatory role of financial reports. This rather sparse literature (e.g., 
Beniluz 2005; Ball et al. 2012a; Frankel et al. 2017) focuses on the impact of audit quality or the 
firm’s commitment to financial reporting quality on management forecast characteristics, 
holding constant accounting standards. I extend this literature by focusing on the impact of a 
change in accounting standard that can adversely affect the confirmability of financial reports. 
By comparing management forecast credibility between derivative users and non-users around 
SFAS 133, I find that an accounting standard that increases measurement uncertainty can 
negatively affect the credibility of voluntary disclosures, consistent with the confirmatory theory. 
Also, incremental to prior studies in this stream, I examine the impact on the timeliness of price 
discovery. However, these results suggest that fair value accounting does not impede timely 
price discovery, contrary to expectations. 
Second, by considering the impact of accounting on information outside of financial 
reports, this study provides policy implications for standard setters. The objective of financial 
reporting is “to provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing 
and potential investors…in making decisions about providing resources to the entity” (SFAC 
No.8 OB2, FASB 2010). Given that investor decisions are largely influenced by information 
outside the financial reports, it is important to evaluate whether and, if so, how accounting 
affects this other information. Ball (2001) stresses the importance of considering the interaction 
between financial reporting and other disclosures when evaluating the efficiency of a disclosure 




the reliability of financial reports serves a critical role in sustaining the integrity of financial 
information in capital markets. In particular, no other public information source in capital 
markets is independently verified on a routine basis the way financial reports are. My findings 
suggest that changes in accounting can have unintended consequences for the quality of 
information outside of the financial reports by adversely affecting their credibility. Hence, future 
research assessing the impact of accounting in capital markets should consider that the financial 
report is only one of many information sources in the public financial reporting and disclosure 
system. 
Third, this study contributes to the literature examining the consequences of fair value 
accounting in a capital market setting. Much of this literature (e.g., Barth 1994; Eccher et al. 
1996; Song et al. 2010) comprises value relevance studies. These studies assess whether the fair 
values on the financial reports reflect information that is relevant to investors’ valuation 
decisions, but they cannot, nor are they intended to, assess whether the fair values, at the time of 
the financial report, contain new information content. Illustrating this point, Barth, Beaver and 
Landsman (2001) state that “accounting information can be value relevant but not decision 
relevant if it is superseded by more timely information” (p.80). The key distinction between 
value relevance and decision relevance is, then, timeliness. Thus, I examine an information 
timeliness construct that captures the impact of various information channels. My findings, 
subject to potential alternative explanations discussed above, suggest that fair value accounting 
does not impede timely price discovery. In fact, when the intraperiod return is negative, the 
findings suggest that fair value accounting may lead to more, not less, timely price discovery.  
Fourth, this study contributes to the stream of literature using IPT metrics. Prior literature 




metrics highlight the importance of averaging away the idiosyncratic timing of news arrival at 
the firm level for the IPT to be useful for making inferences about the timeliness of price 
discovery. However, these studies do not discuss this issue in detail. I contribute to this literature 
by demonstrating that the portfolio-level metric averages away the random timing of firm-
specific news considerably. Specifically, I show that the impact of return reversals are 
substantially reduced in portfolio-level IPT metrics, relative to firm-level IPT metrics, and 
provide some insight into how portfolio size affects return reversals using simulation analysis. I 
also create a proxy to capture the extent of return reversals to assess their impact on IPT. 
 My findings and their implications need to be interpreted with caution in light of the 
caveats discussed above. The thesis is also subject to generalizability limitations. In this thesis, I 
focus on the impact of SFAS 133, which affects derivative instruments. The fair values for such 
instruments generally comprise substantial measurement uncertainty and are bi-directional in 
nature. Fair values that involve little or no measurement uncertainty, such as those for actively 
traded securities, may not dampen the confirmability of financial reports. Furthermore, the 
impact of fair value accounting on the confirmability of financial reports may differ when fair 
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The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Timeliness of Price Discovery  
- IPT Curves in the Unmatched H2 Sample 
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IPT - Combined Sample

























Month Relative to Fiscal Year-End
IPT - Positive Intraperiod Return Subsample


















This figure plots the IPT curves for unmatched H2 sample (3.4, panel B). Panels A, B and 
C plot the IPT curves for the combined, the positive intraperiod return and the negative 
intraperiod return sample/subsamples, respectively. The buy-and-hold abnormal return at the end 
of each month is plotted as a percentage of the 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return. The 
portfolio buy-and-hold abnormal return is the equally-weighted hedge return one would earn 
based on perfect foresight of the 12-month buy-and-hold return. It is calculated as the return one 
would earn by taking a long position in firms with a positive 12-month buy-and hold return and a 
short position in firms with a negative 12-month buy-and hold return. Treatment firms include 
derivative users and control firms include derivative non-users, identified in the pre-SFAS 133 
period. The pre-period includes fiscal years ending June 1999 to May 2000 and the post-period 
includes fiscal years ending June 2001 to May 2002, to correspond with the effective date of 
SFAS 133. Positive (negative) intraperiod return subsamples include observations whose 12-



























Month Relative to Fiscal Year-End
IPT - Negative Intraperiod Return Subsample
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Month Relative to Fiscal Year-End
IPT - Combined Sample

























Month Relative to Fiscal Year-End
IPT - Positive Intraperiod Return Subsample




















This figure plots the IPT curves for matched H2 sample (table 3.4, panel B). Panels A, B 
and C plot the IPT curves for the combined, the positive intraperiod return and the negative 
intraperiod return sample/subsamples, respectively. The buy-and-hold abnormal return at the end 
of each month is plotted as a percentage of the 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal return. The 
portfolio buy-and-hold abnormal return is the equally-weighted hedge return one would earn 
based on perfect foresight of the 12-month buy-and-hold return. It is calculated as the return one 
would earn by taking a long position in firms with a positive 12-month buy-and hold return and a 
short position in firms with a negative 12-month buy-and hold return. Treatment firms include 
derivative users and control firms include derivative non-users, identified in the pre-SFAS 133 
period. The pre-period includes fiscal years ending June 1999 to May 2000 and the post-period 
includes fiscal years ending June 2001 to May 2002, to correspond with the effective date of 
SFAS 133. Positive (negative) intraperiod return subsamples include observations whose 12-
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Month Relative to Fiscal Year-End
IPT - Combined Sample

























Month Relative to Fiscal Year-End
IPT - Positive Intraperiod Return Subsample


















This figure plots the IPT curves for constant derivative matched H2 sample (table 4.19, 
panel B). Panels A, B and C plot the IPT curves for the combined, the positive intraperiod return 
and the negative intraperiod return sample/subsamples, respectively. The buy-and-hold abnormal 
return at the end of each month is plotted as a percentage of the 12-month buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns. The portfolio buy-and-hold abnormal return is the equally-weighted hedge 
return one would earn based on perfect foresight of the 12-month buy-and-hold return. It is 
calculated as the return one would earn by taking a long position in firms with a positive 12-
month buy-and hold return and a short position in firms with a negative 12-month buy-and hold 
return. Treatment firms include derivative users and control firms include derivative non-users, 
identified in the pre-SFAS 133 period. The pre-period includes fiscal years ending June 1999 to 
May 2000 and the post-period includes fiscal years ending June 2001 to May 2002, to 
correspond with the effective date of SFAS 133. Positive (negative) intraperiod return 
subsamples include observations whose 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive 

























Month Relative to Fiscal Year-End
IPT - Negative Intraperiod Return Subsample





Sample Selection – H1 
Continued on next page 
  







Intersection of U.S. firms on Compustat and CRSP 9,325      26,455      8,883      
  Less: Observations in financial industry (1,029)    (6,951)       (2,221)    
-         (16,078)     (4,744)    
Set of annual EPS MF issuers on IBES 8,296      3,426        1,918      
Less:
  Observations other than point or closed range estimates (681)       (274)          (134)       
(412)       (196)          (100)       
  Observations issued before the prior year's earnings announcement (1,084)    (264)          (102)       
  Observations with incomplete data to calculate MF_CAR 0,1 (70)         (33)            (22)         
(207)       (114)          (71)         
(656)       (175)          (86)         
  Observations with pre-MF share price below $1.00 (11)         (7)              (5)           
(69)         (39)            (26)         
(119)       (70)            (47)         
  Multiple observations for each firm year, keeping only the latest MF (2,733)    -            -         
Set of observations with necessary management forecast- and firm-level data 2,254      2,254        1,325      
  Less: Observations with no annual earnings per share (EPS) management forecasts (MFs) on
   IBES
  Observations with no analyst forecast for the corresponding firm year issued within (-2,-90) days 
   of the MF date
  Observations where the absolute value of MF_SURP  is greater than 0.10
  Observations with incomplete data to construct control variables
U.S. firms (Fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002)
  Observations issued on or after the fiscal year-end forecasted 




TABLE 3.1 - Continued 
 





Set of observations with necessary management forecast- and firm-level data 2,254         1,325      
  Less: Firms with no pre-period observation (1,175)       (832)       
  Less: Firms with no post-period observation (225)          (199)       
Set of available observations prior to identifying treatment firms and matching 854            294         
  Less: Firms missing SEC 10-k filing to identify treatment firms in latest pre-period (26)            (10)         
Unmatched sample 828            284         
  Less: Firms with no matches using CEM on OCFVOL,  MVE , industry and fiscal year (510)          (172)       
Matched sample 318            112         
Panel C: Samples, by Treatment versus Control
Sample Control Treat Control Treat
Unmatched sample 263           565 97             187           
Matched sample 153           165 56             56             
This table reports the sample selection process for the H1 samples. The sample period includes fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2001 and
2002, where year t represents fiscal years ending June t to May t+1 to correspond with the effective date of SFAS 133. Panel A
reports the sample selection process to arrive at the set of observations with necessary management forecast- and firm-level data.
Panel B reports the sample selection process to identify the unmatched and the matched samples. Panel C reports each of the
unmatched and matched samples, by treatment versus control group. Treatment firms include derivative users and control firms
include derivative non-users, identified in the latest pre-SFAS 133 period year (1998 or 1999). The matched sample is identified
using CEM on OCFVOL (5 cutpoints), MVE (4 cutpoints), the Fama-French 12 industry classifications and fiscal year. All variables
are defined in Appendix A.









Panel A: Before Matching (Unmatched Sample)
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Diff.
OCFVOL 0.091 0.110 0.041 0.034 -0.049 -4.29 ***
MVE 6.430 1.607 8.052 1.722 1.622 7.87 ***
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Diff.
OCFVOL 0.054 0.041 0.046 0.032 -0.008 -1.19
MVE 6.974 1.633 7.331 1.721 0.357 1.13
Difference in Means
Difference in Means
    This table reports the difference in the covariate means between the treatment and control groups 
for the H1 sample in the latest pre-period year, the year of the match, before and after matching. The 
matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (5 cutpoints), MVE  (4 cutpoints), the Fama-
French 12 industry classifications and fiscal year (see panel B of table 3.1). ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on the two-tailed tests. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.
Panel B: After Matching (Matched Sample)
T-stat
T-stat
Control (N = 56) Treatment (N = 56)





Sample Representativeness - H1 
Continued on next page 
  
Fiscal year N % Sample N % Sample N % Group N % Pop.
1998 71                 22.3 167               20.2 283               12.4 5,566     28.5
1999 70                 22.0 189               22.8 322               14.1 5,281     27.1
2001 84                 26.4 225               27.2 807               35.4 4,511     23.1
2002 93                 29.3 247               29.8 868               38.1 4,146     21.3
Total 318        100.0 828        100.0 2,280     100.0 19,504   100.0
Panel A: Temporal Distribution of Samples versus Population
Compustat 
Population 
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Industry N % Sample N % Sample N % Set N % Pop.
Consumer Non-Durables 41          12.9 97          11.7 286        8.4 1,218     6.2
Consumer Durables 10          3.1 27          3.3 117        3.4 565        2.9
Manufacturing 20          6.3 114        13.8 413        12.1 2,284     11.7
Energy and Extraction 5            1.6 10          1.2 83          2.4 742        3.8
Chemicals and Allied Products 11          3.5 42          5.1 100        2.9 472        2.4
Business Equipment 52          16.3 113        13.6 707        20.6 4,966     25.5
Telecommunications 14          4.4 23          2.8 87          2.5 693        3.6
Utilities -        0.0 51          6.2 186        5.4 569        2.9
Wholesale and Retail           72 22.6 142        17.1 557        16.3 2,367     12.1
Healthcare 27          8.5 101        12.2 347        10.1 2,517     12.9
Other 66          20.8 108        13.0 543        15.9 3,111     16.0
Total 318             100.0 828             100.0 3,426          100.0 19,504        100.0 
  This table reports the sample representativeness of the unmatched and matched H1 samples (see table 3.1, panel B) in relation to 
the Compustat population and the set of annual EPS MF issuers (see table 3.1, panel A). Panels A and B of this table provide the 
temporal and industry distributions, respectively, of each of the samples, set and population. All samples/set/population include 
fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002 and excludes firms in the financial industry. Industry classifications are based on the Fama 





Panel B: Industry Distribution of Samples versus Population






Sample Selection - H2 
Continued on next page 
Panel A: Set of Observations with Necessary IPT Data
 Number of 
Firms 
 Fiscal 1999 Fiscal 2001  Total  Total 
Intersection of U.S. firms on Compustat and CRSP 7,107         6,182         13,289       7,765         
Less:
Observations in financial industry (1,826)        (1,671)        (3,497)        (1,953)        
Observations with less than 10 months of monthly returns for fiscal year (762)           (404)           (1,166)        (601)           
Set of observations with necessary IPT data 4,519         4,107         8,626         5,211         
Panel B: Unmatched and Matched Samples
Number of 
Firm-Years
 Number of 
Firms
Set of observations with necessary IPT data 8,626         5,211         
  Less: Firms with no pre-period observation (692)           (692)           
  Less: Firms with no post-period observation (1,104)        (1,104)        
6,830         3,415         
  Less: Firms with insufficient data to construct OCFVOL  in pre-period (172)           (86)             
  Less: Firms missing MVE  in pre-period (134)           (67)             
(3,712)        (1,856)        
Set of available observations prior to identifying treatment firms and matching 2,812         1,406         
  Less: Firms missing SEC 10-k filing to identify treatment firms in pre-period (58)             (29)             
Unmatched sample 2,754         1,377         
(1,578)        (789)           
Matched sample 1,176         588            
Set of firms with both pre- and post-period observations
Number of Firm-Years
  Less: Firms with no matches using CEM on OCFVOL , MVE , industry and sign 
   of intraperiod news
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Panel C: Samples, by Treatment versus Control
Sample/Subsample Control Treat Control Treat
Unmatched sample 1,770         984            885            492            
Matched sample 588            588            294            294            
Positive intraperiod return matched subsample 132            132            66              66              
Negative intraperiod return matched subsample 456            456            228            228            
   This table reports the sample selection process for H2. The sample period includes fiscal years 1999 and 2001, where year t represents 
fiscal years ending June t to May t+1 to correspond with the effective date of SFAS 133. Panel A reports the sample selection process to 
arrive at the set of observations with necessary IPT data. Panel B reports the sample selection process to identify the unmatched and 
matched samples. Panel C reports the unmatched and matched samples, by treatment and control group. Treatment firms include derivative 
users and control firms include derivative non-users, identified in the pre-SFAS 133 period (1999). The positive (negative) intraperiod 
return subsample includes observations whose 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive (negative) in both the pre- and post-
periods. The matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (28 cutpoints), MVE  (8 cutpoints), Fama-French 12 industry 
classifications and the sign of intraperiod return. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Number of Firms Number of Firm-Years 




Sample Representativeness - H2 
Continued on next page 
  





Sample N % Pop. N % Pop.
Consumer Non-Durables 44 7.5 86       6.2 340 6.4 262 5.8
Consumer Durables 12 2.0 42       3.1 149 2.8 125 2.8
Manufacturing 114 19.4 201     14.6 608 11.5 520 11.5
Energy and Extraction 34 5.8 69       5.0 189 3.6 174 3.9
Chemicals and Allied Products 12 2.0 40       2.9 127 2.4 106 2.4
Business Equipment 98 16.7 292     21.2 1373 26.0 1220 27.1
Telecommunications 6 1.0 23       1.7 202 3.8 170 3.8
Utilities 24 4.1 57       4.1 153 2.9 125 2.8
Wholesale and Retail 82 13.9 153     11.1 663 12.6 513 11.4
Healthcare 52 8.8 199     14.5 622 11.8 612 13.6
Other 110 18.7 215     15.6 855 16.2 684 15.2
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TABLE 3.5 – Continued 
 
Panel B: Means of Confounding Variables in Samples versus Population
Pre-period (fiscal 1999)
Variable N N N Mean
OCFVOL 588 0.061 *** 1,377 0.091 *   4,646 0.098
MVE 588 5.461 *** 1,377 5.128 ***   4,818 4.980
ANALYSTS_N 588 1.577 *** 1,377 1.384   5,281 1.352
MF_N 588 0.326 *** 1,377 0.280 ***   5,281 0.229
Post-period (fiscal 2001)
Variable N N N Mean
OCFVOL 588 0.059 *** 1,377 0.082 ***   4,292 0.125
MVE 588 5.337 1,377 4.905 ***   4,408 5.169
ANALYSTS_N 588 1.356 1,377 1.223 ***   4,511 1.332




  This table reports the sample representativeness of the H2 samples (table 3.4, panel B) in relation 
to the Compustat population. Panel A of this table provides the industry distributions of the 
unmatched and matched samples and the Compustat population for each of the pre- and post-periods. 
Industry classifications are based on the Fama and French 12 industry classifications. Panel B of this 
table provides the mean descriptive statistics for the unmatched and matched samples and the 
Compustat population for each of the pre- and post-periods and tests whether the sample mean is 
equal to the mean value of the H2 population. Both the unmatched and matched samples and the 
Compustat population include fiscal years 1999 and 2001 and excludes firms in the financial 
industry. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, 
based on the two-tailed t-tests comparing the means of the confounding variables between the 















Industry Distribution for H1 
 
 
Industry  N % Sample  N % Industry  N % Sample  N % Industry
Consumer Non-Durables 33 11.6 26 78.8 14 12.5 7 50.0
Consumer Durables 10 3.5 7 70.0 4 3.6 2 50.0
Manufacturing 39 13.7 35 89.7 8 7.1 4 50.0
Energy and Extraction 4 1.4 3 75.0 2 1.8 1 50.0
Chemicals and Allied Products 13 4.6 11 84.6 4 3.6 2 50.0
Business Equipment 39 13.7 21 53.8 18 16.1 9 50.0
Telecommunications 7 2.5 2 28.6 4 3.6 2 50.0
Utilities 16 5.6 15 93.8 0 0.0 0 NA
Wholesale and Retail 50 17.6 24 48.0 24 21.4 12 50.0
Healthcare 34 12.0 25 73.5 10 8.9 5 50.0
Other 39 13.7 18 46.2 24 21.4 12 50.0
Total   284 100.0   187 65.8   112 100.0     56 50.0
TreatmentAll
Matched Sample
  This table reports the industry distribution of the unmatched and matched H1 samples (table 3.1, panel B), using unique firm 
observations. Treatment firms include derivative users identified in the latest pre-period. Industry classifications are based on the 








Descriptive Statistics – H1 
Continued on next page 
  
Panel A: Unmatched Sample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
MF_CAR 0,1 828 -0.015 0.097 -0.121 -0.045 -0.006 0.030 0.072
MF_SURP 828 -0.003 0.012 -0.011 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.003
MF_BNEWS 828 0.550 0.498 0 0 1 1 1
OCFVOL 828 0.049 0.051 0.013 0.021 0.035 0.060 0.096
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 828 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MF_LOSS 828 0.017 0.129 0 0 0 0 0
MF_WIDTH 828 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.006
MF_HORIZON 828 133.694 95.330 23 66 98 193.5 284
MTB 828 4.462 16.299 1.049 1.690 2.744 4.846 8.480
MVE ($B) 828 11.765 31.064 0.193 0.571 1.968 7.225 24.749
EA_CONCUR 828 0.530 0.499 0 0 1 1 1
EA_SURP 439 0.003 0.040 -0.018 -0.004 0.002 0.005 0.014
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 439 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
EA_LOSS 439 0.105 0.307 0 0 0 0 1
Panel B: Matched Sample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
MF_CAR 0,1 318 -0.016 0.101 -0.114 -0.044 -0.006 0.038 0.073
MF_SURP 318 -0.002 0.011 -0.010 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004
MF_BNEWS 318 0.528 0.500 0 0 1 1 1
OCFVOL 318 0.048 0.034 0.014 0.024 0.038 0.061 0.096
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 318 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MF_LOSS 318 0.006 0.079 0 0 0 0 0
MF_WIDTH 318 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005
MF_HORIZON 318 135.692 97.752 22 67 93.5 223 282
MTB 318 4.153 18.042 0.908 1.502 2.649 4.277 6.498
MVE ($B) 318 8.629 26.755 0.181 0.468 1.428 4.613 15.748
EA_CONCUR 318 0.538 0.499 0 0 1 1 1
EA_SURP 171 0.001 0.025 -0.018 -0.002 0.002 0.006 0.011
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 171 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
EA_LOSS 171 0.094 0.292 0 0 0 0 0
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Panel C.1: Combined Unmatched Sample, Control versus Treatment Firms
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 263 -0.004 0.015 565 -0.002 0.011 0.003 2.45 *
MF_BNEWS 263 0.536 0.500 565 0.556 0.497 0.020 0.53
OCFVOL 263 0.068 0.075 565 0.040 0.031 -0.028 -5.77 ***
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 263 -0.0002 0.0010 565 0.0000 0.0005 0.0002 2.77 **
MF_LOSS 263 0.042 0.201 565 0.005 0.073 -0.037 -2.87 **
MF_WIDTH 263 0.003 0.005 565 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -2.00 *
MF_HORIZON 263 4.618 0.954 565 4.522 0.967 -0.095 -1.33
MTB 263 3.947 7.901 565 4.701 18.983 0.755 0.81
MVE 263 6.650 1.692 565 8.130 1.742 1.480 11.61 ***
EA_CONCUR 263 0.494 0.501 565 0.547 0.498 0.053 1.41
EA_SURP a 130 0.006 0.045 309 0.001 0.038 -0.005 -1.19
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 130 0.001 0.009 309 0.000 0.009 -0.001 -1.05
EA_LOSS 130 0.115 0.321 309 0.100 0.301 -0.015 -0.46
Panel C.2: Good News Unmatched Subsample, Control versus Treatment Firms
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 122 0.003 0.004 251 0.003 0.008 0.001 1.29
OCFVOL 122 0.069 0.076 251 0.042 0.032 -0.027 -3.70 ***
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| 122 0.0000 0.0001 251 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 2.03 *
MF_LOSS 122 0.041 0.199 251 0.000 0.000 -0.041 -2.27 *
MF_WIDTH 122 0.002 0.005 251 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -1.19
MF_HORIZON 122 4.727 0.868 251 4.608 0.938 -0.119 -1.21
MTB 122 3.532 3.580 251 4.064 14.290 0.532 0.56
MVE 122 6.710 1.767 251 12.850 7.987 1.778 6.54 ***
EA_CONCUR 122 0.549 0.500 251 0.566 0.497 0.017 0.30
EA_SURP a 67 0.007 0.045 142 0.000 0.033 -0.007 -1.10
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 67 0.001 0.008 142 -0.001 0.007 -0.002 -1.32
EA_LOSS 67 0.119 0.327 142 0.092 0.289 -0.028 -0.60
T-stat
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Panel C.3: Bad News Unmatched Subsample, Control versus Treatment Firms
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 141 -0.010 0.019 314 -0.006 0.011 0.004 2.63 **
OCFVOL 141 0.067 0.074 314 0.039 0.031 -0.029 -4.41 ***
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 141 -0.0004 0.0013 314 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0003 2.60 *
MF_LOSS 141 0.043 0.203 314 0.010 0.097 -0.033 -1.84
MF_WIDTH 141 0.003 0.005 314 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -1.67
MF_HORIZON 141 4.523 1.016 314 4.454 0.985 -0.069 -0.67
MTB 141 4.306 10.270 314 5.211 22.037 0.905 0.6
MVE 141 6.598 1.628 314 8.244 1.707 1.646 9.82 ***
EA_CONCUR 141 0.447 0.499 314 0.532 0.500 0.085 1.68
EA_SURP a 63 0.006 0.045 167 0.002 0.042 -0.004 -0.61
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 63 0.002 0.011 167 0.001 0.010 -0.001 -0.43
EA_LOSS 63 0.111 0.317 167 0.108 0.311 -0.003 -0.07
Panel D.1: Combined Matched Sample, Control versus Treatment Firms
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 153 -0.002 0.012 165 -0.001 0.010 0.002 1.31
MF_BNEWS 153 0.529 0.501 165 0.527 0.501 -0.002 -0.04
OCFVOL 153 0.051 0.036 165 0.045 0.031 -0.006 -1.54
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 153 -0.0001 0.0008 165 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 1.98 *
MF_LOSS 153 0.013 0.114 165 0.000 0.000 -0.013 -1.42
MF_WIDTH 153 0.002 0.005 165 0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.85
MF_HORIZON 153 4.554 1.017 165 4.541 1.005 -0.013 -0.11
MTB 153 4.363 9.957 165 3.959 23.178 -0.404 -0.20
MVE 153 7.185 1.740 165 10.841 7.489 1.781 1.54
EA_CONCUR 153 0.497 0.502 165 0.576 0.496 0.079 1.41
EA_SURP a 76 0.002 0.032 95 0.000 0.018 -0.002 -0.54
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 76 0.000 0.006 95 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.57
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TABLE 4.2 - Continued 
  Continued on next page 
  
Panel D.2: Good News Matched Sample, Control versus Treatment Firms
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 72 0.002 0.004 78 0.004 0.010 0.002 1.61
OCFVOL 72 0.052 0.037 78 0.052 0.036 0.000 0.05
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 72 0.0000 0.0001 78 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 1.70
MF_LOSS 72 0.014 0.118 78 0.000 0.000 -0.014 -1.00
MF_WIDTH 72 0.002 0.004 78 0.002 0.004 0.000 -0.15
MF_HORIZON 72 4.681 0.888 78 4.615 0.950 -0.066 -0.44
MTB 72 3.562 3.605 78 2.367 21.256 -1.195 -0.49
MVE 72 7.197 1.751 78 7.162 1.694 -0.035 -0.12
EA_CONCUR 72 0.583 0.496 78 0.564 0.499 -0.019 -0.24
EA_SURP a 42 0.005 0.042 44 0.005 0.017 0.000 0.01
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 42 0.001 0.008 44 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.38
EA_LOSS 42 0.095 0.297 44 0.068 0.255 -0.027 -0.45
Panel D.3: Bad News Matched Sample, Control versus Treatment Firms
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 81 -0.007 0.015 87 -0.006 0.007 0.001 0.71
OCFVOL 81 0.050 0.035 87 0.039 0.026 -0.011 -2.39 *
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 81 -0.0003 0.0011 87 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 1.47
MF_LOSS 81 0.012 0.111 87 0.000 0.000 -0.012 -1.00
MF_WIDTH 81 0.003 0.005 87 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -1.03
MF_HORIZON 81 4.440 1.113 87 4.475 1.052 0.034 0.21
MTB 81 5.074 13.256 87 5.386 24.811 0.312 0.10
MVE 81 7.174 1.741 87 7.782 1.815 0.608 2.21 *
EA_CONCUR 81 0.420 0.497 87 0.586 0.495 0.166 2.17 *
EA_SURP a 34 -0.001 0.012 51 -0.004 0.017 -0.003 -1.06
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 34 0.000 0.000 51 0.000 0.001 0.000 -1.58




Difference in MeansControl Treat
Control Treat
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TABLE 4.2 - Continued 
 
 
        This table reports the descriptive statistics of management forecast and firm characteristic variables 
for the H1 samples (table 3.1, panel B). Panels A and B report the descriptive statistics for the unmatched 
and matched samples, respectively. For ease of interpretation, the summary statistics for EA_SURP, 
EA_SURP× |EA_SURP|  and EA_LOSS  are based only on management forecasts that are issued 
concurrently with an earnings announcement. MF_HORIZON  and MVE($B)  are reported as unlogged 
amounts in panels A and B only. Panels C.1 to D.3 report the descriptive statistics of management forecast 
and firm characteristic variables, by control and treatment firms, as well as the results of the t-test of 
means for the unmatched and matched samples/subsamples. Panels C.1, C.2 and C.3 report the descriptive 
statistics and the t-test results for the combined, good news (positive MF_SURP ), and bad news (negative 
MF_SURP ) unmatched sample/subsamples, respectively.  Panels D.1, D.2 and D.3 report the descriptive 
statistics and the t-test results for the combined, good news, and bad news matched sample/subsamples, 
respectively. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based 
on the two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
(Test of H1) 
Continued on next page 
  
Panel A: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Not Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? -0.007 -0.009 -0.005 -0.032 * -0.031 *
[-0.71] [-0.95] [-0.49] [-1.95] [-1.90]   
POST ? 0.031 *** 0.032 *** 0.033 *** 0.035 ** 0.034 **
[2.85] [2.92] [2.91] [2.59] [2.54]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.016 0.015
[-0.12] [-0.12] [-0.23] [0.80] [0.76]   
MF_SURP + 1.782 ** 2.647 ** 4.778 *** 1.706 *** 2.489 **
[1.86] [1.76] [3.12] [4.85] [2.57]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? -0.244 -0.484 -0.250 0.186 0.028
[-0.21] [-0.40] [-0.28] [0.14] [0.02]   
POST × MF_SURP + 0.685 0.593 0.272 2.314 *** 2.609 ***
[0.72] [0.60] [0.27] [4.58] [3.80]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - 2.506 * 2.604 * 1.652 -0.317 -0.688
[1.58] [1.60] [1.01] [-0.18] [-0.36]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.016 ** -0.015 **                
[-2.51] [-2.41]                
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP - -1.070 -1.697 *                
[-1.07] [-1.51]                
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| - -50.160 *** -16.430
[-2.62] [-1.06]   
MF_LOSS ? 0.012                
[0.40]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP - 1.011                
[0.60]                
HiMF_WIDTH ? -0.010                
[-1.36]                
HiMF_WIDTH × MF_SURP - 1.769 **                
[2.46]                
HiMVE ? -0.008                
[-1.19]                
HiMVE × MF_SURP - -1.554 *                
[-1.50]                
Constant ? -0.020 ** -0.012 -0.005 -0.019 * -0.018 *
[-2.48] [-1.32] [-0.52] [-1.77] [-1.73]   
N 828 828 828 318 318
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.138 0.167 0.166 0.165
df_m 7 9 16 7 8
df_r 283 283 283 111 111
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TABLE 4.3 - Continued 
Continued on next page  
Panel B: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? -0.005 -0.009 -0.012 -0.037 * -0.043 *
[-0.46] [-0.74] [-1.00] [-1.83] [-1.86]   
POST ? 0.031 ** 0.029 ** 0.026 ** 0.029 * 0.028 *
[2.47] [2.29] [2.11] [1.90] [1.86]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.012 -0.009 -0.007 0.026 0.030
[-0.76] [-0.62] [-0.50] [1.11] [1.19]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS + 3.007 3.389 2.160 0.170 0.101
[0.83] [0.83] [0.54] [0.10] [0.06]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 1.702 ** 1.798 5.174 *** 1.898 *** 0.209
[1.67] [1.13] [2.71] [6.15] [0.07]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? -1.626 0.203 6.296 2.233 8.163 **
[-0.44] [0.05] [1.42] [0.81] [2.23]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -0.097 -0.148 -0.556 -0.722 -0.126
[-0.07] [-0.10] [-0.53] [-0.34] [-0.04]   
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + -0.130 3.825 8.811 * 6.057 ** 4.954
[-0.03] [0.70] [1.61] [1.79] [1.13]   
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + 0.733 0.695 0.740 1.946 *** 1.325 **
[0.77] [0.66] [0.76] [4.55] [1.87]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - 6.436 3.574 -4.142 -4.824 -8.445 **
[1.08] [0.60] [-0.79] [-1.21] [-1.88]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.654 0.653 -0.302 1.116 1.336
[0.42] [0.42] [-0.21] [0.35] [0.41]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.009 -0.009 -0.003
[-1.39] [-1.42] [-0.24]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -4.881 ** -4.014 ** -2.044
[-1.78] [-1.66] [-0.64]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.144 -0.204 2.708
[-0.15] [-0.20] [1.04]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS × |MF_SURP| - 33.807                
[0.46]                
MF_SURP_BNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -60.452 ***                
[-3.06]                
MF_LOSS ? 0.080 ***                
[3.81]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -13.760 ***                
[-4.16]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 2.494 *                
[1.65]                
HiMVE ? 0.007 0.004
[0.92] [0.30]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -7.944 *** -5.351 ***
[-2.45] [-3.75]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.306 0.399
[-0.23] [0.15]   
DV: MF_CAR 0,1
Unmatched Sample Matched Sample
(1) (3) (4) (5)(2)
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[-0.32]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 4.420 *
[1.95]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -1.444
[-1.41]   
Constant ? -0.022 ** -0.015 -0.013 -0.017 -0.016
[-2.29] [-1.53] [-1.25] [-1.46] [-1.07]   
N 828 828 828 318 318
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.156 0.194 0.157 0.167
df_m 11 14 22 11 20
df_r 283 283 283 111 111
    This table presents the tests of H1, which hypothesizes that greater exposure to fair value accounting reduces the 
credibility of voluntary forward-looking disclosures. Panel A reports the regression results, where the management 
forecast response coefficient is not conditioned on the sign of the management forecast surprise (MF_SURP ). Panel B 
reports the regression results, where the management forecast response coefficient is conditioned on the sign of 
MF_SURP . The dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return around the management forecast, 
MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT  is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that use derivatives in the latest pre-period, and 
zero otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable that equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and zero otherwise. Columns 
(1) - (3) report the results for the unmatched sample and columns (4) and (5) report the results for the matched sample. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on the one-tailed tests for 
signed predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. All t-statistics, in brackets, are estimated using firm-level clustering 
and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
DV: MF_CAR 0,1
Unmatched Sample Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




Constant Derivative Samples – H1 
Panel A: Constant Derivative Unmatched Sample
Control Treat Total Control Treat Total
Unmatched sample (table 3.1, panel B) 263       565       828       97         187       284       
Less: Treatment firms that stop using derivatives between pre- to post-period            -   (29)       (29)                  -   (9)         (9)         
Less: Control firms that begin using derivatives between pre- to post-period (125)                -   (125)      (44)                 -   (44)       
138       536       674       53         178       231       
          (3)           (4)           (7)           -             -             -   
Constant derivative unmatched sample 135       532       667       53         178       231       
Panel B: Constant Derivative Matched Sample
Control Treat Total Control Treat Total
Matched sample (table 3.1, panel B) 153       165       318       56         56         112       
Less: Treatment firms that stop using derivatives between pre- to post-period            -   (14)       (14)                  -   (4)         (4)         
Less: Control firms that begin using derivatives between pre- to post-period (82)                  -   (82)        (29)                 -   (29)       
71         151       222       27         52         79         
          (1)           (2)           (3)           -             -             -   
Constant derivative matched sample 70         149       219       27         52         79         
Number of Firms Number of Firm-Years 
 Number of Firm-Years Number of Firms
Set of observations with at least one post-period observation whose derivative 
  use (non-use) is consistent with classification in the latest pre-period
Less: firm-years whose derivative use (non-use) is inconsistent with 
  classification in latest pre-period
Set of observations with at least one post-period observation whose derivative 
  use (non-use) consistent with classification in the latest pre-period
Less: firm-years whose derivative use (non-use) is inconsistent with 
  classification in latest pre-period
    Panels A and B of this table report the number of firms and their respective firm-years that enter the constant derivative unmatched and matched 
samples, respectively. The constant derivative samples include only those firms in the unmatched and matched sample, identified in panel B of 
table 3.1, with at least one post-period observation whose derivative use (non-use) is consistent with that in the latest pre-period and excludes any 
firm-years whose derivative use (non-use) is inconsistent with that in the latest pre-period. 













Panel A: Combined Constant Derivative Matched Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
OCFVOL 0.059 0.044 0.046 0.032 -0.012 -1.28
MVE 6.684 1.550 7.343 1.734 0.659 1.72
Panel B: Good News Constant Derivative Matched Subsample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
OCFVOL 0.067 0.049 0.053 0.035 -0.015 -0.93
MVE 6.630 1.465 7.227 1.620 0.597 1.1
Panel C: Bad News Constant Derivative Matched Subsample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
OCFVOL 0.052 0.040 0.041 0.029 -0.010 -0.87




    This table reports the difference in the covariate means between the treatment and control 
groups in the constant derivative matched H1 sample (table 4.4, panel B) in the latest pre-period 
year, the year of the match. Panels A, B and C report the descriptive statistics and the t-test results 
for the combined, the good news (positive MF_SURP ), and the bad news (negative MF_SURP ) 
constant derivative matched sample/subsamples, respectively. The matched sample is identified 
using CEM on OCFVOL  (5 cutpoints), MVE  (4 cutpoints), the Fama-French 12 industry 
classifications and fiscal year (table 3.1, panel B). All variables are defined in Appendix A.




Treatment (N = 52)Control (N = 27)
Control (N = 12) Treatment (N = 23)




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
- Constant Derivative Sample (Test of H1) 
Continued on next page 
  
Panel A: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Not Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? 0.002 0.006 -0.022 -0.018
[0.15] [0.40] [-0.97] [-0.77]   
POST ? 0.036 ** 0.043 ** 0.042 * 0.045 *
[2.07] [2.45] [1.73] [1.93]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.008 -0.013 0.008 0.003
[-0.43] [-0.67] [0.28] [0.10]   
MF_SURP + 3.404 *** 5.239 *** 1.754 *** 3.725 ***
[2.61] [2.68] [4.50] [2.45]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? -1.911 -0.881 0.119 -0.499
[-1.31] [-0.63] [0.09] [-0.39]   
POST × MF_SURP + -0.249 2.062 2.513 *** 3.272 ***
[-0.16] [1.24] [4.51] [3.58]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - 3.342 * -0.323 -0.692 -1.597
[1.64] [-0.15] [-0.38] [-0.74]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.017 **                
[-2.33]                
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP - -2.701 **                
[-1.73]                
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| - -34.634 -35.027
[-1.18] [-1.52]   
MF_LOSS ? 0.003                
[0.10]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP - -1.323                
[-0.79]                
HiMF_WIDTH ? -0.013 *
[-1.62]
HiMF_WIDTH × MF_SURP - 2.048 *
[1.93]
HiMVE ? -0.011 *
[-1.42]                
HiMVE × MF_SURP - -1.317                
[-1.15]                
Constant -0.029 ** -0.013 -0.029 -0.030
[-2.24] [-0.89] [-1.53] [-1.59]   
N 667 667 219 219
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.181 0.159 0.163
df_m 7 16 7 8
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TABLE 4.6 - Continued 
Continued on next page 
Panel B: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? 0.000 -0.005 -0.029 -0.037
[-0.01] [-0.34] [-1.07] [-1.27]   
POST ? 0.037 ** 0.026 0.029 0.027
[2.08] [1.39] [1.07] [1.00]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.018 -0.009 0.026 0.035
[-0.93] [-0.46] [0.79] [1.01]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS + 1.439 0.186 0.300 0.162
[0.59] [0.06] [0.17] [0.08]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 3.660 ** 6.629 *** 2.014 *** 1.238 ***
[2.44] [2.76] [5.23] [0.26]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? -0.087 7.909 ** 2.102 9.325 ***
[-0.03] [2.10] [0.75] [2.69]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -2.107 -2.440 * -0.904 -1.774
[-1.20] [-1.69] [-0.41] [-0.43]   
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + -0.429 20.287 *** 12.239 * 13.541 *
[-0.09] [2.88] [1.60] [1.51]   
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + -0.334 1.009 1.990 *** 0.020
[-0.21] [0.57] [5.07] [0.01]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - 6.514 -15.529 ** -11.354 * -16.759 **
[1.14] [-2.33] [-1.43] [-1.96]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 1.745 -0.725 1.136 3.214
[0.88] [-0.33] [0.35] [0.81]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.011 -0.006
[-1.44] [-0.40]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -4.721 ** -3.366
[-1.89] [-1.01]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.614 2.923
[-0.37] [0.93]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS × |MF_SURP| - 65.425                
[0.83]                
MF_SURP_BNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -45.492 *                
[-1.56]                
MF_LOSS ? 0.093 ***                
[3.15]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -23.271 ***                
[-4.11]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.397                






(1) (2) (3) (4)
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TABLE 4.6 - Continued 
Predicted
Variable Sign
HiMVE ? 0.008 0.005
[1.07] [0.35]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -8.875 *** -5.449 ***
[-2.69] [-3.41]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.671 1.657
[0.46] [0.46]   
EA_CONCUR ? -0.009
[-0.65]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 4.208
[1.63]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -2.301
[-1.20]   
Constant ? -0.026 * -0.018 -0.026 -0.021
[-1.84] [-1.16] [-1.23] [-0.85]   
N 667 667 219 219
Adjusted R2 0.149 0.22 0.148 0.161
df_m 11 22 11 20





(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV: MF_CAR 0,1
    This table presents the tests of H1, which hypothesizes that greater exposure to fair value accounting reduces the 
credibility of voluntary forward-looking disclosures, using the constant derivative samples (table 4.4). Panel A 
reports the regression results, where the management forecast response coefficient is not conditioned on the sign of 
the management forecast surprise (MF_SURP ). Panel B reports the regression results, where the management 
forecast response coefficient is conditioned on the sign of MF_SURP . The dependent variable is the two-day 
cumulative abnormal return around the management forecast, MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT  is an indicator variable that 
equals one for firms that use derivatives in the latest pre-period, and zero otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable 
that equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for the 
constant derivative unmatched sample and columns (3) and (4) report the results for the constant derivative 
matched sample. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on 
the one-tailed tests for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. All t-statistics, in brackets, are 
estimated using firm-level clustering and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Petersen 2009). All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. 




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
- Include Firm Fixed Effects (Test of H1) 
Continued on next page 
Panel A: Management forecast response coefficient, not conditioned on sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign (1) (2)
POST ? 0.056 *** 0.055 **
[3.15] [2.43]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.021 -0.010
[-1.08] [-0.38]   
MF_SURP + 3.478 -1.761
[1.08] [-1.09]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? 2.439 5.582 **
[1.08] [2.62]   
POST × MF_SURP + 5.282 ** 7.292 ***
[2.28] [9.03]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - -2.889 -6.514 ***
[-0.98] [-3.00]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.020 *                
[-1.82]                
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP - -3.004 **                
[-1.82]                
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| - -32.689 -13.443
[-0.87] [-0.54]   
MF_LOSS ? -0.036                
[-0.44]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP - -2.261                
[-0.88]                
HiMF_WIDTH ? -0.023 *                
[-1.87]                
HiMF_WIDTH × MF_SURP - 1.131                
[0.77]                
HiMVE ? -0.046 **                
[-2.04]                
HiMVE × MF_SURP - -1.977                
[-1.13]                
Constant ? 0.014 -0.043 ***
[1.03] [-7.06]   
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 667 219
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TABLE 4.7 - Continued 
 Continued on next page 
Panel B: Management forecast response coefficient, conditioned on sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
POST ? 0.055 ** 0.052 *
[2.47] [1.93]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.028 0.016
[-1.18] [0.42]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS + 0.632 -2.145
[0.13] [-0.56]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 3.657 -6.344
[1.07] [-1.23]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 14.731 *** 17.390 ***
[2.83] [3.86]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? 0.960 2.478
[0.44] [0.51]   
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + 15.257 ** 8.109
[1.92] [0.91]   
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + 5.552 ** 4.362 **
[2.11] [1.95]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -13.897 ** -13.804 *
[-1.83] [-1.66]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -3.882 -1.278
[-1.28] [-0.24]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.005 0.006
[-0.44] [0.27]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -8.629 *** -11.637 ***
[-2.75] [-3.51]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.098 6.953 *
[0.04] [1.59]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -16.915                
[-0.19]                
MF_SURP_BNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -61.638 **
[-1.78]                
MF_LOSS ? 0.079                
[1.16]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -15.729 ***                
[-2.60]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.137                
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TABLE 4.7 - Continued 
    
Predicted
Variable Sign
HiMVE ? -0.016 -0.059
[-0.72] [-1.32]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -12.129 *** 2.075
[-3.15] [0.21]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.691 3.859
[0.37] [0.94]   
EA_CONCUR ? -0.008
[-0.41]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 7.579 *
[1.68]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -3.455
[-1.54]   
Constant ? -0.016 -0.039
[-1.13] [-1.37]   
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 667 219
Adjusted R2 0.277 0.257
df_m 20 18
df_r 230 78
    This table reports the results of the additional analysis of H1 after including firm fixed effects, using the constant 
derivative samples (table 4.4). Panel A reports the regression results, where the management forecast response 
coefficient is not conditioned on the sign of the management forecast surprise (MF_SURP ). Panel B reports the 
regression results, where the management forecast response coefficient is conditioned on the sign of MF_SURP . The 
dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return around the management forecast, MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT 
is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that use derivatives in the latest pre-period, and zero otherwise. 
POST  is an indicator variable that equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and zero otherwise. Column (1) and (2) 
report the results for the constant derivative unmatched sample and matched sample, respectively. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on the one-tailed tests for signed 
predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. All t-statistics, in brackets, are estimated using firm-level clustering 











Descriptive Statistics for Control versus Treatment Firms - Alternative Matched Sample (H1) 
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Panel A: Pre-Treatment Covariate Balance in Combined Alternative Matched Sample
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff. T-stat
OCFVOL 28 0.056 0.043 28 0.040 0.028 -0.016 -1.67
MVE 28 6.633 1.536 28 7.251 1.547 0.617 1.50
Panel B: MF and Firm-Level Characteristics in Combined Alternative Matched Subsample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff. T-stat
MF_CAR 0,1 71 -0.019 0.108 81 -0.022 0.108 -0.002 -0.14
MF_SURP 71 -0.004 0.015 81 -0.001 0.008 0.003 1.59
MF_BNEWS 71 0.535 0.502 81 0.444 0.500 -0.091 -1.11
OCFVOL 71 0.049 0.033 81 0.039 0.025 -0.010 -2.03 *
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 71 0.000 0.001 81 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 1.55
MF_LOSS 71 0.014 0.119 81 0.000 0.000 -0.014 -1.00
MF_WIDTH 71 0.002 0.005 81 0.002 0.004 0.000 -0.22
MF_HORIZON 71 4.832 0.732 81 4.563 0.820 -0.269 -2.14 *
MTB 71 3.409 3.382 81 6.935 26.879 3.527 1.17
MVE 71 6.735 1.620 81 7.357 1.663 0.622 2.33 *
EA_CONCUR 71 0.577 0.497 81 0.531 0.502 -0.047 -0.57
EA_SURP 41 0.001 0.044 43 -0.005 0.045 -0.005 -0.55
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 41 0.001 0.008 43 -0.002 0.012 -0.002 -1.06
EA_LOSS 41 0.098 0.300 43 0.093 0.294 -0.005 -0.07
Control Treatment Difference in Means
Control Treatment Difference in Means
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TABLE 4.8 – Continued 
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Panel C: MF and Firm-Level Characteristics in Good News Alternative Matched Subsample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff. T-stat
MF_CAR 0,1 33 0.015 0.083 45 0.009 0.077 -0.006 -0.32
MF_SURP 33 0.002 0.004 45 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.31
OCFVOL 33 0.050 0.034 45 0.045 0.030 -0.005 -0.65
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| 33 0.000 0.000 45 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.69
MF_LOSS 33 0.000 0.000 45 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00
MF_WIDTH 33 0.002 0.005 45 0.002 0.005 0.000 -0.03
MF_HORIZON 33 5.041 0.600 45 4.545 0.914 -0.496 -2.89 **
MTB 33 3.887 4.519 45 4.718 10.925 0.831 0.46
MVE 33 6.944 1.598 45 7.196 1.714 0.251 0.67
EA_CONCUR 33 0.667 0.479 45 0.533 0.505 -0.133 -1.19
EA_SURP 22 0.005 0.058 24 -0.008 0.060 -0.012 -0.71
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 22 0.001 0.012 24 -0.0031 0.016 -0.004 -1.08
EA_LOSS 22 0.045 0.213 24 0.125 0.338 0.080 0.96
Panel D: MF and Firm-Level Characteristics in Bad News Alternative Matched Subsample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_CAR 0,1 38 -0.049 0.118 36 -0.060 0.129 -0.011 -0.38
MF_SURP 38 -0.009 0.019 36 -0.005 0.007 0.004 1.32
OCFVOL 38 0.049 0.033 36 0.032 0.016 -0.016 -2.74 **
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 38 0.000 0.002 36 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.42
MF_LOSS 38 0.026 0.162 36 0.000 0.000 -0.026 -1.00
MF_WIDTH 38 0.003 0.005 36 0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.11
MF_HORIZON 38 4.650 0.793 36 4.585 0.698 -0.065 -0.38
MTB 38 2.993 1.895 36 9.707 38.563 6.714 1.04
MVE 38 6.553 1.638 36 7.559 1.599 1.006 2.67 **
EA_CONCUR 38 0.500 0.507 36 0.528 0.506 0.028 0.24
EA_SURP 19 -0.004 0.018 19 -0.001 0.014 0.003 0.56
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 19 0.000 0.001 19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.61
EA_LOSS 19 0.158 0.375 19 0.053 0.229 -0.105 -1.04
Control Treat Difference in Means
T-stat
Control Treatment Difference in Means
   
165 
 




        Panel A of this table reports the descriptive statistics of covariates used to identify the alternative 
matched sample and the results of the t-tests of covariate means between control and treatment groups in 
the latest pre-period, the year of the match. Panels B, C and D report the descriptive statsitics of 
management forecast and firm characteristics, by control and treatment firms, as well as the results of 
the t-test of means for the combined, the good news (positive MF_SURP ), and the bad news (negative 
MF_SURP ) alternative matched sample/subsamples, respectively. The alternative matched sample is 
identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (5 cutpoints), MVE  (4 cutpoints), the Fama-French 12 industry 
classifications and fiscal year within the constant derivative unmatched sample (table 4.4, panel A). For 
ease of interpretation, the summary statistics for EA_SURP, EA_SURP × |EA_SURP|  and EA_LOSS  are 
based only on management forecasts that are issued concurrently with an earnings announcement. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on the two-
tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
- Alternative Matched Sample (Test of H1) 
Continued on next page 
Panel A: Management forecast response coefficient, not conditioned on sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable sign
TREAT ? -0.011 -0.008 -0.009
[-0.46] [-0.34] [-0.37]   
POST ? 0.036 0.039 0.038
[1.48] [1.62] [1.56]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.003 -0.006 -0.005
[-0.11] [-0.19] [-0.15]   
MF_SURP + 0.460 1.576 *** 1.697 ***
[0.24] [3.13] [3.53]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? 5.306 * 4.372 4.322
[1.79] [1.53] [1.54]   
POST × MF_SURP + 2.180 *** 2.386 *** 2.366 ***
[4.30] [3.69] [3.96]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - -2.646 -2.071 -1.842
[-0.77] [-0.62] [-0.60]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.006                
[-0.40]                
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP - 1.350                
[0.66]                
HiMF_HORIZON ? 0.005                
[0.32]                
HiMF_HORIZON × MF_SURP - 0.290                
[0.26]                
HiMVE ? -0.007
[-0.44]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP - -0.437
[-0.08]   
Constant ? -0.021 -0.030 -0.024
[-1.09] [-1.48] [-1.28]   
N 152 152 152
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.197 0.198
df_m 9 9 9
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TABLE 4.9 - Continued 
Continued on next page 
Panel B: Management forecast response coefficient, conditioned on sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? -0.033 -0.030 -0.031
[-1.07]   [-0.96] [-0.96]
POST ? 0.034 0.033 0.031
[1.22]   [1.15] [1.09]
TREAT × POST ? 0.026 0.021 0.021
[0.67]   [0.52] [0.53]
MF_SURP_GNEWS + -0.092 -0.112 0.618
[-0.05]   [-0.03] [0.28]
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 2.322 1.754 *** 1.870 ***
[0.57]   [3.85] [4.00]
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 10.701 *** 11.055 ** 10.282 ***
[3.78]   [2.34] [3.42]
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -3.003 -2.877 -3.128
[-0.71]   [-0.97] [-0.93]
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + -1.617 8.517 8.006
[-0.24]   [1.10] [1.13]
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + 2.104 *** 1.995 *** 2.014 ***
[4.51]   [3.73] [4.48]
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -13.000 ** -13.113 * -11.785 *
[-1.76]   [-1.31] [-1.55]
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 5.346 4.883 4.959 *
[1.21]   [1.27] [1.35]
HiOCFVOL ? -0.017
[-0.92]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - 12.263 ***
[3.95]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.665
[-0.16]   
HiMF_HORIZON ? 0.010
[0.51]
HiMF_HORIZON × MF_SURP_GNEWS - 0.583
[0.17]
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HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -3.718
[-0.27]
HiMVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 2.175
[0.37]
Constant ? -0.030 -0.024
[-1.28] [-1.09]
N 152 152 152
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.194 0.193
df_m 14 14 14
df_r 55 55 55
    This table reports the results of the additional analysis of H1, using the alternative matched 
sample. The alternative matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (5 cutpoints), MVE 
(4 cutpoints), the Fama-French 12 industry classifications and fiscal year within the constant 
derivative unmatched sample (table 4.4, panel A). Panel A reports the regression results, where the 
management forecast response coefficient is not conditioned on the sign of the management forecast 
surprise (MF_SURP ). Panel B reports the regression results, where the management forecast 
response coefficient is conditioned on the sign of MF_SURP . The dependent variable is the two-
day cumulative abnormal return around the management forecast, MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT  is an 
indicator variable that equals one for firms that use derivatives in the latest pre-period, and zero 
otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable that equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and zero 
otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, 
based on the one-tailed tests for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. All t-
statistics, in brackets, are estimated using firm-level clustering and heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
DV: MF_CAR 0,1
(1) (2) (3)




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
- Stand-Alone Management Forecasts (Test of H1) 
Continued on next page 





[0.94]   
POST ? 0.049 *
[1.82]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.023
[-0.82]   
MF_SURP + 8.114 ***
[3.17]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? -1.481
[-0.68]   
POST × MF_SURP + 2.574
[1.01]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - -1.497
[-0.51]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.006
[-0.70]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP - -2.866 ***
[-2.61]   
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| - -72.563 ***
[-3.47]   
MF_LOSS ? 0.047 *
[1.85]   
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP - 0.826
[0.75]   
HiMF_WIDTH ? -0.039 ***
[-3.18]   
HiMF_WIDTH × MF_SURP - 1.365 *
[1.35]   
HiMVE ? -0.007
[-0.75]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP - -1.069
[-1.20]   
Constant ? -0.02
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 TABLE 4.10 – Continued 
Continued on next page












MF_SURP_BNEWS + 14.933 ***
[7.39]
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 6.543 *
[1.94]
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -4.056 ***
[-3.07]
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + 35.553 ***
[3.94]
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + -1.765
[-0.99]
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -41.710 ***
[-4.08]




HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -1.189
[-1.12]
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -4.094 ***
[-3.06]
MF_SURP_GNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -33.277
[-0.97]
MF_SURP_BNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -103.484 ***
[-3.71]
MF_LOSS ? 0.076 ***
[2.92]
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -10.893 **
[-1.91]
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HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -3.725
[-1.14]








    This table reports the results of the additional analysis of H1, using only stand-alone forecasts in the constant 
derivative unmatched sample (table 4.4, panel A). Panel A reports the regression results, where the management 
forecast response coefficient is not conditioned on the sign of the management forecast surprise (MF_SURP ). 
Panel B reports the regression results, where the management forecast response coefficient is conditioned on the 
sign of MF_SURP . The dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return around the management 
forecast, MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT  is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that use derivatives in the latest 
pre-period, and zero otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable that equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and 
zero otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on 
the one-tailed tests for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. All t-statistics, in brackets, are 
estimated using firm-level clustering and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Petersen 2009). All 








Descriptive Statistics for Control Group versus Treatment Group - Earliest MF (H1) 
Continued on next page 
  
Panel A.1: Combined Constant Derivative Unmatched Sample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 135 -0.003 0.015 532 -0.001 0.011 0.002 1.44
MF_BNEWS 135 0.452 0.500 532 0.500 0.500 0.048 1.00
OCFVOL 135 0.077 0.095 532 0.039 0.030 -0.038 -4.61 ***
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 135 0.000 0.001 532 0.0000 0.0006 0.0002 1.80
MF_LOSS 135 0.059 0.237 532 0.004 0.061 -0.055 -2.70 **
MF_WIDTH 135 0.003 0.007 532 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -1.07
MF_HORIZON 135 5.259 0.665 532 5.333 0.680 0.073 1.14
MTB 135 3.792 3.469 532 4.707 19.463 0.915 1.02
SIZE 135 6.373 1.515 532 8.152 1.746 1.779 11.80 ***
EA_CONCUR 135 0.489 0.502 532 0.650 0.477 0.161 3.37 ***
EA_SURP 66 -0.014 0.121 346 -0.005 0.073 0.009 0.56
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 66 -0.011 0.080 346 -0.004 0.070 0.007 0.67
EA_LOSS 66 0.182 0.389 346 0.171 0.377 -0.011 -0.22
Panel A.2: Good News Constant Derivative Unmatched Subsample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 74 0.003 0.005 266 0.004 0.009 0.001 0.95
OCFVOL 74 0.073 0.093 266 0.040 0.029 -0.033 -3.04 **
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| 74 0.000 0.000 266 0.000 0.001 0.000 1.36
MF_LOSS 74 0.041 0.199 266 0.000 0.000 -0.041 -1.76
MF_WIDTH 74 0.003 0.008 266 0.002 0.004 0.000 -0.31
MF_HORIZON 74 5.442 0.400 266 5.396 0.601 -0.046 -0.78
MTB 74 4.196 4.104 266 3.375 13.934 -0.821 -0.84
MVE 74 6.532 1.627 266 8.029 1.740 1.497 6.89 ***
EA_CONCUR 74 0.541 0.502 266 0.669 0.471 0.129 1.98
EA_SURP 40 -0.033 0.144 178 -0.007 0.098 0.025 1.07
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 40 -0.021 0.102 178 -0.008 0.097 0.013 0.74
EA_LOSS 40 0.200 0.405 178 0.1854 0.3897 -0.015 -0.21
T-stat
Control Treat Difference in Means
Control Treat Difference in Means
T-stat
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Panel A.3: Bad News Constant Derivative Unmatched Subsample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 61 -0.011 0.020 266 -0.006 0.011 0.005 1.74
OCFVOL 61 0.082 0.098 266 0.038 0.031 -0.044 -3.46 ***
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 61 -0.001 0.002 266 0.000 0.001 0.000 1.71
MF_LOSS 61 0.082 0.277 266 0.008 0.087 -0.074 -2.08 *
MF_WIDTH 61 0.003 0.005 266 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -1.59
MF_HORIZON 61 5.037 0.837 266 5.269 0.747 0.232 1.99 *
MTB 61 3.303 2.437 266 6.040 23.692 2.737 1.84
MVE 61 6.180 1.355 266 8.274 1.746 2.095 10.3 ***
EA_CONCUR 61 0.426 0.499 266 0.632 0.483 0.205 2.92 **
EA_SURP 26 0.016 0.065 168 -0.003 0.032 -0.018 -1.40
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 26 0.004 0.016 168 0.000 0.004 -0.004 -1.26
EA_LOSS 26 0.154 0.368 168 0.155 0.363 0.001 0.01
Panel B.1: Combined Constant Derivative Matched Sample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_CAR 0,1 153 -0.007 0.092 165 -0.024 0.108 -0.018 -1.44
MF_SURP 70 -0.003 0.017 149 -0.001 0.010 0.002 1.04
MF_BNEWS 70 0.400 0.493 149 0.456 0.500 0.056 0.79
OCFVOL 70 0.050 0.035 149 0.044 0.032 -0.006 -1.16
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 70 -0.0003 0.0012 149 0.0000 0.0004 0.0002 1.63
MF_LOSS 70 0.014 0.120 149 0.000 0.000 -0.014 -1
MF_WIDTH 70 0.002 0.005 149 0.002 0.004 0.0001 0.12
MF_HORIZON 70 5.258 0.687 149 5.297 0.781 0.039 0.38
MTB 70 3.435 3.389 149 4.094 24.388 0.659 0.32
SIZE 70 6.733 1.630 149 7.508 1.807 1.781 3.17 **
EA_CONCUR 70 0.500 0.504 149 0.591 0.493 0.091 1.25
EA_SURP 35 -0.002 0.029 88 0.001 0.028 0.004 0.63
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 35 -0.001 0.004 88 0.000 0.003 0.001 1.10
EA_LOSS 35 0.143 0.355 88 0.148 0.357 0.005 0.07
Treat Difference in Means
T-stat
Control Treat Difference in Means
T-stat
Control
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Panel B.2: Good News Constant Derivative Matched Subsample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 42 0.003 0.004 81 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.94
OCFVOL 42 0.048 0.034 81 0.047 0.035 -0.001 -0.19
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 42 0.000 0.000 81 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.06
MF_LOSS 42 0.000 0.000 81 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00
MF_WIDTH 42 0.002 0.004 81 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.95
MF_HORIZON 42 5.427 0.438 81 5.378 0.672 -0.049 -0.49
MTB 42 3.714 4.148 81 1.061 18.397 -2.653 -1.24
MVE 42 6.806 1.618 81 7.373 1.825 0.567 1.76
EA_CONCUR 42 0.548 0.504 81 0.630 0.486 0.082 0.87
EA_SURP 23 -0.003 0.031 51 0.004 0.023 0.007 0.97
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 23 -0.001 0.004 51 0.000 0.002 0.001 1.33
EA_LOSS 23 0.130 0.344 51 0.157 0.367 0.026 0.30
Panel B.3: Bad News Constant Derivative Matched Subsample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 28 -0.012 0.024 68 -0.007 0.009 0.006 1.21
OCFVOL 28 0.053 0.035 68 0.041 0.027 -0.012 -1.54
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 28 -0.001 0.002 68 0.000 0.000 0.001 1.58
MF_LOSS 28 0.036 0.189 68 0.000 0.000 -0.036 -1.00
MF_WIDTH 28 0.003 0.006 68 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.76
MF_HORIZON 28 5.003 0.896 68 5.200 0.890 0.197 0.98
MTB 28 3.017 1.710 68 7.708 29.755 4.691 1.29
MVE 28 6.623 1.672 68 7.670 1.785 1.047 2.73 **
EA_CONCUR 28 0.429 0.504 68 0.544 0.502 0.116 1.02
EA_SURP 12 0.000 0.024 37 -0.002 0.034 -0.002 -0.20
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 12 0.000 0.001 37 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.19
EA_LOSS 12 0.167 0.389 37 0.135 0.347 -0.032 -0.25
T-stat
Control Treat Difference in Means
T-stat
Control Treat Difference in Means
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TABLE 4.11 - Continued 
  
        This table reports the descriptive statistics of management forecast and firm characteristics, by 
control and treatment firms, as well as the results of the t-test of means using the earliest management 
forecast for a given firm-year in the constant derivative samples (table 4.4). Panels A.1, A.2 and A.3 (B.1, 
B.2 and B.3) provide the descriptive statistics and t-test results for the combined, good news and bad news 
constant derivative unmatched (matched) sample/subsamples, respectively. For ease of interpretation, the 
summary statistics for EA_SURP, EA_SURP × |EA_SURP|  and EA_LOSS  are based only on management 
forecasts that are issued concurrently with an earnings announcement. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on the two-tailed tests. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A.




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
- Earliest Management Forecast in a Given Firm-Year (Test of H1) 
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Panel A: Management forecast response coefficient, not conditioned on sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable sign (1) (2)
TREAT ? 0.005 -0.014
[0.34] [-0.65]   
POST ? 0.034 ** 0.043 **
[2.08] [2.45]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.009 0.004
[-0.50] [0.17]   
MF_SURP + 4.998 *** 1.576 ***
[2.70] [3.67]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? -1.204 2.152
[-0.72] [1.59]   
POST × MF_SURP + 0.252 2.312 ***
[0.16] [3.89]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - 0.113 -0.420
[0.06] [-0.19]   
HiOCFVOL ? 0.002                
[0.38]                
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP - -0.652                
[-0.76]                
MF_LOSS ? 0.056 ***
[2.79]
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP - -0.823                
[-0.97]                
HiMVE ? 0.003 0.005
[0.41] [0.43]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP - -1.574 ** -2.717 **
[-1.77] [-1.73]   
EA_CONCUR ? 0.015 **                
[2.16]                
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP ? -1.445 **                
[-2.02]                
Constant ? -0.037 *** -0.024
[-2.65] [-1.54]   
N 667 219
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TABLE 4.12 - Continued 
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Panel B: Management forecast response coefficient, conditioned on sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign (1) (2)
TREAT ? 0.002 -0.015
[0.13] [-0.60]   
POST ? 0.013 0.030
[0.76] [1.56]   
TREAT × POST ? 0.011 0.009
[0.57] [0.34]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS + 1.443 -0.458
[0.65] [-0.41]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 4.525 ** 1.911 ***
[1.74] [6.27]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 1.680 3.794
[0.62] [1.64]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -1.594 1.981
[-0.72] [1.06]   
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + 11.544 *** 8.446 ***
[2.54] [2.59]   
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + -0.933 1.704 ***
[-0.42] [3.59]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -10.970 *** -4.762
[-2.63] [-1.28]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.961 -0.975
[0.43] [-0.30]   
HiOCFVOL ? 0.005                
[0.71]                
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -1.298                
[-1.07]                
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 1.212                
[0.71]                
MF_LOSS ? 0.048 **                
[2.24]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -6.057 **                
[-1.78]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -1.039                
[-0.96]                
HiMF_HORIZON ? 0.002                
[0.39]                
HiMF_HORIZON × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -3.023 **                
[-1.66]                
HiMF_HORIZON × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.432                
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Predicted
Variable Sign (1) (2)
HiMVE ? 0.010 0.010
[1.29] [0.69]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -1.927 -2.904 *
[-1.27] [-1.44]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 1.062 -1.887
[0.55] [-0.56]   
EA_CONCUR ? 0.005                
[0.72]                
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 2.319                
[1.16]                
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -2.397 **                
[-2.17]                
Constant ? -0.032 ** -0.022
[-2.20] [-1.25]   
N 667 219
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.226
df_m 26 14
df_r 230 78
    This table reports the results of the additional analysis of H1, using the earliest management forecast for a given 
firm-year in the constant derivative sample (table 4.4). Panel A reports the regression results, where the management 
forecast response coefficient is not conditioned on the sign of the management forecast surprise (MF_SURP ). Panel 
B reports the regression results, where the management forecast response coefficient is conditioned on the sign of 
MF_SURP . The dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return around the management forecast, 
MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT  is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that use derivatives in the latest pre-period, 
and zero otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable that equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and zero otherwise. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on the one-tailed tests 
for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. All t-statistics, in brackets, are estimated using firm-level 










Descriptive Statistics for Control Group versus Treatment Group 
- Constant Derivative Samples (H1) 
Continued on next page 
  
Panel A.1: Combined Constant Derivative Unmatched Sample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 135 -0.003 0.015 532 -0.001 0.011 0.002 1.44
MF_BNEWS 135 0.452 0.500 532 0.500 0.500 0.048 1.00
OCFVOL 135 0.077 0.095 532 0.039 0.030 -0.038 -4.61 ***
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 135 0.000 0.001 532 0.0000 0.0006 0.0002 1.80
MF_LOSS 135 0.059 0.237 532 0.004 0.061 -0.055 -2.70 **
MF_WIDTH 135 0.003 0.007 532 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -1.07
MF_HORIZON 135 5.259 0.665 532 5.333 0.680 0.073 1.14
MTB 135 3.792 3.469 532 4.707 19.463 0.915 1.02
MVE 135 6.373 1.515 532 8.152 1.746 1.779 11.80 ***
EA_CONCUR 135 0.489 0.502 532 0.650 0.477 0.161 3.37 ***
EA_SURP 66 -0.014 0.121 346 -0.005 0.073 0.009 0.56
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 66 -0.011 0.080 346 -0.004 0.070 0.007 0.67
EA_LOSS 66 0.182 0.389 346 0.171 0.377 -0.011 -0.22
Panel A.2: Good News Constant Derivative Unmatched Subsample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 65 0.002 0.005 233 0.003 0.008 0.001 1.30
OCFVOL 65 0.079 0.097 233 0.041 0.030 -0.038 -3.16 **
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| 65 0.000 0.000 233 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.66
MF_LOSS 65 0.046 0.211 233 0.000 0.000 -0.046 -1.76
MF_WIDTH 65 0.003 0.006 233 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.94
MF_HORIZON 65 4.985 0.657 233 4.583 0.952 -0.402 -3.92 ***
MTB 65 3.885 3.922 233 4.178 14.795 0.293 0.27
MVE 65 6.430 1.659 233 8.004 1.775 1.574 6.66 ***
EA_CONCUR 65 0.585 0.497 233 0.549 0.499 -0.035 -0.51
EA_SURP 38 0.012 0.056 128 0.000 0.035 -0.012 -1.29
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 38 0.002 0.011 128 -0.001 0.007 -0.003 -1.42
EA_LOSS 38 0.105 0.311 128 0.1016 0.3033 -0.004 -0.06
Control Treat Difference in Means
T-stat
T-stat
Control Treat Difference in Means
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Panel A.3: Bad News Constant Derivative Unmatched Subsample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 70 -0.009 0.018 299 -0.006 0.011 0.003 1.37
OCFVOL 70 0.075 0.095 299 0.038 0.030 -0.038 -3.31 **
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 70 0.000 0.001 299 0.000 0.001 0.000 1.54
MF_LOSS 70 0.071 0.259 299 0.010 0.100 -0.061 -1.95
MF_WIDTH 70 0.003 0.004 299 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.89
MF_HORIZON 70 4.699 0.827 299 4.449 0.992 -0.250 -2.19 *
MTB 70 3.706 3.015 299 5.120 22.454 1.414 1.05
MVE 70 6.320 1.378 299 8.267 1.717 1.947 10.12 ***
EA_CONCUR 70 0.471 0.503 299 0.522 0.500 0.050 0.75
EA_SURP 33 0.010 0.058 156 0.002 0.043 -0.009 -0.82
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 33 0.003 0.014 156 0.001 0.011 -0.002 -0.72
EA_LOSS 33 0.152 0.364 156 0.109 0.313 -0.043 -0.62
Panel B.1: Combined Constant Derivative Matched Sample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_CAR 0,1 70 -0.007 0.092 149 -0.024 0.108 -0.018 -1.44
MF_SURP 70 -0.003 0.017 149 -0.001 0.010 0.002 1.04
MF_BNEWS 70 0.400 0.493 149 0.456 0.500 0.056 0.79
OCFVOL 70 0.050 0.035 149 0.044 0.032 -0.006 -1.16
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 70 -0.0003 0.0012 149 0.0000 0.0004 0.0002 1.63
MF_LOSS 70 0.014 0.120 149 0.000 0.000 -0.014 -1
MF_WIDTH 70 0.002 0.005 149 0.002 0.004 0.0001 0.12
MF_HORIZON 70 5.258 0.687 149 5.297 0.781 0.039 0.38
MTB 70 3.435 3.389 149 4.094 24.388 0.659 0.32
MVE 70 6.733 1.630 149 7.508 1.807 1.781 3.17 **
EA_CONCUR 70 0.500 0.504 149 0.591 0.493 0.091 1.25
EA_SURP 35 -0.002 0.029 88 0.001 0.028 0.004 0.63
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 35 -0.001 0.004 88 0.000 0.003 0.001 1.10
EA_LOSS 35 0.143 0.355 88 0.148 0.357 0.005 0.07
T-stat
Control Treat Difference in Means
T-stat
Control Treat Difference in Means
   
181 
 
TABLE 4.13 - Continued 
 Continued on next page 
  
Panel B.2: Good News Constant Derivative Matched Subsample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 36 0.002 0.004 70 0.004 0.011 0.002 1.53
OCFVOL 36 0.051 0.035 70 0.053 0.036 0.002 0.31
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 36 0.000 0.000 70 0.000 0.001 0.000 1.59
MF_LOSS 36 0.000 0.000 70 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00
MF_WIDTH 36 0.002 0.004 70 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.49
MF_HORIZON 36 4.990 0.656 70 4.583 0.954 -0.408 -2.58 *
MTB 36 3.700 4.383 70 2.386 22.444 -1.314 -0.47
MVE 36 6.787 1.620 70 7.182 1.700 0.395 1.17
EA_CONCUR 36 0.611 0.494 70 0.543 0.502 -0.068 -0.67
EA_SURP 22 0.005 0.058 38 0.005 0.018 0.000 0.02
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 22 0.001 0.012 38 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.41
EA_LOSS 22 0.045 0.213 38 0.079 0.273 0.033 0.53
Panel B.3: Bad News Constant Derivative Matched Subsample
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
MF_SURP 34 -0.009 0.020 79 -0.006 0.008 0.003 0.81
OCFVOL 34 0.050 0.035 79 0.037 0.025 -0.013 -1.91
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP | 34 0.000 0.002 79 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.33
MF_LOSS 34 0.029 0.171 79 0.000 0.000 -0.029 -1.00
MF_WIDTH 34 0.003 0.005 79 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.97
MF_HORIZON 34 4.700 0.779 79 4.441 1.061 -0.259 -1.45
MTB 34 3.155 1.866 79 5.608 26.039 2.454 0.83
MVE 34 6.675 1.663 79 7.798 1.860 1.122 3.17 **
EA_CONCUR 34 0.471 0.507 79 0.570 0.498 0.099 0.96
EA_SURP 16 -0.002 0.016 45 -0.006 0.018 -0.004 -0.76
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| 16 0.000 0.000 45 0.000 0.001 0.000 -1.23
EA_LOSS 16 0.125 0.342 45 0.133 0.344 0.008 0.08
Control Treat Difference in Means
T-stat
Control Treat Difference in Means
T-stat
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        This table reports the descriptive statistics of management forecast and firm characteristic variables, 
by control and treatment firms, as well as the results of the t-test of means in the constant derivative 
samples (table 4.4). Panels A.1, A.2 and A.3 (B.1, B.2 and B.3) provide the descriptives and t-test results 
for the combined, good news and bad news constant derivative unmatched (matched) sample/subsamples, 
respectively. For ease of interpretation, the summary statistics for EA_SURP, EA_SURP × |EA_SURP|  and 
EA_LOSS  are based only on management forecasts that are issued concurrently with an earnings 
announcement. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, 
based on the two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
- Constant Derivative Sample using Alternative Set of Control Variables (Test of H1) 
Continued on next page 
Panel A: Management forecast response coefficient, not conditioned on sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? 0.003 -0.017
[0.17] [-0.75]   
POST ? 0.034 * 0.042 *
[1.95] [1.71]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.008 0.006
[-0.42] [0.21]   
MF_SURP + 6.784 *** 1.778 ***
[3.81] [4.30]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? -2.344 2.065
[-1.57] [1.36]   
POST × MF_SURP + 1.469 2.543 ***
[1.02] [4.42]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - 2.203 -1.412
[1.08] [-0.86]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.017 **                
[-2.34]                
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP - -2.632 **                
[-1.86]                
MF_LOSS ? 0.006                
[0.25]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP - -2.466 **                
[-2.15]                
HiMVE ? -0.010 -0.014
[-1.18] [-1.15]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP - -1.358 -2.942 **
[-1.01] [-2.17]   
EA_CONCUR ? 0.009                
[1.30]                
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP ? -1.914 **                
[-2.17]                
Constant ? -0.019 -0.025
[-1.26] [-1.28]   
N 667 219
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Panel B: Management forecast response coefficient, conditioned on sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? -0.010 -0.033
[-0.65] [-1.18]   
POST ? 0.034 * 0.036
[1.85] [1.30]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.016 0.028
[-0.80] [0.80]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS + 2.964 -0.829
[0.95] [-0.24]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 5.351 *** 1.758 ***
[2.50] [4.22]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 7.629 ** 8.182 *
[1.98] [1.89]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -2.772 * -2.895
[-1.69] [-1.15]   
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + 4.459 12.405 *
[0.87] [1.63]   
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + -0.433 1.608 ***
[-0.29] [2.61]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - 0.797 -13.770 *
[0.16] [-1.52]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 1.311 0.884
[0.66] [0.22]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.013 *                
[-1.73]                
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -4.620 **                
[-2.12]                
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -1.888                
[-1.22]                
MF_HORIZON ? 0.002 0.023
[0.22] [1.64]   
MF_HORIZON × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -1.570 0.838
[-1.03] [0.29]   
MF_HORIZON × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.296 3.296 *
[0.32] [1.66]   
HiMVE ? 0.008 0.001
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Predicted
Variable Sign
HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -7.666 *** -6.123 ***
[-3.39] [-2.81]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.111 1.335
[0.08] [0.42]   
Constant ? -0.018 -0.041 *
[-1.08] [-1.71]   
N 667 219









    This table reports the results of the additional analysis of H1, using the constant derivative samples (table 4.4) 
and an alternative set of control variables that statistically differ between control and treatment groups within the 
respective constant derivative samples (table 4.13). Panel A reports the regression results, where the management 
forecast response coefficient is not conditioned on the sign of the management forecast surprise (MF_SURP ). 
Panel B reports the regression results, where the management forecast response coefficient is conditioned on the 
sign of MF_SURP . The dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return around the management 
forecast, MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT  is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that use derivatives in the latest 
pre-period, and zero otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable that equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and 
zero otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on 
the one-tailed tests for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. All t-statistics, in brackets, are 
estimated using firm-level clustering and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Petersen 2009). All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. 




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
- Constant Derivative Sample using Alternative Set of Control Variables, Additional Analyses (Test of H1) 
Continued on next page 
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? -0.009 -0.008 -0.032
[-0.54]   [-0.46] [-1.17]   
POST ? 0.025 0.019 0.030
[1.30]   [0.95] [1.10]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.007 -0.002 0.033
[-0.34]   [-0.11] [0.95]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS + 2.703 2.417 -0.539
[0.79]   [0.77] [-0.16]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 4.381 ** 3.186 * 1.695 ***
[1.96]   [1.45] [4.11]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 7.815 * 8.232 ** 8.020 *
[1.90]   [2.11] [1.87]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -2.446 -2.242 -3.834
[-1.42]   [-1.45] [-1.61]   
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + 19.202 *** 22.487 *** 13.694 **
[2.81]   [3.04] [1.81]   
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + 1.495 -0.166 -1.638
[0.77]   [-0.10] [-0.74]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -14.492 ** -17.666 *** -14.828 *
[-2.11]   [-2.39] [-1.65]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.757 0.333 2.936
[-0.32]   [0.16] [0.85]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.013 * -0.011                
[-1.71]   [-1.52]                
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -4.345 ** -4.479 **                









Matched Sample (Exclude 
Loss Forecasts)
(2) (3)
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Predicted
Variable Sign
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.919 -0.111                
[-0.56]   [-0.06]                
MF_LOSS ? 0.072 ***
[2.65]   
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -21.337 ***
[-3.76]   
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -1.656 *
[-1.29]   
MF_HORIZON ? 0.001 0.003 0.027 *
[0.15]   [0.37] [1.97]   
MF_HORIZON × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -0.876 -0.981 0.477
[-0.54]   [-0.60] [0.17]   
MF_HORIZON × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.17 1.165 5.636 **
[0.17]   [0.87] [1.99]   
HiMVE ? 0.011 0.014 * 0.003
[1.44]   [1.78] [0.22]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -7.953 *** -8.058 *** -6.224 ***
[-3.48]   [-3.54] [-2.88]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 1.381 2.449 * 1.973
[0.97]   [1.37] [0.62]   
Constant ? -0.021 -0.023 -0.044 *
[-1.24]   [-1.41] [-1.85]   
N 667 656 218
Adjusted R2 0.213 0.205 0.135
df_m 23 20 17








Matched Sample (Exclude 
Loss Forecasts)
(1) (2) (3)
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TABLE 4.15 - Continued 
    This table reports the results of the additional analysis of H1, conditioned on the sign of MF_SURP , using the constant derivative samples (table 4.4) and an 
alternative set of control variables. The regression includes a set of control variables that statistically differ between control and treatment firms within the 
respective constant derivative samples (table 4.14). The dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return around the management forecast, 
MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT  is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that use derivatives in the latest pre-period, and zero otherwise. POST  is an indicator 
variable that equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and zero otherwise. Column (1) reports the results including the alternative set of control variables, plus 
control variables for MF_LOSS  and its interactions with the forecast surprise variables. Columns (2) and (3) report the results for the constant derivative 
unmatched and matched samples, after excluding 11 and 1 loss forecast observations, respectively. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
10% levels, respectively, based on the one-tailed tests for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. All t-statistics, in brackets, are estimated using 
firm-level clustering and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 




Industry Distribution - H2 
 
   
Industry  N % Sample N % Industry  N % Sample N % Industry
Consumer Non-Durables 86            6.2 44          51.2 44            7.5 22          50.0 
Consumer Durables 42            3.1 15          35.7 12            2.0 6          50.0 
Manufacturing 201          14.6 95          47.3 114          19.4 57          50.0 
Energy and Extraction 69            5.0 44          63.8 34            5.8 17          50.0 
Chemicals and Allied Products 40            2.9 19          47.5 12            2.0 6          50.0 
Business Equipment 292          21.2 70          24.0 98          16.7 49          50.0 
Telecommunications 23            1.7 10          43.5 6            1.0 3          50.0 
Utilities 57            4.1 42          73.7 24            4.1 12          50.0 
Wholesale and Retail 153          11.1 50          32.7 82          13.9 41          50.0 
Healthcare 199          14.5 34          17.1 52            8.8 26          50.0 
Other 215          15.6 69          32.1 110          18.7 55          50.0 
Total 1,377 100.0 492          35.7 588 100.0 294          50.0 
Matched Sample
TreatmentAll
  This table reports the industry distribution of the unmatched and matched H2 samples (table 3.4, panel B), using unique firm 
observations. Treatment firms include derivative users and control firms include derivative non-users, identified in the pre-period. 
Industry classifications are based on the Fama and French 12 industry classifications. 
Unmatched Sample
All Treatment




Pre-Treatment Comparison of Potential Confounding Variable Means - H2 
 
Panel A: Unmatched Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
OCFVOL 0.112 0.176 0.053 0.043 -0.058 -7.22 ***
MVE 4.367 1.707 6.293 1.982 1.926 18.92 ***
ANALYSTS_N 1.072 0.978 1.947 1.002 0.876 15.78 ***
Panel B: Matched Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
OCFVOL 0.063 0.046 0.059 0.046 -0.003 -0.91
MVE 5.390 1.690 5.531 1.659 0.140 1.02
ANALYSTS_N 1.506 1.021 1.649 0.964 0.143 1.74
Panel C: Positive Intraperiod Return Matched Subsample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
OCFVOL 0.065 0.047 0.068 0.050 0.002 0.26
MVE 6.342 1.743 6.414 1.762 0.072 0.24
ANALYSTS_N 2.174 0.864 2.178 0.822 0.004 0.03
Panel D: Negative Intraperiod Return Matched Subsample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
OCFVOL 0.062 0.046 0.057 0.045 -0.005 -1.20
MVE 5.115 1.574 5.275 1.540 0.160 1.10
ANALYSTS_N 1.313 0.982 1.496 0.949 0.183 2.02 *
    This table compares the potential confounding variable means between control and treatment 
groups for the H2 samples in the pre-period (1999). Panels A and B report the results of the t-
test of means for the unmatched and matched samples, respectively. Panels C and D report the 
results of the t-test of means for the positive and the negative intraperiod return matched 
subsamples, respectively. Positive (negative) intraperiod return subsamples include 
observations whose 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive (negative) in both the 
pre- and post-periods. Treatment firms are those that use derivatives in the pre-period and 







Control (N = 294) Treat (N = 294)
Control (N = 228) Treat (N = 228)




Treat (N = 492)Control (N = 885)




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Timeliness of Price Discovery (Test of H2) 
 
Panel A: Unmatched Sample
Sample/Subsample N Pre IPT Post IPT N Pre IPT Post IPT
Combined 885 3.942 6.038 2.096 ** 492 5.114 6.910 1.796 ** -0.300
Positive intraperiod return 274 3.677 6.038 2.360 * 123 5.518 6.182 0.664 -1.697 *
Negative intraperiod return 611 4.734 6.149 1.415 369 4.323 7.614 3.291 ** 1.876 ***
Panel B: Matched Sample
Sample/Subsample N Pre IPT Post IPT N Pre IPT Post IPT
Combined 294 4.227 6.288 2.061 294 4.868 6.696 1.828 * -0.233
Positive intraperiod return 66 4.095 5.813 1.717 66 5.247 6.338 1.091 -0.626





  This table presents the results of the DiD tests for H2 using the portfolio-level IPT . Panels A and B present the results using the unmatched 
and  matched H2 samples, respectively. The matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (28 cutpoints), MVE  (8 cutpoints), Fama-
French 12 industry classifications and the sign of intraperiod return. Treatment firms include derivative users and control firms include 
derivative non-users, identified in the pre-SFAS 133 period. The pre-period includes fiscal years ending June 1999 to May 2000 and the post-
period includes fiscal years ending June 2001 to May 2002, to correspond with the effective date of SFAS 133. Positive (negative) intraperiod 
return subsamples include observations whose 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive (negative) in both the pre- and post-
periods. ΔIPT is the post-period IPT minus the pre-period IPT, within the respective group. DiD_IPT  is equal to the treatment group ΔIPT 
minus the control group ΔIPT . ***,  **,  and  * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,  5%,  and 10% levels based on the one-tailed tests, 
respectively. Significance of ΔIPT  and DID_IPT  is determined using a permutation test, where I compare the observed ΔIPT  and DID_IPT to 
the null distributions of ΔIPT and DID_IPT  created under the null hypothesis that the order of the monthly returns does not matter. The 
significance of ΔIPT  and DiD_IPT  depend on the respective null distributions, which are unique to the portfolio(s) examined. The 
corresponding null distributions of ΔIPT  and DID_IPT are presented in appendix E.1. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
DiD_IPT




Constant Derivative Samples – H2 
 
Panel A: Unmatched Sample
Control Treat Total Control Treat Total
Unmatched H2 sample 1,770    984       2,754    885       492       1,377    
      (302)         (54)       (356)       (151)         (27)       (178)
Constant derivative unmatched H2 sample 1,468    930       2,398    734       465       1,199    
Panel B: Matched Sample
Control Treat Total Control Treat Total
Constant derivative unmatched H2 sample 1,468    930       2,398    734       465       1,199    
(1,020)   (482)     (1,502)   (510)     (241)     (751)     
Constant derivative matched H2 sample 448       448       896       224       224       448       
    Panels A and B of this table report the number of firms and their respective firm-years that comprise the constant derivative 
unmatched and matched H2 samples, respectively. These samples exclude any firms whose derivative use (non-use) in the post-period 
is inconsistent with the classification in the pre-period . The constant derivative matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL 
(26 cutpoints), MVE  (10 cutpoints), Fama-French 12 industry classifications and the sign of intraperiod return, within the constant 
derivative unmatched H2 sample. Treatment firms include derivative users and control firms include derivative non-users, identified in 
the pre-SFAS 133 period. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
 Number of Firm-Years Number of Firms
  Less: Firms with no matches using CEM on OCFVOL , MVE , 
    industry and sign of intraperiod return
 Number of Firm-Years Number of Firms
Less: firm-years whose derivative use (non-use) in the post-period 
   is inconsistent with classification in latest pre-period




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Timeliness of Price Discovery - Constant Derivative Sample (Test of H2) 
  
Panel A: Constant Derivative Unmatched Sample
Sample/Subsample N Pre IPT Post IPT N Pre IPT Post IPT
Combined 734 3.799 5.935 2.136 ** 465 5.104 6.970 1.866 ** -0.270
Positive intraperiod return 225 3.513 5.987 2.474 * 120 5.483 6.190 0.707 -1.768 *
Negative intraperiod return 509 4.761 6.057 1.296 345 4.343 7.731 3.388 ** 2.092 ***
Panel B: Constant Derivative Matched Sample
Sample/Subsample N Pre IPT Post IPT N Pre IPT Post IPT
Combined 224 4.107 6.271 2.164 * 224 4.799 7.053 2.254 ** 0.089
Positive intraperiod return 50 3.895 6.211 2.317 50 5.103 6.398 1.295 -1.022







  This table presents the results of the DiD tests for H2 using the portfolio-level IPT . Panels A and B present the results using the constant 
derivative unmatched and matched H2 samples (table 4.19), respectively. The constant derivative samples exclude firms whose derivative use 
(non-use) in the post-period is inconsistent with the classification in the pre-period. The constant derivative matched sample is identified using 
CEM on OCFVOL  (26 cutpoints), MVE  (10 cutpoints), Fama-French 12 industry classifications and the sign of intraperiod return, within the 
constant derivative unmatched H2 sample. Treatment firms include derivative users and control firms include derivative non-users, identified in the 
pre-SFAS 133 period. The pre-period includes fiscal years ending June 1999 to May 2000 and the post-period includes fiscal years ending June 
2001 to May 2002, to correspond with the effective date of SFAS 133. Positive (negative) intraperiod return subsamples include observations 
whose 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive (negative) in both the pre- and post-periods. ΔIPT is the post-period IPT minus the 
pre-period IPT, within the respective group. DiD_IPT  is equal to the treatment group ΔIPT minus the control group ΔIPT . ***,  **,  and  * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%,  5%,  and 10% levels based on the one-tailed tests, respectively. Significance of ΔIPT  and DID_IPT  is 
determined using a permutation test, where I compare the observed ΔIPT  and DID_IPT to the null distributions of ΔIPT and DID_IPT  created 
under the null hypothesis that the order of the monthly returns does not matter. The significance of ΔIPT  and DiD_IPT  depend on the respective 
null distributions, which are unique to the portfolio(s) examined. The corresponding null distributions of ΔIPT  and DID_IPT are presented in 
appendix E.2. All variables are defined in Appendix A.




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Timeliness of Price Discovery - Alternative Matched Samples (Test of H2) 
 Continued on next page 
  
Panel A: Constant Derivative OCFVOL -Matched Sample
Sample/Subsample N Pre IPT Post IPT N Pre IPT Post IPT
Combined 349 4.146 5.774 1.628 349 5.042 7.043 2.001 * 0.373
Positive intraperiod return 88 3.999 5.641 1.642 88 5.279 6.498 1.219 -0.423
Negative intraperiod return 261 4.424 6.122 1.698 261 4.559 7.603 3.044 ** 1.345 **
Panel B: Constant Derivative MVE -Matched Sample
Sample/Subsample N Pre IPT Post IPT N Pre IPT Post IPT
Combined 245 4.525 6.458 1.932 * 245 5.076 6.681 1.605 -0.327
Positive intraperiod return 57 4.502 6.359 1.856 57 5.435 6.429 0.994 -0.863
Negative intraperiod return 188 4.600 6.140 1.540 188 4.365 6.920 2.555 * 1.014
Panel C: Constant Derivative OCFVOL -ANALYSTS_N -Matched Sample
Sample/Subsample N Pre IPT Post IPT N Pre IPT Post IPT
Combined 257 4.318 5.891 1.573 257 5.193 7.049 1.856 ** 0.283
Positive intraperiod return 66 4.242 5.587 1.345 66 5.546 6.410 0.864 -0.481
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  This table presents the results of the DiD tests for H2 using alternative matched samples. Panels A, B and C present the results using the 
constant derivative OCFVOL -, MVE- , and OCFVOL-ANALYSTS_N- matched samples, respectively. The constant derivative samples 
exclude firms whose derivative use (non-use) in the post-period is inconsistent with classification in the pre-period. The constant 
derivative OCFVOL -matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (44 cutpoints), FF12 industry classifications and the sign of 
intraperiod return, within the constant derivative unmatched sample (table 4.19, panel A). The constant derivative MVE -matched sample 
is identified using CEM on MVE  (10 cutpoints), FF12 industry classifications and the sign of intraperiod return, within the constant 
derivative unmatched sample. The OCFVOL-ANALYSTS_N -matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (33 cutpoints), 
ANALYSTS_N  (5 cutpoints), FF12 industry classifications and the sign of intraperiod return, within the constant derivative unmatched 
sample. Treatment firms include derivative users and control firms include derivative non-users, identified in the pre-SFAS 133 period. 
The pre-period includes fiscal years ending June 1999 to May 2000 and the post-period includes fiscal years ending June 2001 to May 
2002, to correspond with the effective date of SFAS 133. Positive (negative) intraperiod return subsamples include observations whose 
12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive (negative) in both the pre- and post-periods. ΔIPT is the post-period IPT minus the 
pre-period IPT, within the respective group. DiD_IPT  is equal to the treatment group ΔIPT minus the control group ΔIPT . ***,  **,  and  
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%,  5%,  and 10% levels based on the one-tailed tests, respectively. Significance of ΔIPT  and 
DID_IPT  is determined using a permutation test, where I compare the observed ΔIPT  and DID_IPT to the null distributions of ΔIPT and 
DID_IPT  created under the null hypothesis that the order of the monthly returns does not matter. The significance of ΔIPT  and DiD_IPT 
depend on the respective null distributions, which are unique to the portfolio(s) examined. The corresponding null distributions of ΔIPT 
and DID_IPT are presented in appendix E.3. All variables are defined in Appendix A.




The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on Management Forecast Frequency 










Combined 224 0.268 0.456 0.188 *** 224 0.367 0.592 0.226 *** 0.037
Positive intraperiod return 50 0.196 0.748 0.551 *** 50 0.390 0.902 0.512 *** -0.040
Negative intraperiod return 174 0.289 0.373 0.084 * 174 0.360 0.504 0.144 ** 0.060
 ΔMF_N ΔMF_N DiD_MF_N
  This table presents the results of the DiD t-tests for the effect of exposure to fair value accounting on management forecast 
frequency using the constant derivative matched H2 sample (table 4.19, panel B). The constant derivative samples exclude firms 
whose derivative use (non-use) in the post-period is inconsistent with classification in the pre-period. The constant derivative 
matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (26 cutpoints), MVE  (10 cutpoints), Fama-French 12 industry classifications 
and the sign of intraperiod return, within the constant derivative unmatched sample. Treatment firms include derivative users and 
control firms include derivative non-users, identified in the pre-SFAS 133 period. The pre-period includes fiscal years ending June 
1999 to May 2000 and the post-period includes fiscal years ending June 2001 to May 2002, to correspond with the effective date of 
SFAS 133. Positive (negative) intraperiod return subsamples include observations whose 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
are positive (negative) in both the pre- and post-periods. MF_N is equal to the natural log of one plus the number of management 
forecasts issued in the 12-month period ending 3 months after the fiscal year-end. ΔMF_N  is the average value in the post-period 
minus the average value in the pre-period, within the respective group. DiD_MF_N  is equal to the treatment group ΔMF_N minus 
the control group ΔMF_N . ***,  **,  and  * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,  5%,  and 10% levels based on the one-tailed 
tests, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Control Treat
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TABLE 4.23  
















Combined 224 1.441 1.196 -0.246 ** 224 1.546 1.279 -0.267 ** -0.021
Positive intraperiod return 50 2.056 2.123 0.067 50 2.112 2.171 0.059 -0.007
Negative intraperiod return 174 1.265 0.929 -0.335 *** 174 1.383 1.022 -0.361 *** -0.025
  This table presents the results of the DiD t-tests of the impact of SFAS 133 on analyst following using the constant derivative matched H2 
sample (table 4.19, panel B). The constant derivative samples exclude firms whose derivative use (non-use) in the post-period is inconsistent 
with classification in the pre-period. The constant derivative matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (26 cutpoints), MVE  (10 
cutpoints), Fama-French 12 industry classifications and the sign of intraperiod return, within the constant derivative unmatched sample. 
Treatment firms include derivative users and control firms include derivative non-users, identified in the pre-SFAS 133 period. The pre-period 
includes fiscal years ending June 1999 to May 2000 and the post-period includes fiscal years ending June 2001 to May 2002, to correspond with 
the effective date of SFAS 133. Positive (negative) intraperiod return subsamples include observations whose 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns are positive (negative) in both the pre- and post-periods. ANALYSTS_N is equal to the natural log of one plus the number of analysts 
following the firm in the 12-month period ending 3 months after the fiscal year-end. ΔANALYSTS_N  is the average value in the post-period minus 
the average value in the pre-period, within the respective group. DiD_ANALYSTS_N  is equal to the treatment group ΔANALYSTS_N minus the 
control group ΔANALYSTS_N . ***,  **,  and  * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,  5%,  and 10% levels based on the two-tailed tests, 














Continued on next page 
Variable Description
Panel A: Management Forecast-Level Variables
MF_CAR 0,1 Cumulative abnormal returns for day 0 to day 1, calculated as the cumulative
daily return minus the corresponding size-decile portfolio return, where day 0
is the management forecast (MF) date. When the forecast is released after the
close of trading, the MF date is set to be the next trading day.
MF_SURP Management forecast surprise, equal to the MF EPS minus the mean analyst
forecast EPS in the set of analyst forecasts issued 90 to 2 calendar days prior
to the MF date, deflated by the share price 2 trading days prior to MF date
(pre-MF share price); if the MF EPS is a closed range, I estimate the news
using the midpoint of the range.
MF_LOSS Indicator variable that equals one if the MF EPS is negative, and zero
otherwise.
MF_WIDTH Width of range or point forecast, where the width for a range forecast is equal
to the high-end estimate minus the low-end estimate, deflated by the pre-MF
share price and the width for a point forecast is zero.
MF_HORIZON The number of calendar days between the MF date and the corresponding
fiscal year-end date.
EA_CONCUR Indicator variable that equals one if an earnings announcement was issued
within 1 trading day of the MF date, and zero otherwise.
EA_SURP Earnings surprise of concurrent earnings announcement (i.e., earnings
announcement issued within 1 trading day of management forecast), equal to
the current quarter EPS minus the four quarters ago EPS, deflated by the share
price 2 trading days prior to earnings announcement date; if no earnings
announcement is issued within 1 trading day of management forecast, variable
is equal to zero.
EA_LOSS Indicator variable that equals one if the concurrent earnings announcement
EPS is negative, and zero otherwise.
HiMF_WIDTH Indicator variable that equals one if MF_WIDTH is above median, and zero
otherwise.
HiMF_HORIZON Indicator variable that equals one if MF_HORIZON is above median, and
zero otherwise.
MF_SURP
   _GNEWS
Equal to MF_SURP  where MF_SURP  is positive, and zero otherwise.
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Appendix A - Continued 





   _BNEWS
Equal to MF_SURP  where MF_SURP  is negative, and zero otherwise.
MF_BNEWS Indicator variable that equals one if MF_SURP is negative, and zero
otherwise.
MF_CAR -1,1 Cumulative abnormal returns for day -1 to day 1, calculated as the cumulative
daily return minus the corresponding size-decile portfolio return, where day 0
is the management forecast (MF) date. When the forecast is released after the
close of trading, the MF date is set to be the next trading day.
Panel B: Firm-Level Variables
TREAT Indicator variable that equals one if the firm holds derivative instruments in 
the latest pre-SFAS 133 period (1999 for H2 and 1998 or 1999 for H1), and 
zero otherwise.
POST Indicator variable that equals one for fiscal years ending on or after June 30, 
2001, and zero otherwise.
OCFVOL Four-year standard deviation of operating cash flows scaled by average total
assets.
MVE The natural logarithm of the market value of common equity (MVE ) at the
beginning of the fiscal year.
MTB Market value of common equity divided by the book value of common equity
at the beginning of the fiscal year.
HiOCFVOL Indicator variable that equals one if OCFVOL is above median, and zero
otherwise.
HiMTB Indicator variable that equals one if MTB is above median, and zero
otherwise.
HiMVE Indicator variable that equals one if MVE is above median, and zero
otherwise.
ANALYSTS_N The natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm
during the 12-month ended three months after the fiscal year-end.
MF_N The natural logarithm of one plus the number of management forecasts issued
during the 12-month period ended 3 months after the fiscal year-end.
   
200 
 







Panel C: Timeliness of Price Discovery and Related Variables
IPT_Firm Area under the graph of market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns over a 12-
month period, plotted as a percentage of the 12-month market-adjusted buy-
and-hold return calculated as:
where:
BH m    = equals the market-adjusted portfolio buy-and-hold returns from 
             month 1 through m; and 
BH 12   = equals the 12-month market-adjusted portfolio buy-and-hold return 
             for the 12-month period ending three months after the fiscal year-end 
             (Butler et al. 2007).
IPT_Port or IPT Area under the graph of market-adjusted portfolio buy-and-hold returns over a
12-month period, plotted as a percentage of the 12-month market-adjusted
portfolio buy-and-hold return. It is calculated in a similar fashion as
IPT_Firm , but uses portfolio returns. Portfolio returns are calculated as the
hedge returns one would earn by taking a long position in firms with a
positive 12-month buy-and hold return and a short position in firms with a
negative 12-month buy-and hold return within the portfolio. 
RET_REV_Firm Extent of return reversals, calculated as:
where, BH m  and BH 12  are defined above.
RET_REV_Port 
or RET_REV
Extent of return reversals, calculated in a similar fashion as the
RET_RET_Firm , but uses portfolio returns (as described for IPT_Port ).




Limitations of the Intraperiod Timeliness Metric 
B.1 Introduction 
This appendix discusses some limitations with using the intraperiod timeliness (IPT) metric in 
research. Section B.2 discusses some of the prior literature using firm-level IPT. Section B.3 
discusses limitations with using a firm-level IPT for assessing the timeliness of price discovery. 
Specifically, I find that the firm-level IPT metric, IPT_Firm, is well-behaved only under certain 
conditions. When these conditions are not satisfied, it is difficult to appropriately interpret the IPT 
results. Section B.4 examines whether such limitations are alleviated with the portfolio-level IPT 
metric and, finally, section B.5 concludes. 
B.2 Prior Literature using Firm-Level IPT 
In addition to portfolio-level IPT curves and/or metrics, prior literature examining an intraperiod 
timeliness construct also uses firm-level IPT metrics.46 Examples of these studies include Butler 
et al. (2007), Ball et al. (2012b), Drake, Thornock and Twedt (2017), Gao, Shivakumar and 
Sidhu (2018), and Chapman, Miller and White (2019). Specifically, these studies use firm-level 
IPT metrics constructed similarly to that developed by Butler et al. (2007). The portfolio-level 
IPT, described in section 3.2.3.1 and presented in equation (3.3), is calculated using Butler et 
al.’s formula, but using portfolio-level returns instead of firm-level returns.  
In this section, I briefly discuss the firm-level IPT metrics used in the studies mentioned 
above. My purpose is not to assess the appropriateness of their use and/or interpretation, but 
rather to describe the different ways in which the firm-level IPT has been constructed and used. 
 
46 See section 3.2.3.1 for a discussion of some of the studies examining portfolio-level IPT curves and/or metrics. 
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There exist circumstances where the firm-level IPT can be useful for interpreting the timeliness 
of price discovery, which I discuss in section B.3.  
Drake et al. (2017) measure firm-level IPT using daily returns over the 10 and 20 days 
following an earnings announcement. They find that firms whose earnings announcements are 
covered by professional and semi-professional intermediaries have greater IPT in the 10- and 20-
day post-announcement period, relative to firms whose earnings announcements are not covered 
by such intermediaries. Similarly, Chapman et al. (2019) find that firms with an in-house investor 
relations officer have a larger 10-day IPT following the earnings announcement than those without. 
Unlike Drake et al. (2017) and Chapman et al. (2019) who use IPT metrics that span a relatively 
short period (i.e., 10 or 20 days), Butler et al. (2017), Ball et al. (2012b) and Gao et al. (2017) use 
IPT metrics that span a much longer period (i.e., 12 months). Butler et al. (2007) develop and use 
an annual IPT metric, using monthly returns, to assess whether reporting frequency affects IPT. 
They find that while firms that voluntarily increase reporting frequency from semiannual to 
quarterly filings increase in IPT, those that mandatorily increase reporting frequency do not. Using 
a similar annual IPT metric, Ball et al. (2012b) find that banks with trading securities have lower 
IPT than those without trading securities. Finally, Gao et al. (2017) find that joining the Singapore 
Exchange’s research incentive scheme, which offers sponsored analyst following for previously 
unfollowed or poorly followed firms, does not improve the firm’s IPT.  
Relying on the use of firm-level IPT in the above literature, I initially planned to use firm-
level IPT in this thesis. However, as I proceeded to examine this metric more carefully, I became 
aware of issues related to return reversals, which can render this metric inappropriate for 
interpreting the timeliness of price discovery. I discuss this issue in the following section. 
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B.3 Limitations of using Firm-Level IPT 
In earlier literature examining IPT curves (e.g., Freeman 1987, Alford et al. 1993, Butler et al. 
2007), the implicit assumption in using area-under-the-curve metrics is that the IPT curves are 
generally monotonically increasing. This literature normally examines IPT curves at the portfolio 
level. I use figure 2 from Butler et al. (2007) as an example (see Figure B.1). In such cases, it is 
relatively straightforward to conclude that a larger area under the curve represents quicker price 
discovery. However, I find, in section B.3.1, that firm-level IPT curves often are non-monotonic. 
Even portfolio-level IPT curves can be non-monotonic if extreme firm-level reversals are not 
sufficiently averaged out, as I discuss in section B.4. Such cases are difficult to interpret. 
Unfortunately, prior studies examining IPT metrics do not discuss such problems in great detail.  
In figure B.2, I illustrate this issue by plotting the IPT curves for three firm-year 
observations in the set of 8,626 firm-year observations with necessary IPT data from panel A of 
table 3.4 (hereafter, IPT sample). The green (solid line, Alaska Air Group 1999) curve represents 
a scenario where the IPT curve is relatively well-behaved. Notice that the curve is generally 
monotonically increasing between 0% and 100%, with the exception of small reversals in months 
-5, -4, 1 and 3. Only 4 out of 8,626 firm-year observations in the IPT sample have zero return 
reversals. In contrast to the green (solid line, Alaska Air Group 1999) curve, the blue (dashed 
line, Foot Locker 2002) and red (dotted line, RailAmerica 2001) IPT curves are not well-
behaved. The blue (dashed line) curve represents a scenario where the IPT_Firm is positive and 
has large return reversals during the period, while the red (dotted line) curve represents a 
scenario where the IPT_Firm is negative and has large return reversals. When large reversals 
exist, the area under the curve (i.e., IPT_Firm) can fall outside the acceptable boundaries of a 
well-behaved IPT curve, namely 0.5 to 11.5, discussed in section 3.2.3.1. Note that the IPT_Firm 
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for the blue (dashed line) and red (dotted line) curves are 16.17 and -11.24, respectively. When 
IPT_Firm is affected by such reversals, it is difficult to interpret the area under the curve as the 
timeliness of price discovery. For example, we cannot conclude that Foot Locker (2002) has 
quicker price discovery than Alaska Air Group (1999) because Foot Locker’s IPT_Firm is 
inflated by return reversals. 
Return reversals can result from large changes in the sign of genuine news, but it can also 
result when the market corrects its prior over-reaction to news that was later shown to be 
unreliable (i.e., inaccurate or managed news). For example, Lang and Lundholm (2000) show 
that some firms substantially increase the frequency of their voluntary disclosures prior to 
seasoned equity offerings to positively influence share prices by “hyping” the stock. However, 
upon the stock issuance announcement, the market partially corrects for their prior over-reaction. 
Market reactions driven by a false perception of reliability and/or accuracy that reverses when 
the actual reliability and/or accuracy becomes apparent are, by definition, not highly credible. 
Whether return reversals result from changes in the sign of genuine news or corrections of prior 
reactions to managed news, IPT does not adequately reflect the timeliness of price discovery in 
the presence of non-trivial return reversals within the same period.  
I note that the idiosyncratic timing of news arrival at the firm level need not always result 
in return reversals. For example, assume firm A experiences two positive events in a given 
period and no negative events, and the two positive events occur early in the period. Next, 
assume firm B experiences the same two positive events and also no negative events, but the two 
positive events occur later in the period, relative to firm A. In both cases, there will be no return 
reversals related to genuine news. However, firm A will have a larger IPT than firm B, ceteris 
paribus, because of the earlier timing of the two positive events. Therefore, even in the absence 
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of return reversals, the random timing of firm-level news arrival can create problems for 
interpreting the timeliness of price discovery. However, the impact of such random timing on 
IPT is much smaller in the absence of return reversals than in their presence, because, absent 
return reversals, the IPT always falls within the acceptable range of 0.5 of 11.5, which I discuss 
in B.3.1.  
Note, then, that if return reversals are trivial during the period examined and there are no 
substantial differences in the news arrival process across the firms examined, a firm-level IPT 
can still be useful for interpreting the timeliness of price discovery. For example, when 
examining a short time period (e.g., few days) around specific events (e.g., earnings 
announcements), return reversals may not have a material effect on results because a shorter time 
interval provides less opportunity for drastic changes in returns and limits news arrival.47 
Furthermore, focusing on specific event periods controls for the timing of the major news event. 
Prior papers, such as Drake et al. (2017) and Gao et al. (2018) acknowledge that the IPT 
metric suffers from the influence of extreme outliers and noise. To alleviate the impact of such 
outliers, these studies transform the IPT metric into a ranked variable. While the ranked IPT 
measure helps to reduce the influence of extreme IPT observations, it still preserves the relative 
(mis)order of the firm-level IPT. For example, firms with large IPT values above 11.5, such as 
Foot Locker (2002) in Figure B.2, will still be ranked as very timely, which may not be 
appropriate.  
B.3.1 Return Reversals 
 
47 I have not examined the extent of return reversals in such a scenario and only describe this scenario for 
illustrative purposes. Concluding on the appropriateness of using a firm-level IPT in a particular setting requires 
examining the setting for return reversals. 
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To better understand the relation between the extent of return reversals and IPT_Firm, I create a 
proxy to capture the extent of return reversals, as follows: 




where BHm equals the buy-and-hold returns from month 1 through m, and m equals the month(s) 
passed since the beginning of the 12-month period. BH12 equals the 12-month buy-and-hold return. 
The absolute values will amplify the ratio in the presence of return reversals. If all monthly returns 
within a given period are in the same direction (i.e., no return reversals), RET_REV will equal 1. 
Hence, RET_REV has a lower bound of 1 and an unlimited upper bound. This metric can be created 
using firm-level or portfolio-level returns. I denote the firm-level (portfolio-level) metric as 
RET_REV_Firm (RET_REV_Port). 
 I first examine the correlation between RET_REV_Firm and the absolute value of 
IPT_Firm in the IPT sample. I use the absolute value of IPT_Firm because return reversals can 
inflate the magnitude of IPT_Firm in either direction, both positive and negative. If all firms have 
well-behaved curves (i.e., monotonically increasing), I expect the correlation to be zero. To the 
extent that small return reversals remain, like that of Alaska Air Group (1999) in figure B.2, I 
expect a small positive correlation. In contrast, if return reversals are substantial, I expect a large 
positive correlation. I find that the Pearson correlation is 0.9477 (untabulated). Accordingly, 
RET_REV_Firm and the absolute value of IPT_Firm are highly positively correlated, indicating 
that return reversals significantly inflate the magnitude of IPT_Firm.  
Next, I examine the IPT curves of three different firm-year observations in the IPT sample 
whose RET_REV_Firm falls in each the following regions: (1) 1–2; (2) 2-3; and (3) 3-4. This 
allows me to assess the extent or severity of return reversals, which is not readily apparent when 
 
(B.1) 
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examining RET_REV_Firm values. Figure B.3 presents these IPT curves. The green (solid line) 
IPT curve has a modest RET_REV_Firm of 1.45, which falls below the 10th percentile of the 
RET_REV_Firm distribution, discussed below (table B.1). While return reversals exist, in this case 
they do not appear severe. For example, the magnitude of the largest reversal, in month -2, is 
smaller than the magnitude of the prior month’s returns. 
The blue (dashed line) IPT curve has the largest RET_REV_Firm (3.38) out of the IPT 
curves in this figure, which is close to the median value of the RET_REV_Firm distribution in the 
IPT sample (table B.1). It is apparent that the return reversals are much more severe in the blue 
(dashed line) curve than in the green (solid line) curve. The magnitude of the largest reversal, in 
month -1, comprises nearly 50% of the 12-month buy-and-hold return. The return reversals in this 
curve are salient and the curve is not generally monotonically increasing. When return reversals 
are of such magnitude, it is problematic to interpret the area under the IPT curve (i.e., IPT_Firm) 
as timeliness of price discovery.  
Finally, the extent of return reversals in the red (dotted line) IPT curve falls somewhere in 
between that of the green (solid line) IPT curve and the blue (dashed line) IPT curve; 
RET_REV_Firm is equal to 2.28. While not as severe as that of the blue (dashed line) IPT curve, 
the extent of return reversals still warrants caution when interpreting IPT_Firm as timeliness of 
price discovery. In sum, I would consider a RET_REV_Firm somewhere between that of the green 
(solid line) IPT curve and the red (dotted line) IPT curve to be acceptable when using IPT metrics 
to infer the timeliness of price discovery. Thus, as a general guide, I consider RET_REV values 
above two to be non-trivial and difficult to interpret. While IPT curves with RET_REV below two 
can be considered generally monotonically increasing, one should use caution in interpreting IPT 
metrics as the speed of price discovery. 
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Next, in table B.1, I examine the distribution of IPT_Firm and RET_REV_Firm in the IPT 
sample. I find that the 10th and 90th percentile IPT_Firm (i.e., area under the curve) are well outside 
the acceptable boundaries of a well-behaved IPT curve, indicating the presence of return reversals 
- some of which are extreme. Recall that a well-behaved IPT curve begins at 0% and gradually 
ascends to a peak of 100% at the end of the period; IPT_Firm should lie between 0.5 and 11.5. 
While the IPT_Firm values between the 25th and the 75th percentile fall within the acceptable 
boundaries, I caution that this does not necessarily signal the absence of salient return reversals. 
To illustrate this point, in figure B.4, I plot the IPT curves of two firm-year observations in the IPT 
sample whose IPT_Firm fall well within 0.5 and 11.5. Note that the blue (solid line) IPT curve has 
severe return reversals, but due to the negative and positive areas offsetting, the IPT_Firm is 5.84. 
The RET_REV_Firm for this firm-year, indeed, is large (19.12), indicating large return reversals. 
While not as severe as the blue (solid line) IPT curve, the orange (dashed line) IPT curve also 
contains non-trivial return reversals, with the curve surpassing 100% on the y-axis at month -5 and 
coming back down to near 0% in month -3. Again, such return reversals are not evident from the 
IPT_Firm value of 5.86. However, the RET_REV_Firm of 4.15 indicates that the IPT curve does, 
indeed, contain non-trivial return reversals. 
In table B.1, I find that the minimum RET_REV_Firm is 1, indicating that there are some 
firm-year observations with no return reversals. However, there are only 4 such observations in 
the IPT sample of 8,626 observations. The majority of the observations have some level of 
reversals in monthly returns. The 25th percentile RET_REV_Firm value is 1.973, indicating that 
close to 75% of the observations in the IPT sample have non-trivial return reversals, based on my 
analysis above. Also, note that the 90th percentile RET_REV_Firm value is 16.918, which is 
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extreme. The mean absolute IPT_Firm for firms with RET_REV_Firm above the 90th percentile is 
120.176 (untabulated), so the impact of such extreme return reversals on IPT_Firm can be huge.  
Based on the above, it is important to note that we cannot assess the severity of return 
reversals in the IPT curve simply by examining the IPT_Firm value. As illustrated in figure B.4, 
an apparently acceptable IPT_Firm value can contain large return reversals, which can render the 
IPT_Firm useless for assessing the timeliness of price discovery. The RET_REV metric can 
provide some insight into the extent of return reversals contained in the IPT curve without having 
to plot the curve itself for every firm-year observation. Specifically, IPT observations with 
RET_REV above a value of two warrant greater attention before the IPT metric can be deemed 
reliable for interpreting the timeliness of price discovery. 
B.4 Portfolio-Level IPT 
The portfolio-level IPT, although measured in the same manner as the firm-level IPT, is less 
problematic because portfolio returns mitigate the effect of idiosyncratic firm-level news arrival, 
including return reversals, through averaging. Of course, the extent to which such return 
reversals are averaged out depends on the portfolio having a sufficient number of observations 
whose return reversals are not synchronous. The prior literature using portfolio IPT metrics does 
not discuss the minimum portfolio size needed to validate this assumption, but studies have used 
portfolios as small as 44 observations. For example, Alford et al. (1993) use portfolios ranging 
from 44 to 2,302 observations and Butler et al. (2007) use portfolios comprised of 98 
observations.  
 To better understand whether using portfolio returns indeed mitigate the problem of 
extreme return reversals, I examine the IPT_Port and RET_REV_Port distribution using 1,000 
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random samples of n observations in the IPT sample, drawn without replacement, where n equals 
50, 100, 200, 500 and 1000 observations. IPT_Port and RET_REV_Port are created in the same 
manner as IPT_Firm and RET_RET_Firm, but use portfolio returns, where portfolio returns are 
equal to the hedge returns one would earn by taking a long position in firms with a positive 12-
month buy-and-hold return and a short position in firms with a negative 12-month buy-and-hold 
return, as discussed in section 3.2.3.1. To the extent extreme reversals are averaged out, I expect 
to find IPT_Port well within the acceptable range of 0.5 to 11.5 across the distribution and 
RET_REV_Port between one and two. Furthermore, if the impact of idiosyncratic timing of news 
arrival at the firm level is averaged out in portfolios, I expect to observe a small standard 
deviation in the distribution of IPT_Port. As discussed in section B.3, the random timing of news 
arrival may not always lead to return reversals. 
Panels A and B of table B.2 report the IPT_Port and RET_REV_Port distributions, 
respectively, across 1000 random portfolios of 50, 100, 200, 500 and 1000 observations. At all 
portfolio sizes, I find that the entire distribution of IPT_Port is within the acceptable range of 0.5 
to 11.5 (panel A). As the portfolio size increases, the standard deviation decreases, indicating 
that the impact of idiosyncratic timing of news arrival decreases as portfolio size increases. Also, 
I find that the mean RET_REV_Port is very close to one (panel B) for all portfolio sizes. Similar 
to IPT_Port, the standard deviation of RET_REV_Port decreases as the portfolio sizes increases, 
indicating that a larger portfolio size better averages away firm-level return reversals. The 
maximum RET_REV_Port across all portfolio sizes is below two. As discussed in section B.3.1, 
I consider RET_REV above two to be problematic. Hence, I posit that IPT_Port can be used with 
caution, to interpret the timeliness of price discovery. In figure B.3, I plotted an IPT curve with 
RET_REV_Firm of 1.45, which I consider non-trivial, but not severe. A portfolio size of 100 
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observations would limit RET_REV_Port to a similar level since the maximum RET_REV_Port 
is 1.411. 
I also compare the distribution of  RET_REV_Port and IPT_Port to those of 
RET_REV_Firm and IPT_Firm (using values from table B.1). I find that the maximum 
RET_REV_Port is smaller than the 10th percentile RET_REV_Firm value for all portfolios with 
at least 100 observations, indicating a drastic improvement in the monotonicity of the IPT curves 
with portfolio-level returns, relative to those with firm-level returns.  
Based on this analysis, I conclude that IPT_Port is more appropriate than IPT_Firm, for 
interpreting the timeliness of price discovery. Portfolio-level returns average away return 
reversals reasonably well, even at a portfolio size of 50, although it is generally better to use 
larger portfolio sizes to minimize the impact of return reversals. The mean portfolio with 500 or 
more observations has zero return reversals; thus, IPT_Port can be reliably interpreted as 
timeliness of price discovery.48 Portfolios with 50 to fewer than 500 observations can be used to 
assess intraperiod timeliness, with caution. Furthermore, portfolio-level returns average away the 
idiosyncratic timing of news arrival at the firm level, quite substantially. In tests of H2, I use 
portfolio sizes ranging from 50 to 885. According to this analysis, these portfolio sizes are 
reasonable for using IPT_Port as a proxy for timeliness of price discovery. 
B.5 Conclusion 
Based on the above, I do not believe I can appropriately interpret results using a firm-level IPT in 
my setting. Specifically, IPT curves are generally not well-behaved at the firm level and I find 
this to be the case in the IPT sample. In contrast, portfolio-level IPT averages out return 
 
48 Recall from above that RET_REV of one is the lower threshold where there are no return reversals. 
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reversals, and reduces their impact noticeably, even with portfolios of 50 observations, although 
it is better to use larger portfolios to minimize the impact of return reversals. Furthermore, 
portfolio-level IPT also averages out the impact of idiosyncratic timing of firm-level news 
arrival. Hence, I use a portfolio-level IPT metric instead of a firm-level one.   

























Example of IPT_Firm Curves 
 
Figure B.2. This figure represents three types of IPT curves, using firm-year observations from 
the IPT sample (table 3.4, panel A). The green (solid line) curve represents a generally well-
behaved IPT curve. The blue (dashed line) curve represents a scenario where the IPT_Firm is 
positive and has large return reversals during the period. The red (dotted line) curve represents a 



























Month Relative to Fiscal Year-End
IPT_Firm
RailAmerica 2001 (IPT_Firm=-11.24) Alaska Air Group 1999 (IPT_Firm=5.98)





Example of IPT_Firm Curves with Varying RET_REV_Firm 
Figure B.3. This figure represents IPT curves for three firm-year observations, with varying 
levels of RET_REV_Firm, in the IPT sample (table 3.4, panel A). The green (solid line) IPT 
curve has a modest RET_REV_Firm of 1.45, which falls below the 10th percentile of the 
RET_REV_Firm distribution in the IPT sample (table B.1). The red (dotted line) IPT curve has a 
slightly higher RET_REV_Firm than that of the green (solid line) IPT curve. Finally, the blue 
(dashed line) IPT curve has the greatest RET_REV_Firm in this graph, which is close to the 



























Month Relative to Fiscal Year-End
IPT_Firm
Westar Energy 1999 (IPT_Firm=5.35; RET_REV_Firm=1.45)
Rite Aid 2002 (IPT_Firm=5.88; RET_REV_Firm=2.28)





Example of IPT_Firm Curves with Similar IPT_Firm but Substantially Different RET_REV_Firm 
 
Figure B.4. This figure represents IPT curves for two firm-year observations in the IPT sample 
(table 3.4, panel A). The IPT_Firm for these observations lie well within the interval [0.5, 11.5], 
where a well-behaved IPT curve can be interpreted. However, these IPT curves contain non-
































Month Relative to Fiscal Year-End
IPT_Firm
Somanetics 1999 (IPT_Firm=5.84; RET_REV_Firm=19.12)





Distribution of IPT_Firm and RET_REV_Firm in the IPT sample 
 
  
Variables N mean sd min p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 max
IPT_Firm 8626 6.717 140.061 -2644.993 -1.728 2.938 5.422 8.205 13.293 10317.850
RET_REV_Firm 8626 15.323 248.325 1.000 1.484 1.973 3.179 6.531 16.918 20867.220
This table presents the distribution of IPT_Firm  and RET_REV_Firm  for the IPT sample of 8,626 firm-year observations (see 





Distribution of IPT_Port and RET_REV_Port, by Portfolio Size 
 
 
Panel A: Distribution of IPT_Port  using 1,000 random samples of n observations
n mean sd min p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 max
50 4.826 0.761 2.343 3.909 4.301 4.771 5.291 5.818 7.752
100 4.780 0.543 3.357 4.106 4.408 4.769 5.124 5.476 6.838
200 4.751 0.353 3.625 4.313 4.521 4.730 4.969 5.218 5.999
500 4.727 0.226 4.054 4.454 4.581 4.723 4.871 5.022 5.710
1000 4.730 0.155 4.222 4.535 4.631 4.727 4.833 4.930 5.309
Panel B: Distribution of RET_REV_Port  using 1,000 random samples of n observations
n mean sd min p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 max
50 1.066 0.097 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.027 1.091 1.191 1.937
100 1.016 0.039 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.010 1.057 1.411
200 1.003 0.013 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.138
500 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.006
1000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Panels A and B of this table present the distribution of IPT_Port and RET_REV_Port, respectively, using 1,000 random samples of 
n observations from the IPT sample of 8,626 firm-year observations (table 3.4, panel A), drawn without replacement. The portfolio 
returns are calculated as the returns one would earn by taking a long position in the positive 12-month buy-and-hold return firms and 





Identification of Derivative Users and Non-Users 
C.1 Introduction 
As discussed in section 3.2.1, I use a combination of a keyword search and manual examination 
of the 10-K filing to identify derivative users and non-users. This appendix describes the 
identification process and defines the criteria for identifying users and non-users based on the 
SeekEdgar keyword search results. In section C.2, I discuss the process for identifying derivative 
users and non-users from the set of latest pre-period firm-year observations available for H1 
and/or H2 prior to identifying treatment firms and matching, described in table C.1 and discussed 
below. Then, in section C.3, I describe the procedures carried out to calibrate and validate the 
criteria for identifying derivative users using the keyword search results. As discussed in section 
3.2.1, I aim to identify derivative users and non-users using the count of keywords and the 
presence/absence of specific instrument words, without manual verification, whenever it is 
reasonably feasible to do so. 
C.2 Process for Identifying Derivative User and Non-users 
To classify firms as derivative users/non-users in the pre-period, I first obtain the count of 
derivative keywords from the keyword search using the phrase/word count request in SeekEdgar. 
I use a comprehensive list of 101 derivative-related keywords/phrases (generic and specific 
instrument words) in figure C.1, similar to that used by Campbell et al. (2020), as discussed in 
section 3.2.1. I also classify whether a firm has at least one specific instrument word, as 




presence/absence of specific instrument words to identify derivative users and non-users. Where 
I cannot reasonably classify a firm as a derivative user or non-user based on the keyword results, 
I manually examine the 10-K filing on SEC’s EDGAR database. I discuss cases where I cannot 
clearly distinguish between derivative users and non-users using the keyword results only, in 
section C.3. 
Table C.1 reports the number of observations included in the process for identifying 
treatment firms. Panel A reports the SeekEdgar keyword search results. I begin with the set of 
1,629 latest pre-period firm-year observations in H1 and/or H2 (hereafter, SeekEdgar sample). 
This set comprises 294 firms (71 in both the H1 and H2 sets and 223 in the H1 set only) 
available for H1 prior to identifying treatment firms and matching (see table 3.1, panel B) and 
1,406 firms (71 in both the H1 and H2 sets and 1,335 in the H2 set only) available for H2 prior to 
identifying treatment firms and matching (see table 3.4, panel B).  
I include all 1,629 firm-years in the SeekEdgar keyword search. Out of this sample, 
SeekEdgar does not return results for 110 observations due to missing 10-K filings on the 
EDGAR database or missing or miscoded headings for the footnote section of the 10-K (i.e., 
notes to the financial statements), in which case SeekEdgar cannot detect the footnote section. In 
addition, I do not rely on SeekEdgar results for 13 observations where SeekEdgar reports the 
total words in the footnote section as less than 1000 words. I trace these observations to the 10-K 




can lead to unreliable results for the number of derivative words.49 Thus, the SeekEdgar keyword 
search provides appropriate results for 1,506 pre-period firm-year observations  
C.3 Criteria to Identify Derivative Users and Non-users Using Keyword Search Results 
I examine the SeekEdgar keyword search results in the set of 1,506 observations to determine the 
criteria for classifying a firm as a derivative user or non-user. The starting point for this analysis 
is based on Campbell et al.’s (2020) classification strategy, where they classify a firm as a user if 
it has 20 or more derivative-related keywords. All other firms are then classified as a non-user. 
They then manually verify observations with 20 or more derivative words to ensure they are 
indeed derivative users. In contrast, I want to rely solely on the keyword search results, without 
manual verification, to identify derivative users and non-users for at least a subset of firms where 
this can be reasonably done, as discussed in section 3.2.1. Therefore, I need to understand the 
relation between the derivative word count, the presence/absence of specific instrument words 
and derivative use. 
 To gain this understanding, I examine the 10-K filings for random samples of 50 firms in 
each of the following categories, as identified by the SeekEdgar results: (1) 1-5 derivative words; 
(2) 6-10 derivative words; (3) 11-15 derivative words; (4) 16-19 derivative words; and (5) 20-30 
derivative words. The last group begins with 20 words, instead of 21, to keep consistent with the 
threshold used in Campbell et al. (2020). Based on their initial identification criteria of 20 or 
more derivative words, I assume that observations with greater than 30 derivative words are 
 
49 I find that 9 out of the 13 observations have at least one derivative word, but the SeekEdgar results for all 13 




unambiguously derivative users.50 Thus, I cut off the analysis at 30 derivative words. Similar to 
the manual identification of derivative users and non-users, described in section 3.2.1, I search 
for the keywords -  derivative, hedge, hedging, and swap - and read the surrounding text to assess 
whether the firm uses derivatives. I specifically search for the word “swap” because interest rate 
swaps are not always described as derivatives. 
Table C.2 provides the results of this analysis. Based on these results, I establish the 
criteria for classifying firms as derivative users and as derivative non-users. I first assess whether 
the category (e.g., 1-5 derivative words, 6-10 derivative words, etc.) can identify derivative users 
or non-users reasonably well. To minimize the impact of mis-classification errors, especially 
given the small sample sizes in this thesis, I only accept classifications with an error rate of 2% 
or less. I also assess whether the presence/absence of specific instrument words improves the 
classification error rate since the presence of specific instrument words is more likely to identify 
derivative users. Indeed, I find that 10.7% (8/75) of derivative non-users mention specific 
instrument words while 85.1% (149/175) of derivative users mention these words (see table C.2). 
When the presence/absence of specific instrument words improves the classification error rate 
and the error rate is 2% or less, I rely on the criteria using both the derivative word count and the 
presence/absence of specific instrument words to minimize classification errors.  
In the random sample of 50 observations with 1-5 derivative words, there are 14 
derivative users (table C.2). Hence, a classification scheme based on 1-5 derivative word count 
 
50 I find that all 50 random observations manually examined in the 20-30 derivative words category are 




would have a high false negative rate (28% - 14/50).51 Incorporating the presence/absence of 
specific instrument words improves the error rate; the false positive rate is 6% (3/50) and the 
false negative rate is 18% (9/50). That is, in firms with 1-5 derivative words and the presence 
(absence) of specific instrument words, there are 3 (9) derivative non-users (users) out of the 50 
observations examined. Hence, I cannot reasonably distinguish derivative users from non-users 
when observations have 1-5 derivative words as the error rates are greater than 2%. 
Next, I examine the category with 6-10 derivative words. A false negative rate is even 
higher in this category (40% - 20/50), relative to the 1-5 derivative words category, because there 
is a more even distribution of derivative users and non-users in this category. Incorporating the 
presence/absence of specific instrument words improves the false negative rate (14% - 7/50). The 
false positive rate is 6% (3/50). In the category of 11-15 derivative words, the false positive error 
rate is 16% (8/50). The false positive rate falls to 4% (2/50) once I consider the presence/absence 
of specific instrument words. The false negative rate is also 4% (2/50). In both categories, the 
error rates are still above the desired rate of 2%. 
In the category of 16-19 derivative words, the false positive error rate is 2% (1/50), which 
falls within the desired error rate of 2% or less. Nevertheless, I consider whether incorporating 
the presence/absence of specific instrument words improves the error rate even further. It does 
for the category of firms with specific instrument words. Specifically, the false positive error rate 
reduces to 0% (0/50). The false negative error rate is, however, 6% (3/50). Thus, I classify all 
 
51 A false positive (negative) rate, in this context, refers to the percentage of firms wrongly identified as 
derivative users (non-users). Incorporating the presence/absence of specific instrument words, a false positive 
(negative) rate refers to the percentage of firms with (without) specific instrument words that are wrongly identified 




firms with 16-19 derivative words and at least one specific instrument word as derivative users. 
In contrast, I cannot reasonably classify firms with 16-19 derivative words and no specific 
instrument words as derivative users or non-users using only the SeekEdgar results. However, 
only four firms in the SeekEdgar sample have 16-19 derivative words and no specific instrument 
words and all four firms were included in the manual verification sample. So, no further manual 
data collection is required for the category of firms with 16-19 derivative words. 
Finally, all 50 random observations with 20 to 30 derivative-related words are derivative 
users, regardless of the presence/absence of specific instrument words, resulting in a 0% false 
positive rate. Hence, I classify all observations with 20 or more derivative words as derivative 
users. 
In sum, I identify a firm as a derivative user if it has 20 or more derivative words, or 16-
19 derivative words and at least one specific instrument words. I identify a firm as derivative 
non-users if it has zero derivative words. I do not classify other observations (i.e., 1-15 derivative 
words; 16-19 derivative words and no specific instrument words), as users or non-users. Out of 
the 1,506 pre-period firm-years with appropriate SeekEdgar results, I can classify 739 
observations as derivative users or non-users (i.e., treatment) using the derivative word count and 
presence/absence of specific instrument words (table C.1, panel A).  
For the remaining 767 observations (table C.1, panel A), the SeekEdgar results are 
ambiguous for assessing treatment. Hence, for these 767 observations, plus the 110 observations 
with no SeekEdgar results and 13 observations with inappropriate SeekEdgar results, I classify as 
a derivative user or non-user by manually examining the 10-K filing. Panel B of table C.1 reports 




firm-year observations needing manual assessment, I can assess treatment (i.e., derivative user or 
non-user) for 854 observations. I cannot find the corresponding 10-K filing on SEC’s EDGAR 
database for 36 firm-years.52 Thus, these observations are excluded from the H1 and H2 samples 
(see table 3.1, panel B and table 3.4, panel B). In sum, the final set of observations where I can 
assess treatment includes 1,593 observations (table C.1, panel C), comprising 739 observations 
where I assess treatment using the SeekEdgar results and 854 observations where I assess 
treatment manually. 
 






Generic derivative-related keywords/phrases 
barrier option(s), basket option(s), call contract(s), cap agreement(s), compound option(s) 
contracts are designated, derivative(s), forward contract(s), hedge(s), hedging, ineffective 
portion(s), instruments are designated, lock agreement(s), lookback option(s), notional, option 
contract(s), put contract(s), put option(s), ratchet option(s), swap(s), swaption(s), quanto(s).53 
 
Specific derivative instrument-related keywords/phrases 
average rate option(s), commodity cap(s), commodity contract(s), commodity derivative(s), 
commodity floor(s), commodity forward(s), commodity future(s), commodity instrument(s), 
commodity option(s), commodity price cap(s), commodity price contract(s), commodity price 
collar(s), commodity price derivative(s), commodity price instrument(s), commodity price 
floor(s), commodity price forward(s), commodity price future(s), commodity price option(s), 
commodity price swap(s), commodity swap(s), cross currency basis swap(s), cross currency 
swap(s), currency cap(s), currency collar(s), currency contract(s), currency derivative(s), 
currency floor(s), currency forward(s), currency future(s), currency instrument(s), currency rate 
cap(s), currency rate collar(s), currency rate contract(s), currency rate derivative(s), currency rate 
floor(s), currency rate forward(s), currency rate future(s), currency rate instrument(s), currency 
rate option(s), currency rate swap(s), currency swap(s), equity swap(s),  foreign exchange cap(s), 
foreign exchange collar(s), foreign exchange contract(s), foreign exchange derivative(s), foreign 
exchange floor(s), foreign exchange forward(s), foreign exchange future(s), foreign exchange 
instrument(s), foreign exchange option(s), foreign exchange rate cap(s), foreign exchange rate 
collar(s), foreign exchange rate contract(s), foreign exchange rate derivative(s), foreign exchange 
rate floor(s), foreign exchange rate forward(s), foreign exchange rate future(s), foreign exchange 
rate instrument(s), foreign exchange rate option(s), foreign exchange rate swap(s), foreign 
exchange swap(s), forward foreign exchange(s), forward rate agreement(s), forward rate 
contract(s), forward rate option(s), interest rate cap(s), interest rate collar(s), interest rate 
contract(s), interest rate derivative(s), interest rate floor(s), interest rate forward(s), interest rate 
future(s), interest rate instrument(s), interest rate lock(s), interest rate option(s), interest rate 
swap(s), single currency basis swap(s), zero coupon swap(s).  
  
 
53 I remove duplicate counts of “derivatives” and “swap(s)”, where such words are part of specific derivative 
instrument-related phrases, such as “commodity derivative(s)”, “interest rate derivative(s)”, “interest rate swap(s)”, 
and “foreign exchange rate swap(s)”. I also run a separate search for the phrase “derivatives litigation” and “hedge 





Identification of Treatment Firms – Number of Latest Pre-Period Firm-Year Observations 
 
Panel A: SeekEdgar keyword search results
H1 & H2 H1 only H2 only Total
Set of available observations in H1 and/or H2 prior to identifying 
   treatment firms and matching (SeekEdgar sample) 71         223       1,335    1,629    
  Less: Observations with no SeekEdgar results (6)         (18)       (86)       (110)     
  Less: Observations with inappropriate SeekEdgar results 
    (i.e., <1000 total words in the footnote section of the 10-K)           -             -   (13)       (13)       
Set of observations with appropriate SeekEdgar results 65         205       1,236    1,506    
  Less: Observations where SeekEdgar results are ambiguous for 
    assessing treatment (24)       (78)       (665)     (767)     
Set of observations where I assess treatment using SeekEdgar results 41         127       571       739       
Panel B: Manual identification of derivative users and non-users
H1 & H2 H1 only H2 only Total
Observations with no SeekEdgar results 6           18         86         110       
Observations with inappropriate SeekEdgar results           -             -   13         13         
Observations where SeekEdgar results are ambiguous for 
   assessing treatment 24         78         665       767       
Set of observations needing manual assessment 30         96         764       890       
   Less: Observations with no corresponding 10-K filing (3)         (7)         (26)       (36)       
Set of observations where I assess treatment manually 27         89         738       854       
Panel C: Set of observations where I can assess treatment
H1 & H2 H1 only H2 only Total
Set of observations where I assess treatment using SeekEdgar results 41         127       571       739       
Set of observations where I assess treatment manually 27         89         738       854       
Set of observations where I can assess treatment 68         216       1,309    1,593    
    This table reports the number of observations included in the process for identifying treatment firms. Panel A 
reports the observations where I can assess treatment using SeekEdgar keyword search results. Panel B reports 
the observations where I can assess treatment by manually tracing to the 10-K filing. Panel C reports the set of 
observations where I can assess treatment. Panel A begins with the set of 294 firms (71 in both the H1 and H2 
sets and 223 in the H1 set only) available for H1 prior to identifying treatment firms and matching (see table 3.1, 
panel B) and 1,406 firms (71 in both the H1 and H2 sets and 1,335 in the H2 set only) available for H2 prior to 





Identifying Derivative Users Using SeekEdgar Results - Random Samples 
  
1-5 Derivative words 6-10 Derivative words
Specific instrument words N Y Total Specific instrument words N Y Total
Y 3 5 8 Y 3 13 16
N 33 9 42 N 27 7 34
Total 36 14 50 Total 30 20 50
11-15 Derivative words 16-19 Derivative words
Specific instrument words N Y Total Specific instrument words N Y Total
Y 2 40 42 Y 0 46 46
N 6 2 8 N 1 3 4
Total 8 42 50 Total 1 49 50
20-30 Derivative words All categories examined
Specific instrument words N Y Total Specific instrument words N Y Total
Y 0 45 45 Y 8 149 157
N 0 5 5 N 67 26 93
Total 0 50 50 Total 75 175 250
Derivative user Derivative user
   This table reports the two-way frequency table of derivative users and non-users and observations with and without specific 
instrument words for random subsamples of the SeekEdgar sample (table C.1, panel A), by number of derivative words. Each 
subsample includes 50 random observations for the latest pre-period year, 1998 or 1999, totalling 250 random observations.	
Derivative user






Alternate Specifications of Model for H1 






The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts  
– Full Set of Control Variables (H1) 
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[0.18]   
POST ? 0.037 **
[2.06]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.008
[-0.40]   
MF_SURP + 6.867 ***
[2.72]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? -1.770
[-1.02]   
POST × MF_SURP + 1.900
[0.93]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - 0.929
[0.42]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.017 **
[-2.27]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP - -2.642 **
[-1.75]   
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| - -43.966 **
[-1.75]   
MF_LOSS ? -0.010
[-0.28]   
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP - -1.524
[-1.03]   
HiMF_WIDTH ? -0.016 **
[-2.00]   
HiMF_WIDTH × MF_SURP - 1.693 *
[1.39]   
HiMF_HORIZON ? 0.006
[0.92]   
HiMF_HORIZON × MF_SURP - 0.231
[0.30]   
HiMTB ? -0.016 **
[-2.38]   
HiMTB × MF_SURP - 0.168







TABLE D.1 - Continued 






[-0.69]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP - -1.160
[-1.07]   
EA_CONCUR ? 0.006
[0.85]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP ? -2.161 **
[-2.26]   
EA_SURP + 0.117
[0.24]   
EA_SURP × |EA_SURP| - 0.212
[0.17]   
EA_LOSS ? 0.002
[0.10]   
EA_LOSS × EA_SURP - 0.046
[0.15]   
HiMTB × EA_SURP - -0.283
[-1.13]   
HiMVE × EA_SURP - 0.081
[0.32]   
Constant -0.008











TABLE D.1 - Continued 
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[-0.79]   
POST ? 0.023
[1.15]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.001
[-0.06]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS + 0.419
[0.09]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 9.742 ***
[2.82]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 10.106 **
[2.15]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -4.254 ***
[-2.65]   
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + 17.078 **
[2.07]   
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + -0.036
[-0.02]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -16.401 **
[-1.99]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 1.319
[0.57]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.009
[-1.15]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -6.832 **
[-2.07]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -1.067
[-0.77]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -23.129
[-0.33]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -79.223 ***
[-2.41]   
MF_LOSS ? 0.079 ***
[2.66]   
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -22.042 ***
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MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.510
[0.28]   
HiMF_WIDTH ? -0.010
[-1.63]   
HiMF_WIDTH × MF_SURP_GNEWS - 3.291 *
[1.30]   
HiMF_WIDTH × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 1.587
[1.22]   
HiMF_HORIZON ? 0.003
[0.42]   
HiMF_HORIZON × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -1.841
[-0.79]   
HiMF_HORIZON × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.190
[0.19]   
HiMTB ? -0.016 **
[-2.05]   
HiMTB × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -4.047 *
[-1.53]   
HiMTB × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.578
[-0.38]   
HiMVE ? 0.016 **
[2.02]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -6.192 ***
- [-2.57]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? 0.780
[0.61]   
EA_CONCUR ? -0.006
[-0.82]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 3.841
[1.15]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -3.617 ***
[-3.63]   
EA_SURP_GNEWS + 0.009
[0.02]   
EA_SURP_BNEWS + -1.374 *
[-1.38]   
EA_SURP_GNEWS × |EA_SURP| - 0.779













EA_SURP_BNEWS × |EA_SURP| - -0.574
[-0.28]   
EA_LOSS ? 0.033
[1.54]   
EA_LOSS × EA_SURP_GNEWS - -0.037
[-0.11]   
EA_LOSS × EA_SURP_BNEWS - 2.193 **
[2.28]   
HiMTB × EA_SURP_GNEWS - 0.006
[0.02]   
HiMTB × EA_SURP_BNEWS - -1.700 *
[-1.71]   
HiMVE × EA_SURP_GNEWS - -0.130
[-0.48]   
HiMVE × EA_SURP_BNEWS - 2.207 **
[2.51]   
Constant ? -0.003





    This table reports the results of the analysis of H1, including the full set of control variables considered 
and discussed in section 3.2.2, using the constant derivative unmatched sample (table 4.4, panel A). Panel 
A reports the regression results, where the management forecast response coefficient is not conditioned on 
the sign of the management forecast surprise (MF_SURP ). Panel B reports the regression results, where 
the management forecast response coefficient is conditioned on the sign of MF_SURP . The dependent 
variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return around the management forecast, MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT 
is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that use derivatives in the latest pre-period, and zero 
otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable that equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and zero otherwise. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on the one-
tailed tests for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. All t-statistics, in brackets, are 
estimated using firm-level clustering and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Petersen 2009). All 








The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts  
- Industry Fixed Effects (H1) 
Continued on next page 
Panel A: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Not Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? -0.002 0.000
[-0.11] [-0.03]   
POST ? 0.043 ** 0.046 ***
[2.43] [2.63]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.012 -0.014
[-0.66] [-0.75]   
MF_SURP + 4.973 *** 6.298 **
[2.48] [2.14]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? -0.601 2.300
[-0.40] [1.15]   
POST × MF_SURP + 2.165 4.321 **
[1.25] [2.24]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - -0.530 -3.278 *
[-0.24] [-1.36]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.017 ** -0.017 **
[-2.22] [-2.27]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP - -2.766 ** -3.214 **
[-1.84] [-1.78]   
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| - -31.148 -16.059
[-1.06] [-0.62]   
MF_LOSS ? 0.009 0.007
[0.29] [0.28]   
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP - -1.401 -3.019 **
[-0.84] [-1.72]   
HiMF_WIDTH ? -0.012 -0.016 **
[-1.50] [-1.99]   
HiMF_WIDTH × MF_SURP - 2.072 ** 0.621
[1.95] [0.40]   
HiMVE ? -0.010 -0.012
[-1.28] [-1.59]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP - -1.286 -2.610 ***
[-1.16] [-2.47]   
Constant ? 0.006 0.010
[0.30] [0.50]   
Industry fixed effects Yes No
No Yes   
N 667 667
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.203
df_m 26 36
df_r 230 230
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Panel B: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? -0.013 -0.005
[-0.69] [-0.30]   
POST ? 0.024 0.029
[1.26] [1.49]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.007 -0.015
[-0.33] [-0.69]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS + -0.569 -0.570
[-0.17] [-0.16]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 6.531 *** 4.584 **
[2.71] [1.80]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 8.411 ** 9.214 **
[2.19] [2.26]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -2.211 1.989
[-1.43] [0.94]   
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + 21.705 *** 21.544 ***
[3.06] [2.81]   
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + 0.899 3.474 *
[0.49] [1.56]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -16.841 *** -16.184 **
[-2.51] [-2.22]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.707 -4.557 *
[-0.31] [-1.47]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.011 -0.010
[-1.45] [-1.36]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -4.837 ** -6.099 **
[-1.92] [-2.13]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.792 -0.870
[-0.50] [-0.66]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS × |MF_SURP| - 64.143 66.317
[0.81] [0.76]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -42.049 * -25.948
[-1.43] [-0.98]   
MF_LOSS ? 0.098 *** 0.081 ***
[3.30] [2.85]   
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -23.516 *** -22.196 ***
[-4.12] [-3.62]   
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.458 -2.455













HiMVE ? 0.008 0.007
[1.11] [1.03]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -8.341 *** -9.680 ***
[-2.53] [-3.42]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.500 0.171
[0.36] [0.13]   
Constant ? -0.001 -0.002
[-0.03] [-0.09]   
Industry fixed effects Yes No
No Yes   
N 667 667




    This table reports the results of the analysis of H1 using the constant derivative unmatched sample (table 4.4, 
panel A), after including industry fixed effects. Panel A reports the regression results, where the management 
forecast response coefficient is not conditioned on the sign of the management forecast surprise (MF_SURP ). Panel 
B reports the regression results, where the management forecast response coefficient is conditioned on the sign of 
MF_SURP . The dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return around the management forecast, 
MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT  is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that use derivatives in the latest pre-period, 
and zero otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable that equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and zero otherwise. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on the one-tailed tests 
for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. All t-statistics, in brackets, are estimated using firm-level 
clustering and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Industry fixed effects interacted with 









The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts  
– Continuous Control Variables (H1) 
Continued on next page 
Panel A: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Not Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? 0.002 -0.018
[0.12] [-0.77]   
POST ? 0.031 * 0.045 *
[1.78] [1.93]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.008 0.003
[-0.41] [0.10]   
MF_SURP + 9.020 *** 3.725 ***
[3.15] [2.45]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? -0.667 -0.499
[-0.38] [-0.39]   
POST × MF_SURP + 1.473 3.272 ***
[0.76] [3.58]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - 0.357 -1.597
[0.15] [-0.74]   
OCFVOL ? -0.142                
[-1.22]                
OCFVOL × MF_SURP - -4.577                
[-0.30]                
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| - -31.885 -35.027 *
[-1.10] [-1.52]   
MF_LOSS ? 0.015                
[0.36]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP - -1.542                
[-0.72]                
MF_WIDTH ? 0.298                
[0.15]                
MF_WIDTH × MF_SURP - -35.664                
[-0.53]                
MVE ? -0.003                
[-1.55]                
MVE × MF_SURP - -0.572 **                
[-1.88]                
Constant ? 0.005 -0.030
[0.25] [-1.59]   
N 667 219












TABLE D.3 - Continued 
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Panel B: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? -0.011 -0.038
[-0.69] [-1.28]   
POST ? 0.020 0.023
[1.01] [0.84]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.001 0.039
[-0.07] [1.13]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS + 9.674 ** 6.618 **
[2.14] [2.34]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 4.962 * -7.233
[1.40] [-0.37]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 7.607 * 7.988 ***
[1.86] [2.89]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -2.321 0.701
[-1.30] [0.10]   
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + 17.720 *** 14.021 *
[2.68] [1.62]   
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + 1.298 2.796
[0.63] [0.45]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -15.032 ** -18.536 **
[-2.27] [-2.18]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -1.026 0.550
[-0.41] [0.08]   
OCFVOL ? -0.150 -0.120
[-1.21] [-0.47]   
OCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -71.638 ** -87.822 *
[-1.74] [-1.44]   
OCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 2.780 51.710
[0.16] [0.68]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS × |MF_SURP| - 3.344                
[0.06]                
MF_SURP_BNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -54.818 **                
[-2.10]                
MF_LOSS ? 0.128 ***                
[2.73]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -23.546 ***                
[-4.07]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.985                















MVE ? 0.000 0.002
[0.09] [0.48]   
MVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -1.464 ** -0.812 **
[-2.27] [-2.31]   
MVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.234 0.753
[0.64] [0.56]   
EA_CONCUR ? -0.007
[-0.48]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 4.501 **
[2.02]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -0.881
[-0.22]   
Constant -0.008 -0.033
[-0.34] [-0.70]   
N 667 219









    This table reports the results of the analysis of H1 using the constant derivative unmatched and matched samples 
(table 4.4), using continuous control variables instead of binary variables. Panel A reports the regression results, 
where the management forecast response coefficient is not conditioned on the sign of the management forecast 
surprise (MF_SURP ). Panel B reports the regression results, where the management forecast response coefficient 
is conditioned on the sign of MF_SURP . The dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return around 
the management forecast, MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT  is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that use derivatives 
in the latest pre-period, and zero otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable that equals one for post-SFAS 133 
periods, and zero otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, 
based on the one-tailed tests for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. All t-statistics, in brackets, 
are estimated using firm-level clustering and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Petersen 2009). All 






The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts  
- Exclude Stand-Alone Control Variables (H1) 
Continued on next page 
  
Panel A: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Not Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? 0.006 -0.018
[0.39] [-0.77]   
POST ? 0.041 ** 0.045 *
[2.35] [1.93]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.015 0.003
[-0.78] [0.10]   
MF_SURP + 5.325 *** 3.725 ***
[2.69] [2.45]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? -1.015 -0.499
[-0.73] [-0.39]   
POST × MF_SURP + 1.856 3.272 ***
[1.10] [3.58]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - -0.281 -1.597
[-0.12] [-0.74]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP - -2.423 *                
[-1.56]                
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| - -40.073 * -35.027 *
[-1.34] [-1.52]   
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP - -1.173                
[-0.82]                
HiMF_WIDTH × MF_SURP - 2.262 **                
[2.16]                
HiMVE × MF_SURP - -1.258                
[-1.09]                
Constant ? -0.03 ** -0.03
[-2.28] [-1.59]   
N 667 219












TABLE D.4 - Continued 
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Panel B: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? -0.003 -0.036
[-0.17] [-1.28]   
POST ? 0.028 0.024
[1.51] [0.87]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.012 0.034
[-0.57] [1.00]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS + 0.510 0.330
[0.14] [0.18]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 6.216 *** 0.348
[2.64] [0.07]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 7.269 * 9.385 ***
[1.84] [2.98]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -2.256 -1.053
[-1.49] [-0.26]   
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + 17.312 *** 13.523 *
[2.40] [1.55]   
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + 1.452 0.372
[0.79] [0.20]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -12.398 ** -16.000 **
[-1.82] [-1.96]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -1.154 2.486
[-0.50] [0.62]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -5.247 ** -3.941 *
[-2.14] [-1.44]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -0.245 3.435
[-0.16] [1.16]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS × |MF_SURP| - 65.713                
[0.83]                
MF_SURP_BNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -40.917 *                
[-1.40]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -17.075 ***                
[-3.19]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -1.434                
[-0.88]                
HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -8.249 *** -5.058 ***
[-2.63] [-3.23]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.484 1.380














EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 3.357
[1.27]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -1.750
[-0.90]   
Constant ? -0.020 -0.025
[-1.37] [-1.17]   
N 667 219
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.171
df_m 19 17
df_r 230 78
    This table reports the results of the analysis of H1 using the constant samples (table 4.4), excluding the 
stand-alone control variables. Only the MF_SURP-  (MF_SURP_GNEWS-  and MF_SURP_BNEWS-) 
interacted control variables are included. Panel A reports the regression results, where the management 
forecast response coefficient is not conditioned on the sign of the management forecast surprise 
(MF_SURP ). Panel B reports the regression results, where the management forecast response coefficient is 
conditioned on the sign of MF_SURP . The dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return 
around the management forecast, MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT  is an indicator variable that equals one for firms that 
use derivatives in the latest pre-period, and zero otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable that equals one 
for post-SFAS 133 periods, and zero otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on the one-tailed tests for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests 
otherwise. All t-statistics, in brackets, are estimated using firm-level clustering and heteroscedasticity-











The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
- One Control at a Time (H1) 
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Variable
TREAT -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.007
[-0.95] [-0.70] [-0.68] [-0.73] [-0.42] [-0.05] [0.26] [0.13] [0.14] [0.46]
POST 0.032 *** 0.030 *** 0.031 *** 0.034 *** 0.031 *** 0.037 ** 0.037 ** 0.039 ** 0.039 ** 0.036 **
[2.92] [2.76] [2.91] [3.12] [2.85] [2.10] [2.16] [2.32] [2.28] [2.07]
TREAT × POST -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.009
[-0.12] [-0.17] [-0.16] [-0.16] [-0.19] [-0.43] [-0.57] [-0.61] [-0.40] [-0.48]
MF_SURP 2.647 ** 4.355 *** 1.778 ** 0.883 1.807 ** 5.592 *** 5.972 *** 3.421 *** 2.742 ** 3.427 ***
[1.76] [3.56] [1.85] [0.98] [1.88] [3.08] [4.05] [2.61] [1.66] [2.62]
TREAT × MF_SURP -0.484 -0.452 -0.136 -0.287 0.459 -2.502 * -1.909 -1.521 -1.649 -1.158
[-0.40] [-0.51] [-0.12] [-0.29] [0.34] [-1.71] [-1.59] [-1.02] [-1.09] [-0.71]
POST × MF_SURP 0.593 1.203 1.021 0.438 0.700 0.065 0.882 2.272 * -0.154 -0.245
[0.60] [1.28] [1.15] [0.51] [0.74] [0.04] [0.50] [1.34] [-0.10] [-0.16]
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP 2.604 * 1.081 2.082 * 2.636 ** 2.325 * 2.904 * 1.231 0.463 3.232 * 3.172 *
[1.60] [0.66] [1.38] [1.72] [1.53] [1.45] [0.51] [0.21] [1.61] [1.61]
[Var] -0.016 ** 0.006 -0.012 * -0.005 -0.017 ** -0.001 -0.014 * -0.008
[-2.51] [0.27] [-1.71] [-0.73] [-2.29] [-0.03] [-1.78] [-0.99]
[Var] × MF_SURP -1.070 -48.331 *** -0.718 1.300 ** -1.323 -2.602 *** -52.013 ** -3.085 *** 0.498 -1.397
[-1.07] [-2.64] [-0.62] [1.74] [-1.24] [-1.98] [-2.42] [-3.35] [0.46] [-1.23]
Constant -0.012 -0.019 ** -0.021 ** -0.016 ** -0.019 ** -0.019 -0.028 ** -0.028 ** -0.024 * -0.027 **
[-1.32] [-2.25] [-2.44] [-2.03] [-2.28] [-1.36] [-2.19] [-2.17] [-1.93] [-2.12]
N 828 828 828 828 828 667 667 667 667 667
adj. R-sq 0.138 0.149 0.131 0.14 0.134 0.158 0.157 0.151 0.144 0.143
df_m 9 8 9 9 9 9 8 9 9 9
df_r 283 283 283 283 283 230 230 230 230 230














TABLE D.5 - Continued 
Continued on next page 
Variable
TREAT -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.013 -0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.008
[-0.74] [-0.73] [-0.36] [-1.05] [-0.31] [-0.08] [0.19] [-0.52]
POST 0.029 ** 0.034 *** 0.024 * 0.032 ** 0.033 * 0.042 ** 0.028 0.037 **
[2.29] [2.81] [1.90] [2.54] [1.86] [2.43] [1.50] [2.09]
TREAT × POST -0.009 -0.016 -0.004 -0.011 -0.016 -0.025 -0.010 -0.017
[-0.62] [-1.08] [-0.28] [-0.72] [-0.82] [-1.33] [-0.50] [-0.86]
MF_SURP_GNEWS 3.389 5.113 * 3.126 3.332 1.405 3.614 * 1.828 1.591
[0.83] [1.63] [0.85] [0.89] [0.51] [1.51] [0.68] [0.64]
MF_SURP_BNEWS 1.798 4.242 *** 1.680 * 1.621 * 5.582 *** 6.668 *** 3.635 ** 3.610 ***
[1.13] [3.00] [1.64] [1.59] [2.74] [4.21] [2.42] [2.41]
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS 0.203 2.048 -1.745 5.292 2.333 2.775 -0.512 7.487 *
[0.05] [0.58] [-0.46] [1.14] [0.68] [1.00] [-0.18] [1.95]
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS -0.148 -0.393 -0.005 -0.442 -2.684 -2.252 * -1.583 -2.498
[-0.10] [-0.37] [-0.00] [-0.32] [-1.57] [-1.67] [-0.89] [-1.41]
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS 3.825 -0.669 5.606 0.048 5.128 -0.590 14.378 ** -0.346
[0.70] [-0.17] [1.23] [0.01] [0.95] [-0.16] [2.30] [-0.07]
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS 0.695 1.315 * 0.704 0.771 -0.413 0.918 1.443 -0.311
[0.66] [1.49] [0.75] [0.82] [-0.26] [0.59] [0.81] [-0.20]
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS 3.574 5.162 0.698 3.165 2.109 5.178 -8.260 3.248
[0.60] [0.99] [0.12] [0.57] [0.37] [1.01] [-1.16] [0.65]
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS 0.653 -0.913 0.668 0.621 1.417 -0.730 -0.409 1.729
[0.42] [-0.64] [0.45] [0.40] [0.71] [-0.34] [-0.18] [0.87]
[Var] -0.009 0.051 *** 0.013 * -0.012 * 0.062 ** 0.011
[-1.39] [2.77] [1.66] [-1.65] [2.50] [1.37]
[Var] × MF_SURP_GNEWS -4.881 ** -126.198 *** -13.336 *** -8.216 *** -5.342 ** -110.819 ** -20.860 *** -8.743 ***
[-1.78] [-2.59] [-5.19] [-2.67] [-1.83] [-2.13] [-3.84] [-2.69]
[Var] × MF_SURP_BNEWS -0.144 -45.671 ** 0.365 0.635 -1.953 * -56.419 *** -1.641 ** 0.697
[-0.15] [-2.21] [0.31] [0.48] [-1.36] [-2.52] [-1.75] [0.49]
Constant -0.015 -0.019 ** -0.023 ** -0.025 ** -0.015 -0.023 * -0.028 * -0.028 *
[-1.53] [-1.97] [-2.37] [-2.57] [-1.04] [-1.68] [-1.94] [-1.95]











TABLE D.5 - Continued 
Variable
N 828 828 828 828 667 667 667 667
adj. R-sq 0.156 0.161 0.147 0.162 0.176 0.172 0.168 0.178
df_m 14 13 14 14 14 13 14 14
df_r 283 283 283 283 230 230 230 230
    This table reports the results of the analysis of H1 using the full unmatched sample (table 3.1, panel B) and the constant derivative unmatched sample (table 4.4, panel A), including one 
control variable, and its interaction(s) with MF_SURP  (MF_SURP_GNEWS  and MF_SURP_BNEWS ), at a time. Panel A reports the regression results, where the management forecast 
response coefficient is not conditioned on the sign of the management forecast surprise (MF_SURP ). Panels B reports the regression results, where the management forecast response 
coefficient is conditioned on the sign of MF_SURP . The dependent variable is the two-day cumulative abnormal return around the management forecast, MF_CAR 0,1 . TREAT  is an 
indicator variable that equals one for firms that use derivatives in the latest pre-period, and zero otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable that equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and 
zero otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on the one-tailed tests for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests 
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The Effect of Exposure to Fair Value Accounting on the Credibility of Management Forecasts 
- Three-day MF_CAR (H1) 
Continued on next page 
Panel A: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Not Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? 0.004 -0.025
[0.23] [-1.03]   
POST ? 0.047 ** 0.044 *
[2.55] [1.80]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.017 0.002
[-0.85] [0.06]   
MF_SURP + 5.618 ** 1.645
[2.17] [1.00]   
TREAT × MF_SURP ? -0.806 0.741
[-0.41] [0.51]   
POST × MF_SURP + 2.542 5.203 ***
[1.11] [3.95]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP - -1.124 -4.360 **
[-0.42] [-1.98]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.012                 
[-1.56]                 
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP - -3.910 **                 
[-2.23]                 
MF_SURP × |MF_SURP| - -24.580 -1.501
[-0.60] [-0.05]   
MF_LOSS ? 0.012                 
[0.31]                 
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP - -0.644                 
[-0.29]                 
HiMF_WIDTH ? -0.008                 
[-0.99]                 
HiMF_WIDTH × MF_SURP - 2.378 **                 
[1.94]                 
HiMVE ? -0.007                 
[-0.88]                 
HiMVE × MF_SURP - -1.514                 
[-1.18]                 
Constant -0.019 -0.024
[-1.17] [-1.15]   
N 667 219













TABLE D.6 - Continued 
 Continued on next page 
  
Panel B: Management Forecast Response Coefficient, Conditioned on Sign of MF_SURP
Predicted
Variable Sign
TREAT ? -0.008 -0.042
[-0.44] [-1.35]   
POST ? 0.028 0.022
[1.56] [0.84]   
TREAT × POST ? -0.010 0.036
[-0.53] [1.06]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS + 1.293 -0.147
[0.34] [-0.08]   
MF_SURP_BNEWS + 7.456 ** 2.384
[2.27] [0.48]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 7.943 * 9.474 **
[1.81] [2.14]   
TREAT × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -2.483 -3.171
[-1.20] [-0.78]   
POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS + 22.590 *** 17.156 **
[2.72] [1.72]   
POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS + 1.122 1.125
[0.46] [0.57]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -18.126 ** -22.740 **
[-2.29] [-2.30]   
TREAT × POST × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -1.180 1.870
[-0.44] [0.46]   
HiOCFVOL ? -0.009 0.000
[-1.15] [0.01]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -5.042 ** -3.084
[-1.82] [-0.75]   
HiOCFVOL × MF_SURP_BNEWS - -2.330 3.200
[-1.17] [0.97]   
MF_SURP_GNEWS × |MF_SURP| - 36.791                
[0.43]                
MF_SURP_BNEWS × |MF_SURP| - -29.195                
[-0.67]                
MF_LOSS ? 0.114 ***                
[2.60]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -25.924 ***                
[-4.27]                
MF_LOSS × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 1.464                
[0.57]                
HiMVE ? 0.011 0.014














HiMVE × MF_SURP_GNEWS - -8.169 ** -5.661 ***
[-2.18] [-4.18]   
HiMVE × MF_SURP_BNEWS - 0.201 4.796
[0.12] [1.24]   
EA_CONCUR ? -0.005
[-0.34]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_GNEWS ? 5.900 ***
[2.67]   
EA_CONCUR × MF_SURP_BNEWS ? -3.823 *
[-1.91]   
Constant ? -0.021 -0.022
[-1.23] [-0.87]   
N 667 219






    This table reports the results of the additional analysis of H1, using the constant derivative samples (table 4.4). 
Panel A reports the regression results, where the management forecast response coefficient is not conditioned on the 
sign of the management forecast surprise (MF_SURP ). Panels B reports the regression results, where the management 
forecast response coefficient is conditioned on the sign of MF_SURP . The dependent variable is the three -day 
cumulative abnormal return around the management forecast, MF_CAR -1,1 . TREAT  is an indicator variable that equals 
one for firms that use derivatives in the latest pre-period, and zero otherwise. POST  is an indicator variable that 
equals one for post-SFAS 133 periods, and zero otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, 10% levels, respectively, based on the one-tailed tests for signed predictions and the two-tailed tests otherwise. 
All t-statistics, in brackets, are estimated using firm-level clustering and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 








Null Distributions of ΔIPT and DID_IPT 
In this appendix, I present the null distributions of the portfolio-level ΔIPT and DID_IPT, 
corresponding to the tests of H2 in section 4.3. Table E.1 presents the null distributions for the 
test of H2 using the full samples in table 4.18.  Table E.2 presents the null distributions for the 
test of H2 using the constant derivative samples in table 4.20. Finally, table E.3 presents the null 





Null Distribution of IPT (H2) 
 Continued on next page 
  
Panel A: Unmatched Sample
Sample/Subsample Statistic N mean sd min p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.414 1.002 -2.299 -1.801 -1.304 -0.952 -0.320 0.472 1.143 1.719 2.021 2.423 3.167
ΔIPT(treat) 1000 0.462 0.775 -1.662 -1.216 -0.767 -0.563 -0.099 0.467 0.989 1.488 1.743 2.180 3.072
DiD_IPT 1000 0.048 0.540 -1.467 -1.108 -0.793 -0.637 -0.348 0.025 0.420 0.789 0.950 1.312 1.517
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.681 1.197 -2.535 -1.899 -1.330 -0.888 -0.214 0.737 1.532 2.239 2.601 3.287 4.151
ΔIPT(treat) 1000 0.704 1.045 -1.767 -1.272 -0.932 -0.638 -0.060 0.640 1.431 2.075 2.523 3.154 3.781
DiD_IPT 1000 0.023 1.153 -2.936 -2.344 -1.898 -1.431 -0.833 0.004 0.794 1.581 2.008 2.618 3.466
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.367 1.112 -2.512 -1.966 -1.430 -1.080 -0.489 0.382 1.263 1.838 2.129 2.494 2.867
ΔIPT(treat) 1000 0.301 1.611 -3.612 -2.968 -2.299 -1.823 -0.968 0.327 1.532 2.445 2.857 3.697 4.211
DiD_IPT 1000 -0.066 0.811 -2.076 -1.781 -1.346 -1.151 -0.665 -0.054 0.532 0.987 1.271 1.726 2.191
Panel B: Matched Sample
Sample/Subsample Statistic N mean sd min p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.439 1.261 -2.739 -2.323 -1.726 -1.219 -0.449 0.436 1.360 2.081 2.535 3.289 3.967
ΔIPT(treat) 1000 0.454 1.016 -2.054 -1.760 -1.220 -0.908 -0.303 0.448 1.195 1.775 2.095 2.750 3.231
DiD_IPT 1000 0.015 0.679 -2.010 -1.579 -1.137 -0.882 -0.454 0.034 0.508 0.908 1.093 1.411 1.835
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.650 1.372 -3.123 -2.108 -1.458 -1.077 -0.384 0.584 1.643 2.497 2.943 3.802 4.812
ΔIPT(treat) 1000 0.650 1.473 -3.023 -2.491 -1.810 -1.285 -0.403 0.647 1.695 2.583 3.041 4.003 5.336
DiD_IPT 1000 0.000 1.026 -3.045 -2.309 -1.748 -1.392 -0.695 0.030 0.744 1.328 1.628 2.208 2.706
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.223 1.457 -3.229 -2.686 -2.137 -1.725 -0.878 0.171 1.293 2.236 2.641 3.106 3.785
ΔIPT(treat) 1000 0.276 1.350 -2.855 -2.348 -1.820 -1.481 -0.781 0.208 1.308 2.111 2.459 3.155 3.573














TABLE E.1 - Continued 
   
  
  This table presents the null distributions of the portfolio-level ΔIPT  and DID_IPT  created under the null hypothesis that the order of the monthly 
returns does not matter. Panels A and B present the distributions for the unmatched and matched H2 samples (table 3.4, panel B), respectively, and 
correspond to the results in table 4.18. The matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (28 cutpoints), MVE  (8 cutpoints), Fama-French 12 
industry classifications and the sign of intraperiod return. Treatment firms include derivative users and control firms include derivative non-users, 
identified in the pre-SFAS 133 period. The pre-period includes fiscal years ending June 1999 to May 2000 and the post-period includes fiscal years 
ending June 2001 to May 2002, to correspond with the effective date of SFAS 133. Positive (negative) intraperiod return subsamples include 
observations whose 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive (negative) in both the pre- and post-periods. ΔIPT(control) is the post-
period IPT minus the pre-period IPT, within the control group. ΔIPT(treat)  is the post-period IPT minus the pre-period IPT, within the treatment 





Null Distribution of IPT - Constant Derivative Sample (H2) 
 Continued on next page 
  
Panel A: Constant Derivative Unmatched Sample
Sample/Subsample Statistic N mean sd min p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.415 1.036 -2.597 -2.008 -1.347 -0.950 -0.306 0.430 1.157 1.804 2.070 2.639 3.075
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.481 0.798 -1.765 -1.335 -0.837 -0.555 -0.082 0.480 1.037 1.540 1.788 2.302 2.553
DiD 1000 0.067 0.538 -1.299 -1.066 -0.776 -0.621 -0.310 0.035 0.416 0.792 0.992 1.331 1.555
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.711 1.238 -2.672 -2.199 -1.392 -0.917 -0.137 0.748 1.587 2.360 2.688 3.358 3.779
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.751 1.072 -1.778 -1.423 -0.955 -0.674 -0.057 0.736 1.551 2.228 2.531 3.067 3.553
DiD 1000 0.040 1.167 -3.193 -2.322 -1.840 -1.488 -0.804 0.052 0.801 1.608 2.041 2.567 3.205
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.351 1.082 -2.433 -1.941 -1.341 -1.029 -0.504 0.327 1.173 1.784 2.196 2.668 3.084
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.272 1.667 -3.819 -3.185 -2.428 -1.868 -1.028 0.291 1.509 2.459 2.950 3.898 4.366
DiD 1000 -0.079 0.906 -2.699 -1.998 -1.581 -1.255 -0.722 -0.084 0.566 1.126 1.416 1.954 2.381
Panel B: Constant Derivative Matched Sample
Sample/Subsample Statistic N mean sd min p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.423 1.357 -3.240 -2.641 -1.724 -1.333 -0.594 0.428 1.420 2.160 2.573 3.516 4.217
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.482 1.016 -1.966 -1.712 -1.174 -0.836 -0.237 0.467 1.194 1.801 2.170 2.929 3.768
DiD 1000 0.058 1.039 -2.994 -2.324 -1.654 -1.257 -0.680 0.091 0.779 1.451 1.808 2.265 2.874
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.604 1.457 -3.179 -2.733 -1.775 -1.299 -0.410 0.595 1.641 2.396 2.945 3.984 5.127
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.672 1.416 -2.697 -2.240 -1.634 -1.175 -0.333 0.650 1.671 2.582 2.992 3.987 5.045
DiD 1000 0.068 1.366 -3.694 -3.008 -2.175 -1.723 -0.906 0.041 1.045 1.795 2.412 3.130 3.797
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.308 1.485 -3.571 -2.784 -2.119 -1.585 -0.785 0.312 1.413 2.350 2.762 3.369 3.973
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.255 1.482 -3.543 -3.156 -2.083 -1.684 -0.802 0.257 1.327 2.170 2.708 3.445 4.425














TABLE E.2 - Continued 
  
  This table presents the null distributions of the portfolio-level ΔIPT  and DID_IPT  created under the null hypothesis that the order of the monthly 
returns does not matter. Panels A and B present the distributions for the constant derivative unmatched and matched H2 samples (table 4.19), 
respectively and correspond to the results in table 4.20.  The constant derivative samples exclude any firm-years whose derivative use (non-use) in 
the post-period is inconsistent with classification in the pre-period. The matched sample is identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (26 cutpoints), MVE 
(10 cutpoints), Fama-French 12 industry classifications and the sign of intraperiod return, within the constant derivative unmatched sample. Treatment 
firms include derivative users and control firms include derivative non-users, identified in the pre-SFAS 133 period. The pre-period includes fiscal 
years ending June 1999 to May 2000 and the post-period includes fiscal years ending June 2001 to May 2002, to correspond with the effective date of 
SFAS 133. Positive (negative) intraperiod return subsamples include observations whose 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive 
(negative) in both the pre- and post-periods. ΔIPT(control)  is the post-period IPT  minus the pre-period IPT , within the control group. ΔIPT(treat)  is 
the post-period IPT  minus the pre-period IPT , within the treatment group. DiD_IPT  is equal to ΔIPT(treat) minus ΔIPT(control). All variables are 





Null Distribution of IPT - Alternative Matched Samples (H2) 
 Continued on next page 
  
Panel A: Constant Derivative OCFVOL -Matched Sample
Sample/Subsample Statistic N mean sd min p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.348 1.078 -2.612 -1.977 -1.421 -1.108 -0.418 0.393 1.110 1.759 2.074 2.665 3.342
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.455 0.974 -2.023 -1.702 -1.185 -0.811 -0.230 0.452 1.155 1.751 2.071 2.518 3.247
DiD 1000 0.107 0.476 -1.305 -0.952 -0.691 -0.511 -0.242 0.115 0.456 0.737 0.880 1.115 1.361
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.573 1.153 -2.652 -1.940 -1.300 -0.955 -0.259 0.632 1.387 2.061 2.454 3.198 4.106
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.698 1.143 -2.052 -1.584 -1.142 -0.834 -0.145 0.671 1.522 2.238 2.551 3.373 3.861
DiD 1000 0.125 0.828 -2.362 -1.724 -1.200 -0.930 -0.474 0.132 0.724 1.158 1.501 1.937 2.421
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.300 1.431 -3.334 -2.739 -1.971 -1.551 -0.753 0.255 1.399 2.192 2.601 3.355 3.788
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.172 1.581 -3.742 -3.120 -2.349 -1.892 -1.065 0.125 1.399 2.327 2.754 3.390 3.950
DiD 1000 -0.128 0.732 -2.148 -1.844 -1.385 -1.110 -0.641 -0.100 0.369 0.833 1.057 1.429 1.642
Panel B: Constant Derivative MVE -Matched Sample
Sample/Subsample Statistic N mean sd min p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.446 1.213 -2.496 -2.154 -1.593 -1.042 -0.387 0.372 1.322 2.088 2.517 3.131 3.551
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.466 0.905 -1.893 -1.573 -0.957 -0.677 -0.185 0.414 1.049 1.732 2.081 2.568 3.106
DiD 1000 0.019 0.76 -2.124 -1.759 -1.213 -0.974 -0.505 0.012 0.556 1.008 1.258 1.657 1.951
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.646 1.458 -2.76 -2.382 -1.722 -1.148 -0.336 0.502 1.707 2.659 3.162 4.046 4.757
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.714 1.234 -2.334 -1.812 -1.167 -0.773 -0.213 0.658 1.521 2.389 2.876 3.848 4.731
DiD 1000 0.069 1.139 -3.235 -2.521 -1.833 -1.407 -0.712 0.065 0.894 1.542 1.957 2.524 3.116
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.233 1.193 -2.823 -2.239 -1.661 -1.29 -0.661 0.168 1.186 1.858 2.209 2.726 3.121
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.269 1.37 -2.981 -2.525 -1.928 -1.49 -0.787 0.202 1.298 2.176 2.612 3.202 3.838


















Panel C: Constant Derivative OCFVOL -ANALYSTS_N -Matched Sample
Sample/Subsample Statistic N mean sd min p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.444 1.071 -2.314 -1.857 -1.236 -0.971 -0.381 0.455 1.249 1.865 2.167 2.759 3.235
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.458 0.840 -1.846 -1.374 -0.946 -0.657 -0.138 0.455 1.051 1.574 1.842 2.356 2.794
DiD 1000 0.014 0.728 -2.076 -1.592 -1.167 -0.949 -0.519 0.028 0.547 0.958 1.211 1.577 1.788
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.632 1.119 -2.193 -1.804 -1.134 -0.819 -0.179 0.609 1.446 2.097 2.566 3.115 3.724
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.673 1.096 -2.207 -1.599 -1.030 -0.694 -0.115 0.561 1.412 2.179 2.659 3.245 4.037
DiD 1000 0.041 0.964 -2.769 -2.088 -1.493 -1.214 -0.644 0.007 0.767 1.320 1.694 2.109 2.697
ΔIPT(control) 1000 0.216 1.551 -3.862 -2.987 -2.272 -1.799 -0.972 0.238 1.332 2.387 2.748 3.471 4.259
ΔIPT(treatment) 1000 0.227 1.579 -4.219 -3.235 -2.315 -1.756 -0.949 0.205 1.408 2.339 2.761 3.513 4.355
DiD 1000 0.011 0.680 -1.939 -1.520 -1.113 -0.883 -0.489 0.026 0.488 0.907 1.140 1.453 1.652
  This table presents the null distributions of the portfolio-level ΔIPT  and DID_IPT  created under the null hypothesis that the order of the monthly 
returns does not matter. Panels A, B and C present the distributions for the constant derivative OCFVOL -matched, MVE -matched, and ANALYSTS_N-
MVE- matched H2 samples, respectively and correspond to the results in table 4.21.  The constant derivative samples exclude any firm-years whose 
derivative use (non-use) in the post-period is inconsistent with classification in the pre-period. The constant derivative OCFVOL -matched sample is 
identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (44 cutpoints), Fama-French 12 industry classifications and the sign of intraperiod return, within the constant 
derivative unmatched sample. The constant derivative MVE -matched sample is identified using CEM on MVE  (10 cutpoints), Fama-French 12 
industry classifications and the sign of intraperiod return, within the constant derivative unmatched sample. The constant derivative OCFVOL-
ANALYSTS_N -matched is identified using CEM on OCFVOL  (33 cutpoints), ANALYSTS_N (5 cutpoints), Fama-French 12 industry classifications 
and the sign of intraperiod return, within the constant derivative unmatched sample. Treatment firms include derivative users and control firms 
include derivative non-users, identified in the pre-SFAS 133 period. The pre-period includes fiscal years ending June 1999 to May 2000 and the 
post-period includes fiscal years ending June 2001 to May 2002, to correspond with the effective date of SFAS 133. Positive (negative) intraperiod 
return subsamples include observations whose 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive (negative) in both the pre- and post-periods. 
ΔIPT(control)  is the post-period IPT  minus the pre-period IPT , within the control group. ΔIPT(treat)  is the post-period IPT  minus the pre-period 
IPT,  within the treatment group. DiD_IPT  is equal to ΔIPT(treat) minus ΔIPT(control). All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Combined
Positive 
intraperiod return
Negative 
intraperiod return
